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Collaborative Governance Under the Endangered 
Species Act: An Empirical Analysis of Protective 
Regulations 
Robert L. Fischman,† Vicky J. Meretsky†† & Matthew P. Castelli††† 
Recent conservation and administrative law scholarship emphasizes the 
need for potential legal adversaries to work together. Stakeholders and 
regulators can pool their political capital, money, property, expertise, and legal 
leverage to achieve more than could be accomplished through mere mechanical 
implementation of statutory commands. Most commentators associate 
collaboration with programs promoting fuzzy objectives to engage the public and 
advisory groups. 
The Endangered Species Act (ESA) is a polarizing statute that imposes 
seemingly uncompromising mandates. But this Article demonstrates that the 
ESA actually provides rich opportunities for collaborative governance. In 
exploring this underappreciated success story, we document how conservation 
collaboration adapts otherwise strict, generic prohibitions to the recovery needs 
of individual species on the brink of extinction. We identify conditions under 
which collaboration arises. 
This Article examines the nearly two hundred ESA protective regulations 
that tailor federal restrictions to the ecological and social circumstances of 
particular extinction threats. Our original empirical study explores how the rules 
manifest collaborative governance, as well as the extent to which they foster 
imperiled species recovery. We focus on provisions in which parties agree to 
constrain activities in exchange for limited statutory liability. Almost three-
quarters of the protective regulations substitute practice-based limitations for 
difficult-to-detect, proximate-effect prohibitions. 
Our results show that collaborative governance transforms the ESA from a 
statute prohibiting certain outcomes (such as harm or jeopardy to a species) to a 
regulatory program implementing collaboratively crafted best practices, along 
the lines of pollution-control statutes. Paradoxically, this shift may improve the 
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prospect for species recovery, even with regulations that are less stringent than 
the standard statutory prohibitions. This insight allows us to recommend 
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Introduction 
Mollie Beattie, the former director of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service (FWS), the principal federal agency responsible for implementing 
the Endangered Species Act, stated that “[w]hat a country chooses to save 
is what a country chooses to say about itself.”1 The Endangered Species 
Act (ESA)2 is both revered as a moral commitment to restraint3 and reviled 
as a pit bull, oblivious to the plight of landowners facing dramatic economic 
losses through no fault of their own.4 These divergent views polarize ESA 
policy debates, seeming to leave scant room for compromise. The Act’s 
strict prohibitions appear inflexible, impeding collaboration between and 
among regulators and stakeholders.5 
Yet, contrary to this conventional wisdom, our research shows that 
the ESA embraces conservation collaborations. We document our 
surprising findings and demonstrate how agencies can spur better-tailored 
solutions to the extinction crisis. While it is surely true that what a country 
chooses to save makes an important statement, how the United States 
chooses to achieve legislative goals reveals much about its ability to 
sustainably govern. 
The ESA literature makes productive use of case studies, but it lacks 
a comprehensive evaluation of existing rules. This study generates new 
data and offers a complete analysis. It also contributes to the collaborative 
governance debate, which lacks “rigorous, empirical scrutiny of emerging” 
approaches.6 Our research explores the incentives for collaborative 
conservation and the extent to which special rules promote imperiled 
species recovery. We focus on emerging approaches that convert the 
effects-based ESA prohibition on harm to individual animals into best 
practices that immunize activities from liability. Our analysis offers 
practical lessons for improving these approaches to achieve more effective 
wildlife conservation. 
 
1. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., A Look Back: Mollie Beattie, NAT’L WILDLIFE REFUGE 
SYS. (Oct. 15, 2015), https://www.fws.gov/refuges/about/conservationheroes/Mollie% 
20Beattie_07182012.html [https://perma.cc/WXX7-9LKR]. 
2. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-41 (2018). 
3. See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 187, 194 (1978) (noting that the ESA’s provisions 
amount to a policy of “institutionalized caution” confining cost-benefit balancing to the margins 
of decisions in order to prevent the “incalculable” loss of species). 
4. See Karl Gleaves, Michele Kuruc & Patricia Montanio, The Meaning of “Species” 
Under the Endangered Species Act, 13 PUB. LAND L. REV. 25, 25 (1992); Steven P. Quarles & 
Thomas R. Lundquist, The Pronounced Presence and Insistent Issues of the ESA, 16 NAT. 
RESOURCES & ENV’T. 59 (2001). 
5. See STEVEN L. YAFFEE, PROHIBITIVE POLICY: IMPLEMENTING THE FEDERAL 
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (1982). 
6. Cameron Holley, Removing the Thorn from New Governance’s Side: Examining the 
Emergence of Collaboration in Practice and the Roles for Law, Nested Institutions, and Trust, 40 
ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS (ELI) 10,656, 10,660 (2010). 
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“Collaborative governance,” though an amorphous concept, enjoys 
bipartisan, multisector support as a path to finding common ground and 
win-win solutions in regulation.7 The collaborative governance literature 
sometimes considers the term a policy goal and other times a means of 
achieving specific objectives.8 The related concept of “new governance,” 
which emphasizes “the role of non-state actors in influencing behavior 
against a backdrop of the state,” has deep roots in regulatory practice.9 The 
origins of collaborative governance trace from the Federalist Papers 
through the enormous literature on cooperative federalism and polycentric 
public administration.10 Collaborative governance tempers the substance-
neutral, free-for-all of pluralism, the dominant lens through which scholars 
have defended regulatory law’s legitimacy in the past half-century.11 
Collaboration is not merely the darling of governance theory. This 
Article reveals how collaboration offers pragmatic, proven avenues to 
 
7. See Kirk Emerson, Tina Nabatchi & Stephen Balogh, An Integrative Framework of 
Collaborative Governance, 22 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 1, 1 (2012); see also MICHAEL L. 
ROSENZWEIG, WIN-WIN ECOLOGY (2003) (applying the win-win principle to conservation 
disputes); ROBERT WRIGHT, NONZERO: THE LOGIC OF HUMAN DESTINY (1999) (arguing that 
zero-sum, win-lose games are no longer common in complex social governance); Karen Bradshaw, 
Agency Engagement with Stakeholder Collaborations, in Wildfire Policy and Beyond, 51 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 437, 443 (2019) (describing the bipartisan nature of collaborative governance for public 
lands and natural resources, demonstrated by the fact that Presidents Clinton, Bush, Obama, and 
Trump have all issued orders directing agencies to collaborate); Kent Redford & M.A. Sanjayan, 
Retiring Cassandra, 17 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1473 (2003) (calling for collaborative 
compromise and criticizing conservation approaches employing strict, scientifically established 
minimum criteria for recovery). 
8. See Lisa Blomgren Amsler, Collaborative Governance: Integrating Management, 
Politics, and Law, 76 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 700, 702 (2016) (acknowledging the inconsistent and 
amorphous use of the term while proposing a framework that captures most uses of the term). 
9. Karen Bradshaw Schulz, New Governance and Industry Culture, 88 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 2515, 2515-16 (2013) (first citing Orly Lobel, The Paradox of Extralegal Activism: Critical 
Legal Consciousness and Transformative Politics, 120 HARV. L. REV. 937, 983 (2007); and then 
citing Bradley C. Karkkainen, “New Governance” in Legal Thought and in the World: Some 
Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471, 478 (2004)). 
10. See Lisa Blomgren Amsler & Rosemary O’Leary, Federalist No. 51: Is the Past 
Relevant to Today’s Collaborative Public Management?, 71 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 78 (2011) 
(focusing on how federalism and separation of powers impel different governing institutions to act 
cooperatively); Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources Law, 14 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 179 (2005) (describing cooperative federalism); Michael D. McGinnis & 
Elinor Ostrom, Reflections on Vincent Ostrom, Public Administration, and Polycentricity, 66 
PUB. ADMIN. REV. 15 (2012) (explaining polycentricity as the diffuse powers exercised by public 
and private institutions with overlapping responsibilities and capacities for action). 
11. Richard Stewart’s The Reformation of American Administrative Law provided the 
standard account of pluralism as the basis for administrative legitimacy via a “surrogate political 
process” to consider a wide range of stakeholder interests. 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1670 (1975). 
Critics view pluralism as providing little basis for normative judgments. See Sidney A. Shapiro, 
Law, Expertise and Rulemaking Legitimacy: Revisiting the Reformation, 49 ENVTL. L. 661 (2019) 
(arguing that administrative law promotes legitimacy through negotiating pluralism only if it 
preserves agency duty to apply its expertise in fulfilling congressional mandates); see also Peter 
M. Shane, Empowering the Collaborative Citizen in the Administrative State: A Case Study of 
the Federal Communications Commission, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 483 (2011) (analyzing FCC 
efforts to encourage better “participatory governance” through collaboration).  
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advance the aims of environmental law. If collaborative governance can 
work within the framework of the ESA, it can work for many other 
regulatory statutes. Besides serving as a rigorous test case for governance, 
the ESA also presents “wicked” conservation challenges.12 In light of 
climate change, rapidly disappearing habitat, and strong domestic property 
rights, environmental law desperately needs better tools. Our 
recommendations are not just aspirational inventions. They build on 
elements found in existing protective regulations that can be sharpened 
and adapted for broader use. 
Legal scholars observe that public administration increasingly 
employs collaborative governance, dispelling “the false dilemma between 
centralized regulation and deregulatory devolution.”13 Social scientists 
likewise study informal governance regimes arising from otherwise 
inflexible, uniform regulatory programs.14 Professor Karen Bradshaw finds 
hundreds of laws requiring stakeholder collaboration but laments that 
understanding how governance works is “virtually unstudied.”15 Our 
comprehensive, empirical study fills that gap. 
Most of the collaborative governance scholarship examines programs 
exhorting stakeholders to work together with few substantive mandates.16 
This Article makes the seemingly paradoxical claim that the dreaded ESA 
prompts collaborative governance and “voluntary” projects through 
binding protective regulations that reward people who go beyond what is 
required.17 Getting the incentives right is critically important, and the devil 
is in the details of each rulemaking. This study also shows that, along with 
collaborative successes, the program’s zeal for overcoming opposition to 
strict federal regulation invites special exceptions that may undermine 
species recovery. 
How does collaborative governance apply to endangered species 
conservation? The answer begins with the ESA’s disparate treatment of 
imperiled species. First, the Act places no limits on actions that harm 
 
12. J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in 
the Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CAL. L. REV. 59, 72 (2010) (describing 
the attributes of “wicked” problems). 
13. Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in 
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 343 (2004).  
14. See, e.g., Thomas Dietz, Elinor Ostrom& Paul Stern, The Struggle to Govern the 
Commons, 302 SCIENCE 1907 (2003); Carl Folke et al., Adaptive Governance of Social-Ecological 
Systems, 30 ANN. REV. ENVTL. RESOURCES 441 (2005). 
15. Bradshaw, supra note 7, at 441. The stakeholders she identifies in her study 
correspond closely to the ones with an interest in ESA § 4(d) rules: landowners, industrial land 
users, nongovernmental organizations, states, tribes, sportsmen, and conservationists. Id. at 445. 
16. See, e.g., id. at 454, 458-60. 
17. Hannah Gosnell et al., Transforming (Perceived) Rigidity in Environmental Law 
Through Adaptive Governance: A Case Study of Endangered Species Act Implementation, 22 
ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 42 (2017), show how the seemingly inflexible ESA consultation standard can 
prompt a transformative reorganization that revives conservation effectiveness.  
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species absent from the federal list promulgated through informal 
rulemaking. Collaborations that succeed in preventing listing will avoid 
direct regulation under the ESA.18 That is a classic “win-win” scenario. 
Second, protected species are listed in two separate categories.19 Strict 
prohibitions shield from harm the 500 “endangered” animals in the United 
States on the brink of disappearing.20 In contrast, “protective regulations” 
offer some flexibility in crafting prohibitions for the 220 “threatened” 
animals at risk of becoming endangered in the foreseeable future.21 
The protective regulations for threatened species bridge the all-or-
nothing distance between the strict prohibitions applicable to endangered 
species and the thousands of imperiled—but unprotected—species. When 
the regulations meet the statutory objective of advancing species 
recovery,22 they are paragons for the advocates who find greater potential 
in collaborative approaches than in one-size-fits-all, command-and-control 
models.23 Others find the regulations to constitute “lethal loopholes” that 
undermine the ESA’s conservation goal to recover species from the brink 
of extinction.24 
We find examples that support both views.25 Some regulations 
manifest collaborative tailoring that allows harm to individual animals in 
exchange for larger contributions to species recovery. Other rules reflect 
an accommodation approach, where the federal agency merely adopts 
 
18. See Robert L. Fischman et al., State Imperiled Species Legislation, 48 ENVTL. L. 81, 
88-89 (2018); see also Briefing on Improving the Endangered Species Act: Perspectives from the 
Fish and Wildlife Service and State Governors: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries, 
Water, and Wildlife of the S. Comm. on Env’t and Pub. Works, 114th Cong. 3-4 (2015) (statement 
of Sen. Jon Tester) (“Montana has leveraged Federal resources with its own funding in tools like 
the Candidate Conservation Agreements with private landowners to reduce areas of conflict and 
to find solutions with broad benefits, and that is how it should be. We should strengthen the State 
and Federal partnerships, and we also need to ensure that the intent of bedrock laws like the 
Endangered Species Act remains both a backstop and a catalyst for action.”). 
19. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532 (2018) (defining endangered and threatened species); id. § 1533 
(prescribing the standards for listing a species as either endangered or threatened). 
20. Id. § 1538(a); see U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Listed Species Summary (Boxscore), 
ENVTL. CONSERVATION ONLINE SYS., https://ecos.fws.gov/ecp/report/boxscore 
[https://perma.cc/KA3D-MVGC] (last visited Aug. 1, 2020) (compiling numbers of endangered 
and threatened animals protected through promulgated rules). 
21. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (commonly referred to as section “4(d)”). 
22. “Recovery,” or “conservation,” is the improvement in a listed species conservation 
status to the point at which it no longer needs the ESA’s protection to avoid extinction. See id. § 
1532 (defining the term). 
23. See, e.g., MICHAEL P. VANDENBERGH & JONATHAN M. GILLIGAN, BEYOND 
POLITICS: THE PRIVATE GOVERNANCE RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE (2018); Hearing on the 
Modernization of the Endangered Species Act Before the S. Comm. on Env’t. and Pub. Works, 
115th Cong. 224-26 (2017) (statement of Dave Freudenthal, Former Governor, State of 
Wyoming). 
24. Tanya Sanerib, Cynthia Elkins, & Noah Greenwald, LETHAL LOOPHOLES: HOW THE 
OBAMA ADMINISTRATION IS INCREASINGLY ALLOWING SPECIAL INTERESTS TO ENDANGER 
RARE WILDLIFE (2016).  
25. See infra Part III. 
 
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 38:976 2021 
982 
exceptions to prohibitions in order to placate stakeholders. Our 
recommendations explain how federal policy can build on the recovery-
enhancement approach. Biodiversity conservation is too important to 
allow expedient concessions to doom a program that otherwise holds 
potential to break the political logjam. Conservation is also too expensive 
for federal agencies to bear the entire cost of species recovery without 
enlisting private sector help. 
In collaborative governance, “economic efficiency and democratic 
legitimacy can be mutually reinforcing.”26 Improving the conservation 
status of imperiled animals so that they no longer face an imminent threat 
of disappearing forever is expensive. Congressional appropriation for ESA 
recovery supplies less than twenty-five percent of the funding needed to 
carry out recovery plans, which exist for only two-thirds of listed species.27 
The federal budget pushes most expenses onto other parties, especially 
states, businesses, and landowners. Collaborative governance can spread 
costs more widely and bolster local acceptance of conservation constraints. 
States, local jurisdictions, conservation groups, trade organizations, and 
ad-hoc assemblages of interested parties jointly implementing programs 
that they helped create may enlarge the pot of funding available to rescue 
species from extinction.28 Because habitat loss poses the greatest risk to 
listed species, even cash-poor parties may contribute significantly to 
collaborative conservation through changes in land-management practices 
or habitat restoration. 
Implemented properly, flexible protective regulations catalyze 
recovery better than seemingly more stringent restrictions that protect 
individual animals. Regulations can—but do not always—focus resources 
on the most efficient, high-priority tasks to conserve species. Many legal 
commentators “fail to appreciate the interaction between new tools like 
[collaboration] . . . and more familiar tools, like agency rulemaking and 
adjudication.”29 This Article explores those interactions and analyzes how 
collaboration arises in the shadow of statutory prohibitions. We show how 
agencies can employ collaboration to craft approaches to specific 
circumstances even under nationally mandated standards. 
Part I begins with a primer on the ESA framework to support the 
discussion of protective regulations that follows. Part II focuses on the 
 
26. Lobel, supra note 13, at 344. 
27. Leah R. Gerber, Conservation Triage or Injurious Neglect in Endangered Species 
Recovery, 113 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 3563, 3563, 3565 (2016) (providing statistics based on 2016 
data with 1,125 listed species).  
28. See, e.g., Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 2013: 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Interior, Env’t, and Related Agencies of the H. Comm. on 
Appropriations, 112th Cong. 86-92 (2012) (statement of M. Beetham, Director of Legislative 
Affairs, Defenders of Wildlife) (explaining that decreasing financial resources requires more 
effective work across jurisdictional boundaries). 
29. Karen Bradshaw, Agency Coordination of Private Action, 6 TEX. A&M L. REV. 229, 
231 (2018).  
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ESA conservation standard, which delimits administrative latitude to tailor 
protective regulations for threatened species. It explains how collaborative 
governance arises within the discretionary space of protective regulations 
as relational contracting or accommodative conservation. It connects these 
ideas to the tailored restrictions we identify in this study. Part III describes 
the method and results of our empirical analysis. It highlights where 
collaborative governance induces land-use planning and best practices 
otherwise out of reach of federal implementation. It also describes some of 
the shortcomings that may undermine conservation in the exceptions 
promulgated through protective regulations. Lastly, Part IV compiles 
lessons to be learned from our investigation. It builds upon the track record 
of tailored regulations and emphasizes opportunities for greater 
conservation collaboration. We also suggest avenues for future research to 
better understand how collaborative governance arises. New empirical 
studies should track over time the outcomes of the different collaborative 
governance tools uncovered in our comprehensive evaluation. 
I.  The ESA Conservation Framework 
The ESA does not protect any species, no matter how close to 
extinction it may be, unless the FWS or National Marine Fisheries Service 
(NMFS, also known as NOAA Fisheries) lists it through notice-and-
comment rulemaking.30 A fluke of agency reorganization under the Nixon 
Administration places different species under the aegis of two different 
agencies.31 While the ESA assigns responsibility for extinction prevention 
to “the Secretary,” the actual decisionmaker may be the Secretary of the 
Department of the Interior (who delegates responsibility to the FWS) or 
the Department of Commerce (who delegates responsibility to the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s NMFS).32 The vast 
majority of listed species are selected and protected by the FWS, but 
NMFS promulgates protective regulations for most threatened marine 
species, including fishes that travel between fresh and marine waters 
during their life cycle.33 We explore differences between the two Services 
in our data analysis. We employ the term “Secretary” or “Service” to refer 
to either.34 
 
30. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a) (2018). 
31. Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,627 (July 9, 1970), reprinted in 84 
Stat. 2090 (1970). 
32. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(15) (2018). 
33. Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,627. 
34. In rare situations, both Services share conservation duties for the same species. For 
instance, when imperiled sea turtles nest on the beach, they are protected by FWS regulations 
addressing beach habitat, shoreline armoring, and artificial lighting. But, when they enter their 
marine habitat, turtles are protected by NMFS regulations addressing incidental capture in fishing 
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The following Sections explain just enough about the ESA to 
understand protective regulations.35 First, we describe how the modern 
approach to biodiversity conservation emerged in the ESA. Second, we 
detail the ESA prohibitions that prevent certain actions resulting in harm, 
death, injury, and other effects to individual organisms. Third, we relate 
how incidental take permits became prominent tools to loosen the 
application of the otherwise strict prohibitions. The incidental take permit 
program offers contrasts to and lessons for protective regulations. 
A. The Evolution of the ESA 
The ESA conservation framework emerged from the failure of two 
previous statutes to stem the tide of extinctions. In 1966, Congress 
instructed the Interior Secretary to prevent domestic species extinctions 
but provided no new powers other than authorizing land acquisition for 
habitat protection.36 Earlier statutes sought to conserve particular types of 
animals, such as anadromous fish and migratory waterfowl.37 In contrast, 
the 1966 law mandated preservation of all animal species. Three years 
later, Congress authorized the Interior Secretary to list wildlife threatened 
by extinction and to restrict trade in those species.38 That list is the origin 
of the current ESA roster, which contains 1,275 endangered and 391 
threatened species at risk of extinction in the United States.39 
In 1973, Congress tossed the old playbook and created a new 
framework.40 It retained land acquisition authority for domestic species 
imperiled by habitat degradation and loss. But the ESA broke new ground 
 
gear and marine contamination. See Catherine M. McClellan et al., Conservation in a Complex 
Management Environment: The By-Catch of Sea Turtles in North Carolina’s Commercial 
Fisheries, 35 MARINE POL’Y 241 (2011). This administrative peculiarity has long delighted legal 
wags, especially after President Obama misidentified the jointly managed species as salmon rather 
than turtles. See Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in State of Union Address, WHITE 
HOUSE (Jan. 25, 2011), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2011/01/25/remarks-president-state-union-address [https://perma.cc/EE34-Q73F]; 
Elizabeth Shogren, Obama’s Salmon Quip: The Truth is Murky, NPR (Jan. 26, 2011, 3:00 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2011/01/26/133249608/The-Salmon-Bureaucracy-From-Egg-To-Table 
[https://perma.cc/X8PZ-UX3W].  
35. For comprehensive explanations of the entire ESA regulatory apparatus, see SAM 
KALEN & MURRAY FELDMAN, BASIC PRACTICE SERIES: ESA (ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT) (2d 
ed. 2012); ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: LAW, POLICY AND PERSPECTIVES (Donald C. Bauer & 
Ya-Wei Li eds., 3d ed. 2020). 
36. Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-669, 80 Stat. 926. 
37. See Anadromous Fish Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-304, 79 Stat. 1126 (codified at 16 
U.S.C. § 757(a)-(g) (2018)); Migratory Bird Conservation Act, ch. 257, 45 Stat. 1222, 1222-26 
(1928) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 715-715r (2018)). Anadromous fish are species that breed in 
freshwater but spend most of their lives feeding at sea. 
38. Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-135, 83 Stat. 275. 
39. See U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., supra note 20. When we use the term “species,” we 
mean the statutory definition, which includes subspecies and distinct population segments of 
animals. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16) (2018). 
40. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884. 
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in two key respects. First, section 9 established the first prohibitions against 
all activities (not just federal agency actions) that result in the “take” of an 
endangered animal species. It also prohibited activities centered around 
wildlife trafficking. But for threatened species, ESA section 4(d) allows the 
Services to promulgate special rules identifying what prohibitions, if any, 
apply. The Act defines “take” to include “harm,”41 which the Services 
interpret to encompass habitat alteration in certain circumstances.42 -
Otherwise legal, land-disturbing activity, including farming or 
construction, may result in an illegal take if its habitat alteration actually 
injures a listed animal. Because listed plants are not protected by the take 
prohibition, section 4(d) rules have not played a role in threatened plant 
conservation.43 The importance of 4(d) rules in collaborative conservation 
stems from their ability to tailor ESA take liability to specific situations 
rather than applying the more general prohibitions under section 9. 
Second, section 7 created new procedural and substantive duties for 
federal agencies. The ESA imposes an affirmative—but nonspecific—duty 
for agencies to use their legal authorities to implement species recovery 
programs.44 Because the ESA defines “conservation” to mean the use of 
any methods to improve a species’ status to the point at which ESA 
protections are no longer necessary, this duty is commonly called the 
conservation duty.45 Courts consistently hold that the conservation duty 
requires some action or reason why the agency has not acted. However, 
courts seldom rely on the conservation duty as the sole basis for 
overturning an agency’s decision.46 The ESA neglected either to identify a 
 
41. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2018). 
42. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2019) (FWS definition of harm); § 222.102 (NMFS definition of 
harm). 
43. Compare 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (2018) (providing general prohibitions for listed 
animals), with § 1538(a)(2) (specifying general prohibitions for listed plants). During the 
timeframe of our study, the FWS blanket rule automatically extended the section 9 endangered 
plant prohibitions to all threatened plants. The FWS promulgated no extant rules tailoring section 
9 prohibitions to listed plants. However, the FWS extends a blanket limit to the statutory 
application of endangered prohibitions for seeds of “cultivated origin” and for state agency 
employees or agents acting under the terms of a section 6 cooperative agreement who remove and 
reduce to possession plants from federal lands. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.71 (2019). After September 26, 
2019, the blanket rule no longer extends section 9 plant prohibitions to newly listed species. 
Therefore, the FWS has begun work to promulgate individual plant 4(d) rules. See, e.g., 
Endangered Species Status for Beardless Chichweed With Designation of Critical Habitat, and 
Threatened Species Status for Bartram’s Stonecrop With Section 4(d) Rule, 84 Fed. Reg. 67,060 
(proposed Dec. 6, 2019) (proposing 4(d) prohibitions for Batram’s stonecrop, a plant species from 
southern Arizona and northern Mexico). During the time period of our study, the NMFS list 
contained only one threatened plant, Johnson’s seagrass, but the NMFS did not promulgate any 
prohibitions under ESA section 4(d). See 50 C.F.R. § 226.213 (2019). 
44. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1) (2018). 
45. Id. § 1532(3). 
46. See J.B. Ruhl, Section 7(a)(1) of the “New” Endangered Species Act: Rediscovering 
and Redefining the Untapped Power of Federal Agencies’ Duty to Conserve Species, 25 ENVTL. 
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trigger for applying or specify a procedure for fulfilling the conservation 
duty. Courts rarely use the conservation duty to compel agencies to assist 
in species recovery.47 The overlapping, but separate and more specific, 
mandate to prepare recovery plans overshadows the conservation duty.48 
In other parts of the ESA, especially section 4(d), Congress more clearly 
established “conservation” as a substantive standard that limits agency 
discretion.49 
Section 7 also includes a far more prominent and effective mandate 
that employs the model of environmental impact analysis pioneered by the 
National Environmental Policy Act.50 Section 7 requires all agencies to 
engage in a “cooperation” procedure to “insure that any action authorized, 
funded, or carried out . . . is not likely to jeopardize the continued 
existence” of a listed species or result in the destruction or adverse 
modification of critical habitat.51 This requirement is called “consultation,” 
even though it entails not just the interagency procedure but also the 
substantive duty to avoid jeopardy and critical habitat impairment. The 
marriage of substance with procedure elevates the consultation duty to the 
most important component of the 1973 ESA in reshaping federal anti-
extinction efforts.52 Section 7 requires agencies considering discretionary 
actions to consult with the Service that listed a species potentially affected 
by the action.53 The Service then replies with a biological opinion stating 
whether jeopardy or adverse modification will likely result from the 
 
L. 1107 (1995) (describing how the duty to conserve may be used as a shield by an agency or as a 
sword by an agency’s critic). 
47. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Glickman, 156 F.3d 606 (5th Cir. 1998); Sierra Club v. Lujan, 
36 Env’t. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1533 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 1, 1993), appeal dismissed, 995 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 
1993). 
48. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f) (2018). The mandate to prepare recovery plans, however, does 
not compel federal agencies to actually comply with the plan’s provisions. See Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n 
v. Nat’l Park Serv., 669 F. Supp. 384 (D. Wyo. 1987) (holding that the National Park Service need 
not comply with the recovery plan’s recommendations for recovering the grizzly bear). 
49. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (2018). 
50. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2018). 
51. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2018). 
52. In an opinion that has come to typify the judicial response to the consultation 
mandate, the Ninth Circuit stated: 
[T]he strict substantive provisions of the ESA justify more stringent enforcement of 
its procedural requirements, because the procedural requirements are designed to 
ensure compliance with the substantive provisions. The ESA’s procedural 
requirements call for a systematic determination of the effects of a federal project on 
endangered species. If a project is allowed to proceed without substantial compliance 
with those procedural requirements, there can be no assurance that a violation of the 
ESA’s substantive provisions will not result. The latter, of course, is impermissible. 
Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 764 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978)) 
(rejecting the Forest Service’s contention that the procedural requirements of consultation should 
be enforced flexibly and loosely and requiring that the Forest Service prepare a biological 
assessment). 
53. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2018). 
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action.54 The Service’s expert opinion is not strictly binding, but in practice 
it exerts a “powerful coercive effect.”55 Even if the Service concludes that 
no jeopardy is likely, it must provide the agency contemplating action with 
an incidental take statement specifying the “impact of such incidental 
taking on the species,” any “reasonable and prudent measures that the 
[Service] considers necessary or appropriate to minimize such impact,” and 
“terms and conditions . . . that must be complied with by the Federal 
agency . . . to implement [those measures].”56 The incidental take 
statement operates as a kind of permit, authorizing the agency action 
notwithstanding any otherwise illegal takes.57 For instance, a property 
developer seeking a permit from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to fill 
a wetland need not obtain an incidental take permit if the Corps’ section 7 
consultation results in a biological opinion containing an incidental take 
statement. 
B. “Take” Prohibitions 
Like the conservation duty for federal agencies, the section 9 
prohibitions themselves are purely substantive. However, unlike the 
section 7 conservation duty, the prohibitions are not general, affirmative 
obligations. In other words, section 9 violations are easier to identify and 
enforce. Also, the section 9 prohibitions apply not only to federal agencies, 
but also to all “persons,” defined broadly to include individuals, 
corporations, and state or federal agencies.58 Many of the general 
prohibitions relate to commerce in listed species and their parts, including 
delivery, shipping, transportation, and import/export. 
For endangered animals only,59 the ESA proscribes “take,”60 defined 
as “harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, 
or to attempt to engage in any such conduct.”61 Of these terms, “harm” and 
“harass” are the broadest, encompassing incidental effects of activities 
 
54. Id. § 1536(b). 
55. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 169 (1997). 
56. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4) (2018). 
57. See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 170. The ESA requires an incidental take statement for 
taking incidental to the agency action, even if the incidental take is otherwise legal because it is 
not prohibited under a relevant 4(d) rule. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Salazar, 695 F.3d 893 
(9th Cir. 2012) (interpreting 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4)(B)). 
58. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(13) (2018). 
59. Apart from the commercial prohibitions, the ESA proscribes only actions that 
remove, cut, dig up, damage, or destroy an endangered plant in knowing violation of any state law 
or regulation or in the course of any violation of state criminal trespass law. § 1538(a)(2). On 
federal lands, however, it is unlawful to “remove and reduce to possession” or “maliciously 
damage or destroy” endangered plants. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(2) (2018). 
60. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (2018). 
61. Id. § 1532(19) (2018). Section 9 also imposes indirect liability on those who cause a 
take “to be committed.” Id. § 1538(g).  
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whose principal goal, such as logging or construction, is otherwise legal. 
Though the definition of “harass” is in certain respects broader,62 “harm” 
has become the pressure point limiting habitat disrupting activities. 
The Services define “harm” as “an act which actually kills or injures 
wildlife. . . include[ing] significant habitat modification or degradation 
where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential 
behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering.”63 The 
Supreme Court upheld this definition against a facial challenge.64 But 
lower courts continue to debate its precise meaning, as applied to 
particular situations.65 Nonetheless, it seems clear that harm may occur 
indirectly, through a foreseeable chain of causation.66 This creates a 
liability risk for a wide array of industries and landowners who disturb 
habitat in ways that will injure listed animals. 
For instance, logging in suitable habitat for the threatened marbled 
murrelet, in an area where many of the birds display nesting behavior, 
would likely cause prohibited harm to the bird (i.e., significant impairment 
of breeding behavior).67 The Ninth Circuit found that demonstrating past 
or present harm is not necessary for injunctive relief under the Act; 
imminent threat of future harm can be a basis for an order enjoining harm-
causing activity.68 On the other hand, the same court subsequently clarified 
that the “mere potential for harm” from cattle trampling desert fish habitat 
is insufficient without evidence that a take would occur.69 
Landowners seldom face a serious risk of prosecution for violating 
ESA prohibitions. But, the specter of enforcement—including citizen 
suits70—motivates collaborative governance by landowners and others 
whose businesses degrade habitat or otherwise impede species recovery.71 
 
62. Under 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2019), harassment, as compared to harm, includes omissions 
as well as acts, and requires only the likelihood of injury, not actual injury. See MICHAEL J. BEAN 
& MELANIE J. ROWLAND, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 234 (3d ed. 1997). For 
a history of the harm and harass definitions, see Steven G. Davison, Alteration of Wildlife Habitat 
as a Prohibited Taking Under the Endangered Species Act, 10 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 155 
(1995). 
63. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1999). The NMFS definition adds the terms “spawning,” “rearing,” 
and “migrating” to the list of essential behavioral patterns. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife 
and Plants; Definition of “Harm,” 64 Fed. Reg. 60727, 60731 (Nov. 8, 1999). 
64. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995). 
65. See, e.g., Palila v. Haw. Dep’t of Land & Nat. Res., 73 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (D. Haw. 
1999). 
66. Robert L. Fischman, The Divides of Environmental Law and the Problem of Harm 
in the Endangered Species Act, 83 IND. L.J. 661 (2008). 
67. Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 1996). 
68. Id. at 1064. 
69. Ariz. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 273 F.3d 1229, 1246 (9th 
Cir. 2001). 
70. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(g) (2018) (authorizing citizen suits). 
71. BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note 62, at 224 (noting that the federal government rarely 
prosecutes incidental takes). 
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Professor Steven Yaffee shows that successful conservation collaborations 
depend on “legal structures that establish management bottom lines” for 
conservation goals.72 In about half of the hundreds of conservation 
collaborations he studied, the ESA served as the “regulatory driver” of 
stakeholder cooperation.73 The stringent legal mandates create 
collaboration incentives to avoid more drastic outcomes (e.g., an 
endangered rather than a threatened listing).74 
C. Incidental Take Permits 
Although the prohibitions in section 9 and section 4(d) apply to 
everyone generally, there are exceptions. First, a biological opinion shields 
all covered activities from section 9 liability to the extent specified in the 
incidental take statement.75 Second, but rarely, certain subsistence 
activities by Alaska natives enjoy narrow exemptions.76 Third, the Services 
issue permits to allow takes incidental to legitimate scientific and 
conservation projects.77 Fourth, though the statute does not exempt takes 
stemming from actions protecting a human from bodily harm, it provides 
a defense from liability.78 
The most important exception to the general prohibitions is the 
incidental take permit (ITP) of section 10(a), which allows takes under 
prescribed conditions in exchange for implementing a habitat conservation 
plan (HCP).79 Congress created the permit program in 1982 at the request 
of a coalition of San Francisco Bay Area developers, municipal 
governments, and a local environmental organization that agreed to allow 
some harm to the endangered mission blue butterfly from a new housing 
development at San Bruno Mountain, California.80 In exchange, the 
 
72. Steven L. Yaffee, Collaborative Strategies for Managing Animal Migrations: Insights 
from the History of Ecosystem-Based Management, 41 ENVTL. L. 655, 677 (2011). 
73. Id.; see STEVEN L. YAFFEE ET AL., ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED 
STATES: AN ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT EXPERIENCE 21, 27 (1996); see also JULIA M. 
WONDOLLECK & STEVEN L. YAFFEE, MAKING COLLABORATION WORK: LESSONS FROM 
INNOVATION IN NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 102, 240 (2000) (describing more case 
studies). 
74. Yaffee, supra note 72, at 677-78. 
75. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4), (o)(2) (2018). The incidental take statement details: (1) the 
impact of the taking on the species (e.g., the amount and extent), (2) reasonable and prudent 
measures to minimize the impact, and (3) terms and conditions that must be complied with when 
implementing the measures. § 1536(b)(4); see 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(i) (1999). 
76. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(e) (2018). 
77. Id. § 1539(a)(1). 
78. Id. § 1540(a)(3). 
79. Id. § 1539(a)(2). 
80. Id. § 1539(a); see H.R. REP. NO. 97-835, at 31-32 (1982) (Conf. Rep.) (describing the 
San Bruno Mountain plan as the model for the amendment authorizing incidental take permits); 
see generally TIMOTHY BEATLEY, HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING: ENDANGERED SPECIES 
 
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 38:976 2021 
990 
project proponents agreed to habitat preservation and enhancement 
efforts.81 Although section 10(a) provides for a permitting program, the 
Services have used section 10(a) to foster “[c]ollaboration, flexibility, 
ingenuity, innovation, and thoughtful planning” in HCPs.82 In other words, 
the permit program is an alternative to section 4(d) rules for promoting 
collaborative governance.83 
The ESA lists several requirements that, if fulfilled, mandate the 
issuance of a permit. But the Services retain discretion to include in the 
permit “terms and conditions” to carry out the purposes of the HCP.84 The 
most controversial administrative initiative to foster collaborative 
governance is the “no surprises” policy providing ITP holders with long-
term security.85 Through the life of the permit, which may extend to a 
century, the “no surprises” assurance means that changed circumstances 
or new information about a species covered by the HCP will never trigger 
any additional obligations for the permittee. A permittee will not be liable 
for habitat restoration or financial compensation beyond the level of 
mitigation negotiated in the HCP. Instead, the public and the Services bear 
the risk of unforeseen circumstances. The debate over motivating 
participation in the HCP program86 parallels issues with collaborative 
governance in 4(d) rules. Part II discusses how the ESA and courts 
determine when flexible promotion of conservation agreements crosses 
the line into betrayal of statutory standards. 
 
AND URBAN GROWTH (1994) (providing a general discussion and detailed description of the rise 
of habitat conservation plans under the ESA).  
81. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-835, at 30-32 (1982) (Conf. Rep.); Albert C. Lin, Participants’ 
Experiences with Habitat Conservation Plans and Suggestions for Streamlining the Process, 23 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 369 (1996). A federal court upheld the San Bruno Mountain incidental take permit 
and HCP in Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976, 982-83 (9th Cir. 1985). 
82. Habitat Conservation Planning and Incidental Take Permit Processing Handbook, 
U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV. 1-2 (2016), https://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-
library/pdf/HCP_Handbook-Ch1.pdf [https://perma.cc/4M5Y-T3KF]. 
83. See, e.g., Patrick Duggan, Incidental Extinction: How the Endangered Species Act’s 
Incidental Take Permits Fail to Account for Population Loss, 41 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & 
ANALYSIS  10628 (2011); Robert L. Fischman & Jaelith Hall-Rivera, A Lesson for Conservation 
from Pollution Control Law: Cooperative Federalism for Recovery Under the Endangered 
Species Act, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 45, 132-67 (2002) (comparing the relative conservation 
effectiveness of 4(d) rules and ITPs); Robert Meltz, Where the Wild Things Are: The Endangered 
Species Act and Private Property, 24 ENVTL. L. 369, 383 (1994) (analogizing 4(d) rules promoting 
land-use restrictions to rulemaking versions of HCPs); Jessica Owley, Keeping Track of 
Conservation, 42 ECOLOGY L.Q. 79 (2015). 
84. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B) (2018). 
85. Habitat Conservation Plan Assurances (“No Surprises”) Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 8859 
(Feb. 23, 1998). Spirit of Sage Council v. Kempthorne, 511 F. Supp. 2d 31 (D.D.C. 2007), upheld 
the rule as within the regulatory discretion that Congress delegated to the Services. 
86. See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm & Kya B. Marienfeld, Endangered Species Act Listings 
and Climate Change: Avoiding the Elephant in the Room, 20 ANIMAL L. 277, 278 (2014); Fred 
Bosselman, The Statutory and Constitutional Mandate for a No Surprises Policy, 24 ECOLOGY 
L.Q. 707 (1997); Alejandro Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve?, 55 UCLA L. REV. 293, 355-56 
(2007); J.B. Ruhl, Who Needs Congress? An Agenda for Administrative Reform of the 
Endangered Species Act, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 367, 397-98 (1998). 
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II. The Collaborative Governance Framework in ESA 4(d) Rules 
The ESA itself sets out prohibitions only for endangered species, not 
threatened species. Unlike the federal duties in section 7, which do not 
distinguish between threatened and endangered species, section 9 gives the 
Services discretion to promulgate regulations specifying prohibitions that 
apply to threatened species.87 The Services issue what the ESA calls 
“protective regulations” under section 4(d) (hence the nickname “4(d) 
rules”) as they deem “necessary and advisable to provide for the 
conservation” of threatened species.88 This discretion to tailor prohibitions 
provides flexibility to design a regulatory framework that is no more 
stringent than required by a particular threatened species’ recovery needs. 
In contrast to section 10 ITPs, 4(d) rules may allow direct harm to listed 
species even if the harm is not incidental to the purpose of the activity. For 
instance, several protective regulations allow lethal trapping of animals 
that interfere with farming and ranching.89 
This Part begins with a review of the statutory standards and their 
judicial interpretations. Section II.A shows how the seemingly strict ESA 
command to promulgate threatened species rules that provide for recovery 
nonetheless provides broad latitude for tailored rulemaking. The judiciary 
generally endorses 4(d) rules as long as they make some contribution to 
recovery, even if just by reducing population depletion. That range of 
discretion creates space for potential collaborative outcomes. Section II.B 
discusses how the framework for special rules circumscribes that domain 
for collaborative conservation and explains the elements of negotiated 
governance, which we examine in the empirical study described in Part III. 
A. Substantive Standards for Protective Regulations 
“Protective regulations” are protective only from a baseline of no 
prohibitions. Until 2019, the FWS automatically applied all section 9 
prohibitions to threatened species absent a species-specific rule.90 
Therefore, the FWS species-specific regulations we studied focus on the 
exceptions from the general section 9 prohibitions. After September 26, 
2019, no prohibitions apply to threatened species unless adopted by a 4(d) 
 
87. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(G), (2)(E) (2018). 
88. The Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 4, 87 Stat. 884, 888 
(codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (2018)); see also Regulations for Prohibitions to Threatened 
Wildlife and Plants, 84 Fed. Reg. 44,753, 44,753 (Aug. 27, 2019) (explaining why the FWS also calls 
the 4(d) rules “special rules”).  
89. See, e.g., 50 C.F.R. § 17.40(g)(3) (2019) (Utah prairie dog). 
90. Reclassification of the American Alligator and Other Amendments, 40 Fed. Reg. 
44,412 (Sept. 26, 1975), first established this blanket coverage. 
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rule.91 Now, any act proscribed in a 4(d) rule may be properly considered 
protective because no prohibitions would apply in the absence of a species-
specific rule. That brings FWS practice into line with the NMFS, which 
prohibits only those actions specifically identified in special rules.92 Future 
research may explore whether and how the new FWS approach changes 
the mix of 4(d) regulatory tools and the use of collaborative conservation. 
In our study, the key provisions of the rules are special exceptions to 
the statutory prohibitions applicable to endangered species under section 
9. This is because all but a handful of the 4(d) rules first apply the blanket 
prohibitions and then carve out safe harbors from take liability. Section 
III.B shows that regulations may fail to achieve the titular “protective” 
objective when they neglect to address the chief threats causing the species 
decline. 
Closely related to the ESA 4(d) provision is ESA section 10(j), which 
authorizes the Secretary to transport and release an “experimental 
population” of listed “species outside the current range of such species if 
the Secretary determines that such release will further the conservation of 
such species.”93 For experimental populations, even an endangered species 
is “treated as a threatened species” for the purposes of tailored rules 
defining prohibited acts.94 Both 4(d) and 10(j) rules identify prohibited 
actions or exceptions from the generally applicable prohibitions of section 
9.95 Therefore, the caselaw interpreting 4(d) rules also applies to 10(j) rules, 
which must meet the same conservation standard. 
The ESA requires the Service to list species as either endangered or 
threatened based solely on the degree of risk of extinction faced by the 
species.96 In the ESA framework, a listed species is either “in danger of 
extinction”97 and therefore endangered, or is “likely to become an 
endangered species within the foreseeable future”98 and therefore 
threatened. Conservation biology conceives of extinction risk as a 
continuum—all species face some risk, however small, of extinction.99 The 
ESA requires that listing determinations rely on “the best scientific and 
 
91. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.31 (2019). This regulation superseded Protection for Threatened 
Species of Wildlife, 42 Fed. Reg. 46,539 (Sept. 16, 1977), and Protection for Threatened Species of 
Wildlife, 43 Fed. Reg. 18,180 (Apr. 28, 1978), which applied the section 9 prohibitions to all 
threatened species unless limited by species-specific rule. 
92. These rules are promulgated at 50 C.F.R. § 223 (1999). 
93. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(j)(2)(A) (2018) (emphasis added). 
94. Id. § 1539(j)(2)(C). 
95. Id. § 1539(j)(2)(B). 
96. Id. § 1533(b)(1)(A).  
97. Id. § 1532(6). 
98. Id. § 1532(20). 
99. See Ben Collen et al., Clarifying Misconceptions of Extinction Risk Assessment with 
the IUCN Red List, 12 BIOLOGY LETTERS, Apr. 2016, at 1 (characterizing extinction risk as a 
continuous metric that is divided into categories with subjective boundaries).  
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commercial data available.”100 The judiciary reviews rulemakings to ensure 
that they rationally consider credible scientific studies of extinction 
threats.101 The categorical disparity between endangered and threatened 
listings fits poorly within the scientific basis justifying listings. The Services 
understand this conundrum. Yet, categorize they must. 
For instance, the 2015 rulemaking listing the northern long-eared bat 
as threatened candidly observed that the species “resides firmly in th[e] 
category where no distinct determination exists to differentiate between 
endangered and threatened.”102 Courts nonetheless review such listings 
and section 4(d) rules using two key standards from two statutes. First, the 
Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA) “arbitrary and capricious” 
standard requires that an administrative record demonstrate how an 
agency “considered the relevant factors and articulated a rational 
connection between the facts found and the choice made.”103 Judicial 
deference to the agency is greatest when courts review technical matters 
within the agency’s expertise, particularly its choice of scientific data and 
statistics.104 Courts generally review of 4(d) rules in this zone of greatest 
deference.105 
Second, the ESA requires the Services to project current trends into 
the future to determine the risk of extinction.106 Here, courts apply the 
concept of the foreseeability. Where defendants’ actions lead to harms that 
are outside the scope of reasonable expectations for future consequences, 
foreseeability limits liability.107 A Service finding of foreseeable risk of 
 
100. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (2018). Congress added the word “solely” to the ESA 
listing mandate in 1982 to limit the Reagan Administration’s attempts to inject economic cost 
considerations into species determinations. Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. 
L. No. 97-304, § 2(a), 96 Stat. 1411. In 2019, the Services revised the regulations governing the 
listing process to remove a provision that had stated that listing determinations would occur 
“without reference to possible economic or other impacts of such determination.” Regulations for 
Listing Species and Designating Critical Habitat, 84 Fed. Reg. 45,020, 45,024 (Aug. 27, 2019) 
(codified at 50 C.F.R. § 424) (conceding “that the statute and its legislative history are clear that 
listing determinations must be made solely on the basis of the best scientific and commercial data 
available,” but insisting that the legislation does not prohibit “compiling economic information or 
presenting that information to the public, as long as such information does not influence the listing 
determination.”). 
101. See, e.g., In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing and Section 4(d) Rule 
Litigation, 709 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
102. Threatened Species Status for the Northern Long-Eared Bat With 4(d) Rule, 80 
Fed. Reg. 17,974, 18,020 (Apr. 2, 2015). 
103. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)-(D) (2018); see Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. 
Council, 462 U.S. 87, 105 (1983). 
104. See Baltimore Gas, 462 U.S. at 103. 
105. See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. Verity, 853 F.2d 322, 329 (5th Cir. 1988) 
(upholding shrimp net towing duration limits and net design restrictions to protect sea turtles). 
106. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20) (2018) (defining threatened species as those “likely to 
become an endangered species within the foreseeable future”). 
107. See Robert L. Fischman, supra note 66, at 688-90 (discussing the concept of 
foreseeability in the context of ESA litigation); see also Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. 
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extinction (or not) must meet a similar reasonableness test. Center for 
Biological Diversity v. Everson remanded the long-eared bat rule because 
the administrative record failed to fully consider the extinction risk in the 
most significant portion of the bat’s range, where most individuals reside.108 
The same record also improperly constrained its analysis of the foreseeable 
future. The court stated that the ESA requires the Service to “look not 
only at the foreseeability of threats, but also at the foreseeability of the 
impact of the threats on the species.”109 For the bat, this would require 
consideration of the controllable threats posed by habitat loss and logging 
in combination with the uncontained, contagious disease sweeping through 
the species.110  
The 4(d) rule had limited—but not completely eliminated—the harm 
prohibition for incidental takes from damaging habitat or maternity roost 
trees.111 These incidental takes, by themselves, might be compatible with 
recovery. But, in combination with disease, they might push the bat closer 
to extinction. Everson emphasized the importance of cumulative impacts 
in conservation. A 4(d) rule must assess cumulative effects in justifying 
permitted takes. The strongest principle to emerge from litigation over 
how much recovery is enough to meet the conservation criterion is that the 
Services must consider all sources of extinction risk—not just the primary 
factor driving imperilment. In 2019, the Services promulgated a rule 
defining “foreseeable future” for evaluating the statutory factors that 
influence listing decisions.112 The rule largely codifies the judicial 
interpretations, though there remains some debate about how it may limit 
the timeframe for applying climate models to wildlife conservation.113 
We focus on the content of ESA 4(d) rules that directly pertains to 
the narrowest statutory issue—whether the rules provide for recovery of 
threatened species or merely maintain the status quo. We call this the 
 
for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 713 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (describing foreseeability as 
the functional equivalent to proximate causation and a limit on take liability in the ESA); In re 
Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing and Section 4(d) Rule Litigation, 709 F.3d 1, 15-16 
(D.C. Cir. 2013) (upholding the use of a case-by-case approach of the FWS in applying a forty-five 
year period for the foreseeable future showing a loss of sea ice habitat in listing the polar bear as 
a threatened species). 
108. 435 F. Supp. 3d 69 (D.D.C. 2020). 
109. Id. at 86. 
110. The emerging infectious disease, white-nose syndrome, is the most “severe and 
immediate [threat] to the northern long-eared bat’s persistence.” Threatened Species Status for 
the Northern Long-Eared Bat with 4(d) Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 17,974, 17,989 (Apr. 2, 2015). The 
listing rule provides considerable information about the disease. Id. at 17,994-98. 
111. See 4(d) Rule for the Northern Long-Eared Bat, 81 Fed. Reg. 1900, 1921 (Jan. 14, 
2016). Other courts emphasize that the foreseeable future for determining extinction risk depends 
on the available data for species, habitat, and principal threats. In re Polar Bear, 709 F.3d 1. 
112. Regulations for Listing Species and Designating Critical Habitat, 84 Fed. Reg. 
45,020 (Aug. 27, 2019) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 424.11 (2019)). 
113. See Ya-Wei Li et al., Species Protection Will Take More Than Rule Reversal, 370 
SCIENCE 665, 665 (2020). 
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conservation standard. Congress tinkered with the 1973 ESA in 1976, 1978, 
1979, 1982, 1988, and 2003.114 However, the “4(d) rule” text authorizing 
protective regulations remains unchanged except for updated statutory 
citations. Section 4(d) contains two sentences, one mandatory and the 
other discretionary. The mandatory sentence compels the Secretary to 
“issue such regulations as he deems necessary and advisable to provide for 
the conservation of such species.”115 This duty requires the foreseeability 
inquiry to forecast future conservation of currently imperiled species. The 
discretionary sentence authorizes regulations that “prohibit any act 
prohibited under section 9(a)(1).”116 
The judiciary largely endorses the Service argument that the baseline 
for measuring protective contributions to recovery is no prohibitions at all. 
In other words, as long as the rule itself makes some contribution to 
recovery, it meets the conservation standard. This interpretation gives the 
Services almost unrestrained latitude to accommodate collaborative 
conservation. But it comes at the cost of momentum to advance species 
recovery. 
Courts refuse to compel the Services to justify excluding a section 9 
prohibition that could better the prospects of recovery. In upholding the 
protective regulation for the polar bear, a species threatened by sea ice loss 
from greenhouse-gas emissions, a court rejected the environmentalists’ 
arguments that the rule should have restricted emissions wherever they 
occur. As the court noted, “[t]he relevant question . . . is whether the 
Service reasonably concluded that the specific prohibitions and exceptions 
set forth in its Special Rule are necessary and advisable to provide for the 
conservation of the polar bear.”117 In other words, the court did not 
consider stricter prohibitions that could have been—but were not—
included in the rule. A more protective interpretation requiring the 
 
114. See Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 4, 87 Stat. 886; Act of 
July 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-359, § 1, 90 Stat. 911; Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978, 
Pub. L. No. 95-632, §§ 11, 13, 92 Stat. 3764, 3766; Act of Dec. 28, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-159, § 3, 93 
Stat. 1225; Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982, § 2(a), 96 Stat. 1411; Endangered 
Species Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-478, Title I, §§ 1002-04, 102 Stat. 2306, 2307; 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-136, § 318, 117 Stat. 
1433. 
115. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (2018). 
116. Id. Section 9(a)(1) is codified at § 1538(a)(1), the ESA section that prohibits a 
variety of actions related to endangered animals. A final phrase in this 4(d) sentence deals with 
species covered by cooperative agreements with states under § 1535(c). 
117. In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing and Section 4(d) Rule Litigation, 
818 F. Supp. 2d 214, 230 (D.D.C. 2011) (upholding the content of the 4(d) rule against a challenge 
that it was arbitrary and capricious but remanding for failure to comply with the environmental 
impact analysis required by the National Environmental Policy Act, Pub L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 
852 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4321)). Though this particular decision was not appealed, other 
challenges to the polar bear listing were finally resolved in In re Polar Bear Endangered Species 
Act Listing and Section 4(d) Rule Litigation, 709 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Despite the case caption, 
the court of appeals did not address or change Judge Sullivan’s analysis of ESA section 4(d). 
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Services to justify exceptions to the section 9 prohibitions would prompt 
better conservation outcomes. Nevertheless, the deferential standard 
embraces tailored, collaborative governance as long as it abates some 
harm. 
The strong consensus among courts is that the conservation criterion 
for 4(d) is flexible enough to support trade-offs in protective regulations. 
Rules that allow some take (e.g., residual by-catch of turtles) but that 
reduce the overall depletion of threatened populations (e.g., through use 
of turtle excluder devices in nets) may be presumed to contribute to 
recovery. This principle is the foundation for conservation collaboration in 
4(d) rulemakings. Conservation limitations in protective regulations may 
mitigate harms that are not the principal source of imperilment. Most 
courts allow the Services to justify a 4(d) rule as contributing to recovery 
if it relieves any threat to the species.118 
The only qualification to this general principle concerns protective 
regulations permitting purposeful take for sport or reducing depredation. 
Cases challenging such rules turn on the ESA’s definition of conservation, 
which is 
 
[T]he use of all methods and procedures which are necessary to [recover 
listed species]. Such methods and procedures include, but are not limited 
to, all activities associated with scientific resources management such as 
research, census, law enforcement, habitat acquisition and maintenance, 
propagation, live trapping, and transplantation, and, in the extraordinary 
case where population pressures within a given ecosystem cannot be 
otherwise relieved, may include regulated taking.119  
 
Litigation stopped almost all sport hunting of threatened species due to the 
Service’s failure to show population pressures in need of relief.120 
Depredation control to ameliorate the costs to farming and ranching 
from species protection is widespread. Live trapping and translocation are 
“takes” under ESA section 9. But they are not purposeful kills, unlike 
hunting, fishing, and lethal trapping. The ESA definition of conservation 
distinguishes “live trapping,” listed as an ordinary conservation method 
along with such tools as habitat acquisition, from the “extraordinary case” 
of “regulated taking.”121 Depredation control via lethal methods survives 
in many 4(d) programs, especially if states administer or oversee the 
regulated takes rather than simply allowing private self-help.122 Lethal 
 
118. See, e.g., Defs. of Wildlife v. Andrus, 428 F. Supp. 167 (D.D.C. 1977). 
119. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3) (2018) (emphasis added). 
120. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Clark, 755 F.2d 608 (8th Cir. 1985) (remanding 4(d) rule 
allowing sport trapping of wolves). The only protective regulation allowing hunting applies to an 
experimental population of wood bison in Alaska. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.84(x)(5) (2019). 
121. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3) (2018). 
122. See, e.g., 50 C.F.R. § 17.40(d)(2)(i)(C) (2019) (wolves); § 17.40(b)(1)(i)(C) (grizzly 
bears).  
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controls may be necessary to gain social acceptance for higher priority 
recovery action. But they rest on a weak statutory foundation except in the 
exceedingly unusual circumstance where they relieve overpopulation. 
B. Collaborative Governance Manifestations 
Collaborative governance is a kind of informal contracting for public 
goods among stakeholders where enforceable rules circumscribe the 
negotiating domain. The conservation standard for ESA 4(d) rules sets an 
indistinct boundary, which the Services could clarify through guidance.123 
Before we review the promulgated protective regulations, this Section 
explores in greater detail how collaborative governance manifests in 
special exceptions to the ESA’s prohibitions. We begin by explaining how 
we identified signs of collaborative conservation in tailored rules. Then we 
turn to the informal collaborative process to show where the rules may 
bend in response to negotiating power.  
Listing under the ESA is like a “toggle switch” that flips a species’ 
status from unprotected to protected. It creates more political and 
institutional opposition to species protection than incremental and tailored 
methods.124 One important result from our study is that protective 
regulations do more than just apply or waive the individual statutory 
prohibitions that safeguard endangered species. That would be solely an 
incremental approach. For instance, many 4(d) rules simply waive federal 
take prohibitions for anglers who comply with state law.125 Incremental 
options for prohibitions are useful and feature prominently in the 
attributes of successful commons management.126 But they may provide 
too coarse a menu of choices to address the diverse situations involving 
habitat harms to threatened species. Species recovery needs differ from 
place to place, and some activities can avoid or minimize harm with minor 
adjustments (e.g., seasonal restrictions).127 
Our study shows that many rules tailor special exceptions to 
encourage better conservation practices in specific activities, such as 
farming. For instance, rather than merely prohibit soil tilling or timber 
 
123. See infra Section IV.A. 
124. Professor J.B. Ruhl describes the ESA statutory provisions that trigger a transition 
from little or no regulation to draconian restrictions “toggle switches.” J.B. Ruhl, The Regulation 
Charade, 24 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 139 (2017) (responding to Jonathan J. Adler, The Science 
Charade in Species Conservation, 24 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 109 (2017)). We thank Professor Ruhl 
for suggesting the distinction between incremental and tailored approaches. 
125. See, e.g., 50 C.F.R. § 17.44(d) (2019) (allowing take of the leopard darter only when 
it complies with state fishing law). 
126. See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS 94-100 (1990) (discussing 
graduated sanctions, which is the converse of incremental relief from prohibitions). 
127. See, e.g., § 17.47(b)(3)(v) (establishing a Dakota skipper exception for haying to 
mowing after breeding season, when the butterfly lays eggs upon leaves). 
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cutting, the tailored regulations specify how each of those drivers of 
imperilment can be undertaken in a manner that reduces impacts on the 
threatened species.128 Rather than simply relying on state fishing law, 
tailored exceptions for the Kentucky arrow darter require minimizing 
certain types of disturbances during low flow periods.129 Tailoring serves as 
the currency for more creative collaborative conservation.130 
Section III.A organizes our empirical results to highlight instances of 
tailoring that we think offer the greatest potential to meet a recovery 
standard for 4(d) rules. Limitations on activities by ownership, location, 
land use, and method are the prime dimensions of tailoring. The content 
for the tailored exceptions may come from recovery plans, land-use plans, 
best agricultural practices or other regulatory programs. Sometimes they 
are crafted solely for the 4(d) rule itself. 
Protective regulations are not hammered out in a conference room 
with all parties at the table in the way that a contract or permit might be 
negotiated. Yet they bear the imprint of collaborative governance. 
Professor Bradshaw calls this kind of collaborative governance “relational 
contracting” because no parties are strictly bound to the terms of any 
agreement.131 Other than the sea turtles’ shrimp-boat rules, the ESA 
protective regulations tailoring the practices of stakeholders do not bind 
any parties. Stakeholders may ignore the special exceptions and instead 
risk liability for harming a threatened animal. Conversely, regulators may 
later decide to tighten limitations unilaterally to meet the recovery 
standard of ESA section 4(d).132 
Nonetheless, the very process of collaborating on the content of the 
rule helps foster commitment to a common goal. In many cases, the 
Services need to coordinate with the same regulatory stakeholders when it 
comes time to develop and implement a recovery plan. Loose, non-binding 
“contracting” helps build these relationships.133 The most common parties 
identified in rules as subject to special exceptions are (1) state/tribal 
 
128. See, e.g., § 17.40(a)(4)(ii)(D) (detailing practices such as managing the depth of farm 
plowing to avoid take liability for Mazama pocket gophers). 
129. § 17.44(p)(2). 
130. See generally James Salzman and J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification 
of Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607 (2000) (describing the issues of creating currencies 
for environmental trading markets). 
131. Bradshaw, Agency Coordination of Private Action, supra note 29, at 236 (describing 
relational contracting as the practice by which parties “use trust-based agreements, without the 
potential for judicial enforcement, to coordinate private action on regulatory goals”). 
132. See infra Section III.B.2 (describing the steady tightening of turtle-protection 
standards for the shrimping industry). 
133. See Bradshaw, Agency Coordination of Private Action, supra note 29, at 233 (noting 
that the mere threat of regulation may prompt industry to “undertake preemptive steps to improve 
practices”); see also infra Section III.B.1 (describing how the FWS justified a 4(d) hay-harvesting 
delay date for a butterfly based on consistency with harvest dates in existing conservation 
agreements for bird breeding). 
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institutions, and (2) landowners, livestock owners, and farmers.134 In other 
words, the Services are most attentive to (1) other entities exercising 
sovereign power, which generally offer more “boots on the ground” to 
accomplish conservation actions, and (2) rural land-use decision makers, 
who control much of the habitat for threatened species. The latter match 
the most common category of incidental take authorized by purpose: 
agricultural activities. 
The conservation imperative to fine-tune recovery actions over time 
requires continual coordination with stakeholders—a process called 
“adaptive management.”135 Though most adaptive management literature 
focuses on natural science learning through conservation actions, 
collaborative governance can employ adaptive management to build 
stronger commitments to recovery over time.136 Turtle-protection 
rulemakings that limit shrimp harvesting show how NMFS built on both 
technological improvements as well as changing attitudes of the shrimpers 
to improve conservation measures over time.137 
Even where the FWS does not actually negotiate with the 
stakeholders themselves, it is aware of their views, political influence, and 
litigation capability. Our study shows how protective regulations 
accommodate those interests to relieve the political pressure and litigation 
threat. Such “accommodative conservation,” like “relational contracting,” 
may be considered a form of collaborative governance, as accommodation 
is a form of negotiation.138 Accommodative conservation risks, but does 
not necessarily result in, limitations that fail to contribute to recovery. 
The ESA requires the Services to justify their protective regulations 
on the basis of science. But, while science informs conservation, science 
cannot actually achieve recovery of imperiled species without social 
mechanisms. Collaborative governance can implement what science 
indicates might be needed to improve conditions so that the protections of 
the ESA are no longer necessary.139 In that respect, collaborative 
governance is beholden to the real thresholds of the natural world that 
 
134. Though livestock owners often own farms or ranches and farmers often own farms, 
leasing arrangements sometimes create non-landowner stakeholders who make decisions that 
affect habitats. 
135. See infra Section III.A.4. 
136. See Robert L. Fischman et al., Planning for Adaptation to Climate Change: Lessons 
from the US National Wildlife Refuge System, 64 BIOSCIENCE 993, 1003 (2014) (discussing 
literature that links successful conservation to strong relationships and an understanding of the 
social dimension of linked social-ecological systems). 
137. See infra Section III.B.2. 
138. See G. Richard Shell, Bargaining Styles and Negotiation: The Thomas-Kilmann 
Conflict Mode Instrument in Negotiation Training, 17 NEGOT. J. 155, 161-62 (2001) (describing 
the widely employed “Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Mode Instrument,” a continuum of conflict 
management approaches that includes compromising, accommodating, and avoiding). 
139. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3) (2018) (defining “conservation”). 
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separate viability from extinction.140 But, in other respects, collaborative 
governance constitutes an end in itself to avoid backlash from the very 
people who manage habitat.141 Social opposition may prompt preemptive 
habitat destruction to prevent threatened species from occupying locations 
that stakeholders seek to use for unrestricted activities. Collaboration, in 
turn, can build trust.142 Moreover, the Services also displace state authority 
when they list species, and states themselves often oppose the preemption 
of their programs. The Services are relatively weak players in the federal 
administrative firmament.143 They bend in the face of fierce opposition to 
regulation of private property.144 Thus, to ease political pressure, some 
rules manifest defensive tailoring.145 Section III.B examines instances 
where accommodative special exceptions bump up against recovery 
realities. 
Contemporary congressional hearings consistently urge more support 
for conservation collaboration.146 Notwithstanding some persistent 
critics,147 collaborative governance now enjoys a strong foothold as an 
essential, bipartisan conservation tool.148 Though our study is limited to the 
 
140. See, e.g., 50 C.F.R. § 223.203(b)(12)(i) (2019) (requiring land-use plans to ensure 
“properly functioning habitat conditions” for salmon species covered by the exception). 
141. See Amsler, supra note 8, at 702 (discussing how collaborative governance is 
sometimes used as a means and other times employed as a goal).  
142. See Bradshaw, Agency Coordination of Private Action, supra note 29 . 
143. See JEANNE CLARKE & DANIEL MCCOOL, STAKING OUT THE TERRAIN 111-12 (2d 
ed. 1996). 
144. See supra text accompanying notes 143-45 (noting that land and livestock owners 
negotiate special exceptions for themselves in exchange for cooperation in establishing 
experimental populations). 
145. See supra text accompanying note 187 (horned lark exceptions). 
146. See, e.g., H.R. 424, “Gray Wolf State Management Act of 2017”; H.R. 717, “Listing 
Reform Act”; H.R. 1274, “State, Tribal, and Local Species Transparency and Recovery Act”; H.R. 
2603, “Saving America’s Endangered Species Act” or “SAVES Act”; and H.R. 3131, 
“Endangered Species Litigation Reasonableness Act”: Legislative Hearing Before the H. Comm. 
on Nat. Res., 115th Cong. (2017) (statements of Greg Sheehan, Deputy Director, U.S. Fish & 
Wildlife Serv.; David Willms, Policy Advisor, Wyoming Governor Matt Mead; Rep. Jim Costa, 
Member, H. Comm. on Nat. Res.). 
147. See, e.g., George C. Coggins, Regulating Federal Natural Resources: A Summary 
Case Against Devolved Collaboration, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 602, 603 (1999) (characterizing much of 
the collaboration under federal natural resources laws as an “abdication of responsibility” to 
achieve federal objectives); Michael Hibbard & Jeremy Madsen, Environmental Resistance to 
Place-Based Collaboration in the U.S. West, 16 SOC’Y & NAT. RESOURCES 703 (2003) (collecting 
qualitative studies, interviews, and documents that discuss attitudes toward and roles of 
environmentalists in collaborative conservation initiatives); Martin Nie & Peter Metcalf, National 
Forest Management: The Contested Use of Collaboration and Litigation, 46 ENVTL. L. REP. 
NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,208 (2016) (interviewing critics of collaborative governance in national 
forest management).  
148. In 2004, President Bush proclaimed as federal policy “cooperative conservation,” 
another name for collaborative governance for natural resource management. Exec. Order No. 
13,352, 69 Fed. Reg. 52,989, 52,989 (Aug. 30, 2004) (defining “cooperative conservation” to mean 
“collaborative activity among Federal, State, local, and tribal governments, private for-profit and 
nonprofit institutions, other nongovernmental entities and individuals” for achieving 
environmental and natural resource management goals). 
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ESA 4(d) program, we expect the tailoring tools we identify to play an 
increasingly important role in other programs, such as area-wide 
permitting under the Clean Water Act.149 
III. A Comprehensive Evaluation of Protective Regulations 
This Article presents the first comprehensive survey of all the 4(d) 
and 10(j) rules. Prior law journal commentary on 4(d) rules examined 
selected subsets of special exceptions.150 Three non-profit institutions have 
published white papers containing summary comprehensive information, 
highlights of key 4(d) rules, and recommendations for reform.151 In Section 
III.A, we focus on attributes of protective regulations that reveal 
conditions under which collaborative conservation arises. We catalog the 
common forms of tailoring in the resulting special exceptions. In Section 
III.B, we selectively evaluate the rules’ conservation bases to review where 
accommodative conservation may conflict with the science of species 
recovery. 
A. Method and Results 
We reviewed all species-specific FWS and NMFS 4(d) and 10(j) rules 
in force as of September 26, 2019,152 the date that the FWS reversed its 
default approach of applying all section 9 prohibitions unless a protective 
regulation created exceptions.153 Prior to that date, both Services 
 
149. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e) (2018) (detailing general permits for discharge of fill, often used 
to develop wetlands). 
150. The best analyses employing case examples include Daniel J. Rohlf, Section 4 of the 
Endangered Species Act: Top Ten Issues of the Next Thirty Years, 34 ENVTL. L. 483, 530-35 
(2004); Frank R. Lupo, Species-Specific Regulation of Threatened Species Under Section 4(d) of 
the Endangered Species Act, in ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: CURRENT & EMERGING ISSUES 
AFFECTING RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT 7A (2015); Travis J. Ternes, Special 4(d) Rules: Break 
Glass in Case Political Reality Slaps Lofty Goals in the Face, 55 WASHBURN L.J. 461 (2016); Ruhl, 
The Regulation Charade, supra note 124 at 139; Joshua Ulan Galperin, Trust Me, I’m a 
Pragmatist: A Partially Pragmatic Critique of Pragmatic Activism, 42 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 425, 
459-67 (2017); see also Fischman & Hall-Rivera, supra note 83, at 132-67 (comparing the 
effectiveness of 4(d) rules relative to ITPs in a case study of the rules for the coastal California 
gnatcatcher and the West Coast salmonids).  
151. Expanding Opportunities for Threatened Species Conservation Through Section 
4(d) of the ESA, MISSION:WILDLIFE (2015), https://sandcountyfoundation.org/uploads/Section-
4d-of-the-ESA.pdf [https://perma.cc/U3UY-H657]; Ya-Wei Li, 4(d) Rules: The Peril and the 
Promise, DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE (2017), 
https://defenders.org/sites/default/files/publications/section-4d-rules-the-peril-and-the-promise-
white-paper_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/UAJ7-YGZM]; Sanerib, Elkins & Greenwald, supra note 24. 
152. Readers seeking more information about our domain and methods should contact 
Professor Fischman at rfischma@iu.edu. He will also provide an Excel spreadsheet of the data 
upon request. 
153. We do not evaluate rules that are no longer in force because of delisting or judicial 
vacatur.  
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structured almost all rules by first applying the endangered species 
prohibitions and then setting out exceptions to the general liability 
provisions.154 Even the NMFS 4(d) protective regulations, which have 
never been subject to a default rule applying all the section 9 prohibitions, 
employ an exceptions approach.155 
Except where we separately comment on 10(j) rules, we use the term 
“4(d) rule” to refer to both types of rules. For each species-specific 4(d) 
rule, we coded each tailored prohibition or exception as a different 
protective regulation. We disaggregated 4(d) rules into separate 
exceptions for different types of activities or different regulated parties. 
Some rules contain just a single exception.156 Others compile multiple 
exceptions manifesting a variety of collaborative governance efforts.157 The 
NMFS promulgated 9 percent of the 4(d) rules but accounted for 16 
percent of the exceptions we coded—many NMFS rules contain complex 
protective regulations. The disparity arises from land-use conflicts 
involving habitat for anadromous fishes (sturgeon, salmon, and steelhead 
species) and detailed regulatory regimes attempting to reduce sea turtle 
mortality from commercial fishing nets. We use the terms “tailored 
prohibition,” “protective regulation,” and “special exception” 
interchangeably to mean individual liability shields. In contrast, we refer 
to a 4(d) rule when we mean a compilation of all the exceptions applicable 
to a particular threatened animal or experimental population. 
While our count of tailored 4(d) rules is easily reproducible, our 
judgments on lumping and splitting each rule into special exceptions are 
somewhat subjective, though consistent. We coded the 87 rules extant on 
September 26, 2019, which contain 189 separate exceptions.158 Figure 1 
 
154. A rare exception from the FWS covers the northern long-eared bat. The rule 
contains a few affirmative, incidental take prohibitions within a zone where the species suffers 
from a lethal fungal disease. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.40(o)(1) (2019) (remanded but not vacated by 
Everson v. Ctr. For Biological Diversity, 435 F. Supp. 3d 69 (2020)) (banning incidental take in 
known hibernacula, and tree-removal incidental take within 0.25 miles of a known hibernaculum 
or in a known, occupied maternity roost tree). Outside of the disease zone, the rule prohibits no 
incidental take. The affirmative prohibitions aspect of the final 4(d) rule served as an initial test 
of what would become the 2019 rule lifting the blanket application of all ESA section 9 
prohibitions to threatened species. See 4(d) Rule for the Northern Long-Eared Bat, 81 Fed. Reg. 
1900 (Jan. 14, 2016). 
155. The major NMFS outlier is the sea-turtles regulation affirmatively requiring any 
shrimper in certain areas to employ special technology to reduce incidental take. 50 C.F.R. §§ 
223.205(b)(1), 223.206(d)(2) (2019). 
156. See, e.g., § 17.44(g) (2019) (4(d) rule for Chihuahua chub containing just a single 
exception to the section 9 prohibitions for a take “in accordance with applicable State law”). 
157. See, e.g., § 223.203 (4(d) rule for West Coast salmon ESUs and steelhead DPSs 
containing thirteen exceptions to the section 9 prohibitions, applying to public and private parties 
covering diverse activities including water diversions, residential development, habitat 
restoration, tribal fisheries management, and forest management); see also Fischman & Hall-
Rivera, supra note 83, at 109-27 (detailing the collaborative governance efforts in the West Coast 
salmon ESUs and steelhead DPSs 4(d) rule). 
158. The number of rules does not correspond to the number of threatened species with 
4(d) rules. In one case, sea turtles (two 4(d) rules, one for each Service), we count more than one 
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shows the number of rules promulgated by each service over time, with no 
clear trends evident.159 The NMFS lists many fewer threatened species than 
the FWS because of its limited jurisdiction. Apart from experimental 
populations, the NMFS promulgated only five 4(d) rules during the time 
frame of our study. The NMFS has not been active in creating 
experimental populations, designating its first one in 2013. With only the 
three species and four protective regulations, 160 our results for the NMFS 
10(j) rules have little descriptive value. However, a 2016 NMFS rulemaking 
describes a plan to expand its experimental population program.161 Figure 




rule per species. The official list at 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (2019) counts the FWS and the NMFS listings 
as one species. In other cases, we identify one rule that covers multiple species, each with a 
separate listing at § 17.11 (e.g., single rule for slender chub, spotfin chub, slackwater darter, and 
yellowfin madtom, § 17.84(m); a single rule at for multiple West Coast salmonid evolutionarily 
significant units, § 223.203). On September 26, 2019, there were 215 threatened animals in the 
United States. Although 216 threatened animals were reported as of September 1, 2019, see U.S. 
Fish & Wildlife Serv., Listed Species Summary (Boxscore), ENVTL. CONSERVATION ONLINE SYS., 
(Sept. 1, 2019), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20190901065706/https://ecos.fws.gov/ecp0/reports/box-score-report 
[https://perma.cc/SK5Q-9TLS], the Foskett speckled dace was delisted on September 13, 2019, see 
Removing the Foskett Speckled Dace from the List of Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, 84 
Fed. Reg. 48,290 (Sept. 13, 2019), bringing the number of threatened animals to 215, see U.S. Fish 
& Wildlife Serv., Listed Species Summary (Boxscore), ENVTL. CONSERVATION ONLINE SYS. 
(Oct. 17, 2019), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20191017034929/https://ecos.fws.gov/ecp0/reports/box-score-report 
[https://perma.cc/6PH8-8YEK] (recording 215 threatened animals). 
159. A single rule does not always correspond to a single listed species. See, e.g., 50 
C.F.R. § 17.44(c) (2019) (covering four fishes). Li, supra note 151, at 5, counted 159 threatened 
animals covered by 4(d) rules.  
160. 50 C.F.R. §§ 223.301(a)(2), (b)(4), (b)(5), (c) (2019) (providing one set of special 
exceptions for Middle Columbia River steelhead, two special exceptions for San Joaquin River 
Central Valley spring-run Chinook, and one set of special exceptions for Okanogan River Upper 
Columbia River spring-run Chinook Salmon, respectively). The NMFS promulgated these 
protective regulations in three rulemakings. Designation of a Nonessential Experimental 
Population for Middle Columbia River Steelhead Above the Pelton Round Butte Hydroelectric 
Project in the Deschutes River Basin, OR, 78 Fed. Reg. 2893 (Jan. 15, 2013); Designation of a 
Nonessential Experimental Population of Central Valley Spring-Run Chinook Salmon Below 
Friant Dam in the San Joaquin River, CA, 78 Fed. Reg. 79,622 (Dec. 31, 2013); Designation of a 
Nonessential Experimental Population of Upper Columbia River Spring-Run Chinook Salmon in 
the Okanogan River Subbasin, Washington, and Protective Regulations, 79 Fed. Reg. 40,004 (Jul. 
11, 2014). 
161. Designation of Experimental Populations Under the Endangered Species Act, 81 
Fed. Reg. 33,416 (May 26, 2016). In contrast, the FWS promulgated its experimental population 
designation framework in 1984. Experimental Populations, 49 Fed. Reg. 33,885 (Aug. 27, 1984). 
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Figure 1: Rules by Service Over Time 
 
 
Section 4(d) may well authorize the Services to promulgate additional 
prohibitions that go beyond those contained in section 9, where necessary 
for recovery. But, other than the turtle-excluding device requirement for 
shrimp trawlers,162 no tailored 4(d) rule exercises that latent authority—
except for those that make violation of state laws also a violation of the 
ESA.163 In practice, tailoring either restates or loosens the section 9 take 
prohibition. Nonetheless, as we discuss in Part IV, the enforcement 
difficulties of the section 9 outcome-based prohibitions may justify a rule 
inducing stakeholders to adopt liability-exempt conservation practices. In 
that respect, collaborative governance transforms the ESA from a statute 
that prohibits certain effects (i.e., harm, jeopardy, recovery impairment) to 





162. 50 C.F.R. §§ 223.205(b)(1), 223.206(d)(2) (2019). 
163. Federalizing violations of state laws is particularly common in about two dozen FWS 
protective regulations for fishes. See, e.g., 50 C.F.R. § 17.44(h)(2) (2019) (describing 4(d) rule for 
Yaqui catfish and beautiful shiner making any violation of Arizona law a violation of the ESA). 
But it is also apparent elsewhere, such as in the rule for Canada lynx, § 17.40(k)(5). Federalization 
of state law violations may assist in enforcement, even though it does not alter the legal obligations 
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Figure 2: Exceptions by Service Over Time 
 
 
We also coded the higher-level taxon in which the species belongs 
(e.g., fish, reptile). Table 1 shows that fishes and mammals are 
overrepresented relative to the proportion of listed taxa in both 4(d) rules 
and in protective regulations. Of the 220 threatened animals occurring in 
the United States, 34 percent are fishes and 13 percent are mammals. 
Fishes constitute 40 percent of 4(d) rules and 37 percent of exceptions 
in protective regulations. The FWS rules, which account for all but five of 
the fish rules, tend toward simplicity because they address non-target take 
incidental to recreational fishing—generally with a single exception for 
take where it occurs in accordance with state law.164 Their simplicity and 
general consistency across rules suggest that they are relatively 
standardized and easy to promulgate to deploy incremental cooperative 
federalism. The NMFS rules covering fishes, in contrast, deal with 
anadromous species whose migrations and breeding requirements present 
tremendous conflicts with human enterprises, mediated through twenty-
four tailored special exceptions. 
 
 
164. All states require fishing licenses, and these 4(d) rules protect anglers from ESA 
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Table 1: Numbers of Rules and Exceptions by Service, By Taxon 
 
  Mammal Bird Reptile Amphibian Fish Invertebrate Total 
          
FWS  
Rules 
4(d) 11 3 6 5 26 3 54 
10(j) 6 4 0 0 11 4 25 
Total 17 7 6 5 37 7 79 
 
        
NMFS 
Rules 
4(d) 1 0 1 0 2 1 5 
10(j) 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 
Total 1 0 1 0 5 1 8 
  
        
Total 
Rules 




4(d) 41 5 9 5 33 9 102 
10(j) 31 8 0 0 12 5 56 
Total 72 13 9 5 45 14 158 
 
        
NMFS 
Exceptions 
4(d) 1 0 3 0 20 3 27 
10(j) 0 0 0 0 4 0 4 
Total 1 0 3 0 24 3 31 
         
Total  
Exceptions 
73 13 12 5 69 17 189 
 
Twenty-one percent of rules cover mammals. These account for 40 
percent of exceptions in protective regulations, many of which display 
tailored responses to stakeholder concerns. The mammal rules often deal 
with predation and other behaviors that pose direct conflicts with human 
enterprises. The complications of mediating those conflicts through 
collaborative governance explain the even more dramatic proportion of 
exceptions. 
We present our results in the context of how and why we made the 
coding decisions. We excluded from coding those exceptions that merely 
restate the legality of an activity already exempted from ESA section 9.165 
We also excluded the few protective regulations based on other federal 
rules no longer in force.166 In order to center our investigation on 
collaborative governance, we excluded from our domain any rules or 
 
165. That is, an activity covered by a section 10 permit (e.g., an ITP) or by a section 7 
incidental take statement in a biological opinion. 
166. See, e.g., 50 C.F.R. § 17.42(b)(1)(v) (2019) (exempting from liability incidental sea 
turtle take as specified in the NMFS’s rule at § 227.72, a provision that is no longer extant).  
 
Collaborative Governance Under the Endangered Species Act 
1007 
 
exceptions that simply apply, wholesale, the ESA section 9 prohibitions.167 
Such rules and exceptions essentially treat threatened species the same as 
endangered species and do not leverage the flexibility to carve out 
exceptions for particular settings and circumstances. Few FWS 4(d) rules 
fit this exclusion from our domain, because all of the FWS threatened 
listings until September 26, 2019 were, by default, covered by all the ESA 
section 9 prohibitions.168 The majority of FWS threatened species listed 
before September 26, 2019 have no 4(d) rule, which is tantamount to 
having a 4(d) rule with no exceptions. Subsequent research should examine 
whether the number of 4(d) rules applying all of the ESA section 9 
prohibitions decreases as a result of the 2019 rulemaking. Because 
wholesale application of the prohibitions now requires the affirmative 
effort of a species-specific rule, we expect to see more tailoring—motivated 
the rulemaking process. For a species whose recovery needs conflict with 
many private land uses, such as the desert tortoise, we predict different 
outcomes. 
In general, we are less interested in exceptions related to 
conservation, restoration, and scientific research activities typically 
covered by permits or permit-like programs as well as 4(d) rules.169 We 
focused on land use and commercial enterprises. Each of the four 
subsections below combines a description of method along with the results 
for a suite of variables. We explain why we selected particular variables to 
code and then how we split or lumped each exception into the result 
categories we report in the tables. The first subsection addresses special 
exceptions that apply only to certain parties or in certain places. These 
regulations reveal with whom the Services seek to collaborate, and the 
places of greatest conflict or lowest conservation value. The second 
subsection explores why certain activities receive special exceptions. It 
highlights the disparity between activities purposefully taking an animal 
and activities causing undesired take. The third subsection catalogs how 
activities can proceed under special exceptions. We distinguished between 
provisions that shield certain conservation practices from provisions that 
identify impact thresholds below which take activities are exempt. This is 
a familiar distinction in environmental law, which similarly employs 
 
167. See, e.g., 50 C.F.R. § 223.212 (2019) (southern DPS of the spotted seal); § 223.213 
(Mexico DPS of the humpback whale).  
168. See Protection for Threatened Species of Wildlife, 42 Fed. Reg. 46,539 (Sept. 16, 
1977) (rule applying the section 9 prohibitions to all threatened species unless limited by species-
specific rule); Protection for Threatened Species of Wildlife, 43 Fed. Reg. 18,180 (Apr. 28, 1978) 
(same)); Regulations for Prohibitions to Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 84 Fed. Reg. 44,753 
(reversal of the earlier rules, applying no prohibitions by default upon threatened listing). 
Nonetheless, FWS 4(d) rules sometimes merely clarify that regulations implementing the section 
9 prohibitions and section 10 permits apply to a threatened species. See, e.g., 50 C.F.R. § 17.42(e) 
(2019) (desert tortoise). 
169. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(A) (2018). 
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exceptions from illegal pollution-generating activities through both 
practices (technology-based standards) and thresholds (ambient 
environmental conditions). In 4(d) rules, many practice-based exceptions 
reveal private or cooperative governance. The fourth subsection examines 
review and revision provisions in special exceptions. Such provisions may 
reflect adaptive conservation management that monitors the results of 
regulations and uses the information to periodically adjust regulations. 
1. Who and Where 
Some protective regulations apply only to certain parties. For 
instance, rules commonly limit purposeful takes to public agencies or 
officials.170 We coded those exceptions for state/local entity, federal entity, 
or both. We coded Indian tribes as states.171 Where a rule identifies a party 
as a public entity, agency contractor, or “designated agent,” we coded it as 
public only because the designating agency is ultimately responsible, even 
where the designee may be private.172 
Table 2 shows that we found forty-three protective regulations 
carving out a special role for a non-federal agency or official. This may 
indicate cooperative federalism at play. For instance, rather than directly 
regulating forest management to protect anadromous fish habitat, the 
NMFS relies on Washington’s relatively stringent legal regime controlling 
timber management practices on non-federal forests. If the forest 
management complies with the state’s regulatory regime, then no federal 
permits are needed to avoid ESA liability for harming salmon.173 In other 
rules, federal officials share the administrative burden with states. For 
instance, the grizzly bear exception for nuisance bears relies on federal, 
state, or tribal authorities to accomplish removal of the animal, rather than 
allowing landowners to help themselves.174 
We coded special exceptions for landowners. For instance, 
landowners are the only parties eligible to receive permits for intentional 
 
170. See, e.g., 50 C.F.R. § 17.40(b)(1)(i)(C)(2) (2019) (limiting take exception of removal 
of nuisance bears only to authorized federal, state, or tribal authorities); § 17.40(i)(3)(ii) 
(excepting certain takes of problem Columbian white-tailed deer by “any employee or agent of 
the Service or the State conservation agency”). 
171. For the purposes of cooperative federalism, most of the federal pollution control 
statutes either treat tribes as states, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1377 (2018), or contain 
special tribal delegation programs, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7474(c) (2018). See Judith V. 
Royster & Rory SnowArrow Fausett, Control of the Reservation Environment: Tribal Primacy, 
Federal Delegation, and the Limits of State Intrusion, 64 WASH. L. REV. 581, 619-20 (1989). The 
ESA lacks these types of provisions but does not prohibit the Services from treating tribes as 
states. See, e.g., 50 C.F.R. § 17.40(k)(5) (2019) (making a violation of state or tribal law also a 
violation of the protective regulation for Canada lynx). 
172. See, e.g., 50 C.F.R. § 17.84(h)(10) (2019). 
173. § 223.203(b)(13). 
174. § 17.40(b)(1)(i)(C). 
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harassment of Columbian white-tailed deer.175 Though some rules 
designate other private actors,176 landowners and livestock owners are the 
most common and important because of the political power they wield, the 
habitat they control, and the burden they bear under the section 9 
prohibitions. Eight of the ten exceptions for land and livestock owners 
appear in 10(j) rules, which are more accommodating of those who control 
the habitat necessary for the experimental population’s success.177 An 
additional twenty exceptions apply take exceptions to locations designated 
as privately owned or non-federal land. Because the owners of those 
locations will benefit from the rules, we tally thirty exceptions reflecting 
participation of property owners. In exchange for the take exception, 
private owners must act in accordance with certain protocols or only under 
certain circumstances. 
 
Table 2: Numbers of Owner and Identity Exceptions, By Service 
 
    













       
FWS 
Exceptions 
4(d) 11 2 0 13 
10(j) 17 4 4 6 
Total 28 6 4 19 
 




4(d) 12 0 0 1 
10(j) 3 0 0 0 
  
Total 15 0 0 1 
        
Total 
Exceptions   
43 6 4 20 
 
In addition to ownership, 4(d) rules sometimes distinguish among 
different locations by land-use and by geographic location. Table 3 shows 
our results. We coded three categories of land use: (1) agricultural (in 
which we place farming, forestry, and ranching), (2) cultural sites 
 
175. § 17.40(i)(3)(i). 
176. See, e.g., § 17.40(p) (authorizing sea otter use by Native Alaskans under the Marine 
Mammal Protection Act). 
177. See, e.g., § 17.84(c)(4)(iii) (excepting certain takes of red wolves by private 
landowners); § 17.84(l)(5)(v) (allowing permitted livestock owners to take or harass grizzly bears 
pursuing or killing livestock); § 17.84(k)(7)(iv) (excepting certain takes of Mexican wolves on non-
Federal lands). Livestock owners are typically ranchers/farmers who graze their stock on more 
acreage than they own. 
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(including burial sites)178 and developed areas (including single-family 
residential use),179 and (3) water infrastructure.180 Not surprisingly, given 
the large areas of private-land habitat in forests, farms, and ranches, the 
agriculture category is most common, with twenty exceptions.181 Six of 
those (30 percent) apply to insects, which otherwise account for only 6 
percent of all exceptions in 4(d) rules. 
 
Table 3: Numbers of Land Use and Location Exceptions, By Service 
 
    Land Use   Location 


























4(d) 16 5 1 
 
11 21 
10(j) 0 0 0 
 
0 1 








4(d) 1 0 0 
 
1 2 
10(j) 3 2 3 
 
0 1 








  20 7 4   12 25 
 
Twelve protective regulations identify certain areas for special 
treatment based on distance from a conservation reserve or some key 
habitat feature.182 Twenty-five make geographic distinctions based on the 
jurisdiction where a property occurs or its distance from a jurisdictional 
boundary.183 Experimental population designations always include the 
 
178. See, e.g., § 17.40(g)(4). 
179. See, e.g., § 17.40(a)(5). 
180. See, e.g., § 223.301(b)(5) (excepting from take of San Joaquin River Central Valley 
spring-run Chinook experimental population individual fish that swim outside of the experimental 
population area where avoiding the take would “impose more than de minimus water supply 
reductions, additional storage releases, or bypass flows on unwilling” parties). 
181. See, e.g., § 17.47(b)(3) (excepting certain activities from take of the Dakota skipper 
where they are “associated with livestock ranching”). 
182. See, e.g., § 17.40(g)(3)(ii) (excepting takes of Utah prairie dog for private property 
within 0.5 miles of a conservation reserve); § 17.40(o)(1) (prohibiting incidental takes of northern 
long-eared bats within 0.4 km of a known hibernaculum or within 45 m of a roost tree). 
183. See, e.g., § 17.47(s)(4) (prohibiting collection of butterflies in certain coastal 
counties south of Interstate 4).  
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boundary circumscribing where a protected animal is part of the 
experimental population.184 Therefore, we categorized a 10(j) regulation as 
having a geographic limitation only if it defines an area other than the 
designated range of the experimental population or if it permits take 
outside of the experimental population area.185 
2. Why 
The protective regulations differentiate between purposeful takes, 
where harming or harassing an animal is the very reason for an activity, 
and incidental takes, where an otherwise lawful purpose results in an 
undesired harm.186 Though we employ more precision in calling these two 
categories “purposeful” and “incidental,” some regulations employ the 
equivalent distinction between “direct” and “indirect” takes. All 
accidental takes are incidental;187 but many incidental takes are not 
accidents.188 Table 4 shows our counts of purposeful and incidental takes 
authorized by exceptions. 
 
 
184. The area of the experimental population must be “wholly separate geographically 
from nonexperimental populations of the same species” 16 U.S.C. § 1539(j) (2018). 
185. See, e.g., 50 C.F.R. § 223.301(b)(5) (2019) (allowing takes outside of the salmon’s 
designated experimental population boundary). 
186. For instance, harming or harassing an animal may occur as part of a conservation 
program to translocate individuals.  
187. See, e.g., § 17.40(i)(3) (exempting accidental shooting of threatened Columbian 
white-tailed deer in the course of hunting black-tailed deer or carrying out black-tailed deer 
damage control). 
188. See, e.g., § 17.40(o)(2)(ii) (permitting incidental harm to northern long-eared bat in 
the course of removal of hazardous trees). 
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Table 4: Numbers of Exceptions by Reason for Take, By Service 
 

















                
FWS 
Exceptions 
4(d) 52 73 35 9 13 7 
10(j) 32 39 16 15 18 8 
Total 84 112 51 24 31 15 
  




4(d) 23 24 21 4 1 1 
10(j) 0 4 0 2 0 0 
Total 23 28 21 6 1 1 
  




  107 140 72 30 32 16 
 
We code as “incidental take” all exceptions labeled as such. However, 
an exception the Service labels as an “incidental take” may encompass 
purposeful takes as well. For instance, the 4(d) rule for the California red-
legged frog excludes from prohibition “incidental take” from “routine 
ranching activities.”189 The rule lists examples of routine ranching 
activities, which include “control and management of burrow complexes 
using discing and grading to destroy burrows and fill openings.”190 We 
consider actions to destroy the burrow complexes in which the frogs spend 
most of their time to be a purposeful take, as compared to construction of 
fences or planting of forage, which harm the frog incidentally. Nonetheless, 
we code this as an “incidental take” to ensure we capture all special 
exceptions relating to activities that might otherwise qualify for an ITP. As 
a result, our count of incidental take exceptions may sometimes include 
purposeful takes as well. Table 4 shows 140 exceptions allow incidental 
takes and 107 allow purposeful takes. Of those, seventy-two exceptions, 
such as those applicable on agricultural land for the Utah prairie dog, 
contain a mix of both purposeful (translocations) and incidental (ordinary 
ranching activities, such a fencing) takes.191 These numbers underscore that 
the chief motivation for 4(d) rulemaking is to allow take otherwise 
prohibited under ESA section 9, ideally where enforcement of the 
prohibitions would not advance species recovery. 
The incidental take permit program applies to both endangered and 
threatened species. A 4(d) rule creating a liability exception for incidental 
take provides an alternative avenue for stakeholders to secure a shield 
 
189. § 17.43(d)(3). 
190. § 17.43(d)(3)(iii). 
191. § 17.40(g)(3). 
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from section 9 liability. A common category of incidental take authorizes 
routine farming and ranching activities, which are less frequently 
addressed in ESA section 10 ITPs than residential, commercial, and 
industrial development.192 Even where agricultural land uses are not 
mentioned in a regulation, they may benefit from rules allowing a 
purposeful take (e.g., relocation) where a species creates “conflict with 
human activities.”193 Other section 4(d) incidental take authorizations 
overlap with the kind of commercial and residential development often 
covered by ITPs.194 
Thirty exceptions allow fishing, hunting, and collecting 
notwithstanding takes of threatened species. Most of these exceptions 
allow only incidental take of non-target threatened species (of fish, 
reptiles, and mollusks) in commercial and sport fishing.195 The sport-fishing 
exceptions mostly rely upon state fishing license regulations and 
enforcement to limit the conservation impacts.196 Hunting game or 
collecting butterflies constitute just three of these exceptions, two of which 
include purposeful take.197 
The protective regulations commonly authorize purposeful takes for 
activities that could be authorized solely by ESA section 10 scientific and 
conservation permits.198 However, 4(d) rulemaking may be the only viable 
avenue for stakeholders to avoid liability for purposeful takes to limit 
depredation or nuisances. We counted thirty-two exceptions that allow 
such purposeful takes. The most controversial purposeful take exceptions 
 
192. See, e.g., § 17.40(l) (exempting established, ongoing agricultural activities from takes 
of the Preble’s meadow jumping mouse); § 17.43(c) (exempting ranching activities from takes of 
the California tiger salamander); see also Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Managing the Working 
Landscape, in THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AT THIRTY 101 (Dale D. Goble, J. Michael Scott, 
and Frank W. Davis eds., 2005). 
193. 50 C.F.R. § 17.84(g)(4) (2019) (allowing relocation of a black-footed ferret in an 
experimental population that causes the conflict). 
194. See, e.g., § 223.203(b)(12) (describing program to authorize incidental takes for 
municipal, residential, commercial, and industrial development under local ordinances and plans 
approved by the Service). 
195. See, e.g., § 17.44(1)(ii) (permitting recreational fishing incidental catch of the Pecos 
bluntnose shiner); § 223.206(d)(2) (allowing commercial shrimp trawler netting incidental catch 
of sea turtles). 
196. See, e.g., § 17.44. 
197. See, e.g., id. § 17.40(i)(3) (allowing incidental shooting of threatened Columbian 
white-tailed deer in the course of hunting black-tailed deer under a lawful state permit and with 
the exercise of “reasonable due care”); § 17.47(a)(4) (exempting purposeful collection of three 
butterfly species—listed as threatened due to their similarity of appearance to an endangered 
butterfly—outside of the range where the endangered butterfly occurs); § 17.84(x)(5) (exempting 
purposeful hunting of the sustained yield generated by an experimental wood bison population in 
Alaska). 
198. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(A) (2018); see, e.g., 50 C.F.R. § 17.40(h)(3) (2019) (allowing 
direct takes of mountain lions consistent with actions to conserve the Florida panther). These 
exceptions often allow small harms that may ultimately save an individual animal from death, such 
as moving stranded Guadalupe fur seals. § 223.201(b)(2). 
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allow shooting or trapping of charismatic fauna—such as wolves and 
bears—that prey on livestock or pets.199 But other rules that abate hazards 
allow purposeful takes for nuisances, such as northern long-eared bats in 
human structures or Utah prairie dogs burrowing that disrupts farms and 
ranches.200 Of the thirty-two depredation/nuisance purposeful takes, 
twenty-eight apply to mammals and four apply to birds. 
Acute safety concerns associated with emergencies, self-defense, and 
defense of others prompted an additional sixteen purposeful take 
exceptions.201 The ESA itself creates a defense to liability for good-faith 
acts of self-defense or defense of others.202 In addition, the Services exclude 
acts in defense of lives from their take regulation applying to all 
endangered species.203 Nonetheless, stakeholders find more assurance in 
species-specific liability shields.204 
Though wildlife trafficking spurred the original federal species 
protection laws, it is no longer a key driver of imperilment within the 
United States.205 Only three protective regulations allow for export and 
commerce of individual organisms and their parts or products. One deals 
with lynx in captivity at the time of listing.206 Another concerns the 
American alligator,207 which is listed under a special provision of the ESA 
not for its own status but for its similarity of appearance to other 
endangered crocodilians.208 The final provision concerns authentic Native 
handicrafts made from the southwest Alaska distinct population segment 
of the northern sea otter.209 
 
199. See, e.g., § 17.40(d)(2)(i)(C) (wolves); § 17.40(b)(1)(i)(C) (grizzly bears); see also 
Sierra Club v. Clark, 755 F.2d 608 (8th Cir. 1985) (reviewing a wolf trapping exception challenge 
that became a leading case on the limits of Service discretion to allow purposeful take).  
200. See, e.g., § 17.84(j)(4)(ii) (describing liability exemption in condor experimental 
population area for public officials when acting on a removal request by landowners adversely 
affected by condor behavior); § 17.40(o)(2) (detailing liability exemptions for removal of bats from 
human structures and for the protection of public health); § 17.40(g) (Utah prairie dog). 
201. See, e.g., § 17.84(l)(5)(iii) (waiving liability in experimental population areas for self-
defense by any person, but not for general nuisance bears). 
202. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(a)(3), (b)(3) (2018). 
203. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.21(c)(2) (2019). 
204. See, e.g., § 17.40(h)(4) (providing that the Florida mountain lion may be taken “for 
reasons of human safety”). 
205. BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note 62. 
206. 50 C.F.R. § 17.40(k)(4) (2019). 
207. § 17.42(a) (allowing take and commercial use of American alligators under certain 
circumstances). 
208. Reclassification of the American Alligator to Threatened Due to Similarity of 
Appearance Throughout the Remainder of Its Range, 52 Fed. Reg. 21,059 (Jun. 4, 1987) 
(explaining the rationale for listing the American alligator under 16 U.S.C. § 1533(e)).  
209. 50 CF.R. § 17.40(p) (2019). 
 




The most innovative collaborative governance approaches to section 
4(d) rulemaking describe how activities can proceed without take liability. 
We distinguished between provisions that shield certain conservation 
practices (e.g., use of turtle excluder devices)210 from those that identify 
impact thresholds below which take activities are exempt (e.g., limiting 
take exception to 5 percent of the population).211 Table 5 shows that almost 
three-quarters of the protective regulations contain some practice-based 
criterion for an activity to qualify for an exception. Only twenty-seven 
exceptions provided effects-based standards, and many of them also 
contained practice-based limitations.212 
 
Table 5: Triggers for Exceptions, By Service 
 
    Triggers   Practice-Based Triggers 





to a Plan 
Reporting 
Requirement  
          
FWS 
Exceptions 
4(d) 81 12 
 
28 5 1 
10(j) 28 5 
 






39 5 1 
        
NMFS 
Exceptions 
4(d) 25 9 
 
8 8 9 
10(j) 1 1 
 






8 8 9 






47 13 10 
 
Effects-based triggers for exceptions establish outcomes that focus on 
the consequences of the take. The thresholds may be quantitative (e.g., a 
certain number of individual deaths) or qualitative (e.g., a take that results 
in death).213 The threshold approach to trigger take mirrors the Service’s 
 
210. § 223.206(d)(2) (requiring turtle excluder devices on fishing nets to qualify for take 
exception). 
211. § 17.40(i)(4) (limiting a program permitting a variety of takes to no more than 5 
percent of the Columbian white-tailed deer population). 
212. See, e.g., § 17.40(l)(2)(iii) (excepting incidental take of Preble’s jumping mouse for 
certain agricultural activities (practice-based) that “do not increase impacts to or further encroach 
upon the Preble’s meadow jumping mouse or its habitat” (effects-based)). 
213. Compare § 17.40(g)(3)(iii) (limiting state permitted take of Utah prairie dogs on 
agricultural lands and private property near conservation land to 10% of estimated range-wide 
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“harm” definition, which triggers liability when an act “actually kills or 
injures wildlife . . .  through habitat modification or degradation . . .  by 
significantly impairing essential behavior patterns, including breeding, 
feeding or sheltering.”214 The spotty enforcement of the ESA harm 
prohibition indicates that monitoring impacts, especially from habitat 
disruption, on species recovery is exceedingly difficult. Devastating 
impacts on species viability from habitat alteration may never result in any 
detected injury to an individual animal proximately caused by the 
alteration activity. The 4(d) effects-based thresholds may alleviate the 
problem of proving take by measuring habitat directly, rather than relying 
on actual, injured wildlife. The best effects-based rules provide a 
quantitative surrogate for identifying the boundary between a take 
exception and potential section 9 liability. The advantage of effects-based 
approaches is that they avoid overregulation by allowing some number of 
takes not expected to impede recovery. 
Exceptions that substitute practice-based limitations for difficult-to-
detect proximate consequences of an activity are far more common. A 
practice that causes some takes may result in better conservation than 
banning unnoticed effects on individual animals. Moreover, some practices 
derive from collaborative plans or relational contracting. We found 
evidence of collaborative governance transforming the ESA from a statute 
that prohibits actions proximately causing species or individual animals 
from crossing certain thresholds (i.e., harm, jeopardy, recovery 
impairment) into a regulatory program insisting on best practices along the 
lines of pollution-control statutes.215 
The practice-based exceptions usually specify only a general type of 
activity, such as “restoration” or “enforcement.”216 But forty-seven 
exceptions—35 percent of practice-based limitations—provide some sort 
of definition or standard for the activities that qualify as a “practice” 
triggering the exception. These exceptions vary in their level of detail, 
creating a continuum of clarity. We describe this gradient in the following 
paragraphs, because we consider specificity important in both constraining 
exceptions and in providing stakeholders with clear guidelines for what 
they may do without risking ESA liability. We draw many of our examples 
from agricultural activities. All but one exception limited to agricultural 
 
population annually), with § 17.84(x)(5)(v) (allowing harassment of wood bison experimental 
population as long as it is not “lethal or physically injurious” to an individual bison). 
214. § 17.3.  
215. See Robert L. Fischman, Predictions and Prescriptions for the Endangered Species 
Act, 34 ENVTL. L. 451, 475-79 (2004). 
216. See, e.g., 50 C.F.R. § 223.210(b)(2) (2019) (describing exception for take of green 
sturgeon in the course of enforcement activity); § 223.208(c)(2) (exempting take of threatened 
coral in the course of restoration activity); § 17.84(b)(2)(i) (allowing take of Colorado squawfish 
and woundfin for “educational purposes, scientific purposes, the enhancement of propagation or 
survival of the species, zoological exhibition, and other conservation purposes”). 
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land uses (which includes forest management and ranching) contained a 
practice-based standard; two-thirds of them included some kind of 
definition or standard for determining which agricultural activities the 
exception covers. 
The least specific standards that we count in Table 5 as “special 
practice definition or standard” limit liability exceptions descriptively, 
through such terms as normal, generally accepted, routine, or humanely. 
The descriptions may be subjective. For instance, no liability attends to a 
government official or designated agent who takes a stranded Guadalupe 
fur seal as long as she does it in a “humane manner.”217 That is a practice-
based approach because liability does not hinge on the outcome, such as 
whether the seal actually experienced injury. More objective—but not very 
specific—standards sometimes characterize exceptions. For instance, 
immune incidental takes of the California tiger salamander from “routine 
ranching activities . . . include, but are not limited to, livestock grazing 
according to normally acceptable and established levels of intensity in 
terms of the number of head of livestock per acre of rangeland.”218 
Other exceptions explain a standard through illustrative practices the 
Services intend to endorse. For instance, qualifying for an exception to 
incidental takes of Utah prairie dogs requires the use of “standard” 
agricultural practices, which “include plowing to depths that do not exceed 
46 cm (18 in.), discing, harrowing, irrigating crops, mowing, harvesting, and 
bailing.”219 The Mazama pocket gophers exception for “accepted 
agricultural or horticultural (farming) practices include “[p]lanting, 
harvest, fertilization, harrowing, tilling, or rotation of crops . . . [with soil 
disturbance not exceeding] a 12-inch (30.5-cm) depth.”220 Though the 
depth limits introduce an outcome component to the practice-based 
standard, we code these exceptions as practice-based. Our coding decision 
more clearly distinguishes the less common exceptions defined by 
proximate effects on an individual, population, or habitat feature. 
Many rules prescribe a manner of acting with reference to some 
express standard. The regulation itself may define the standard of practice. 
For instance, experimental populations of the grizzly bear may be subject 
to “opportunistic, noninjurious harassment,” a term defined elsewhere in 
 
217. § 223.201(b)(2) (implying that the take may be lethal so long as it “[i]ncludes steps 
designed to ensure the return of the animal to its natural habitat, if feasible”). Undefined humane 
constraints also apply to some permitted takes of grizzly bears and wolves. See, e.g., § 
17.40(b)(1)(i)(C), (d)(2)(i)(C). 
218. § 17.43(c)(3). A similar exception for the California red-legged frog contains almost 
identical standards. See § 17.43(d)(2). 
219. § 17.40(g)(5). 
220. § 17.40(a)(4)(ii)(D). 
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the rule.221 Or, a regulation may incorporate practices through reference to 
other federal criteria. For instance, the streaked horned lark exception for 
“routine management activities associated with airport operations to 
minimize hazardous wildlife”222 contains a reference to an FAA regulation 
prescribing certain standards.223 
Collaborative governance is especially evident in the thirteen 
exceptions that define the manner of exempted behavior with reference to 
plans adopted outside of federal rulemaking. Because land-use planning is 
less common in rural areas and generally regulates a wide array of uses, 
none of the exceptions limited to agricultural uses include practices defined 
in plans. The 1993 coastal California gnatcatcher 4(d) rule marked the 
earliest incorporation of practice standards from a plan. It allows incidental 
takes resulting from activities authorized by an approved California 
Natural Community Conservation Planning (NCCP) program with the 
written concurrence of the Service.224 In supporting the relatively new 
NCCP, the FWS attempted to motivate collaborative governance of 
gnatcatcher habitat in the context of land-use planning. In 1998, the FWS 
concurred on the San Diego Species Conservation Program’s plan for the 
unincorporated areas in the county. Those areas contained most of the 
gnatcatcher’s remaining habitat but also tracts ripe for residential 
development.225 
Like the NCCP-authorized gnatcatcher plan, protective regulations 
often encourage planning in incidental take exceptions, even if the plans 
are still prospective at the time of the 4(d) rulemaking. The West Coast 
salmon ESUs protective regulation for municipal, residential, commercial, 
and industrial development waives liability for incidental takes only if the 
development occurs pursuant to plans that the NMFS determines 
“adequately conserve listed salmonids by maintaining and restoring 
 
221. §§ 17.84(l)(5)(iv), (16) (describing exceptions for permitted harassment and 
definition of “opportunistic noninjurious harassment” respectively). 
222. § 17.41(a) (4(d) rule for streaked horned lark). 
223. 14 C.F.R. § 139.337 (2019) (describing requirements for wildlife hazard assessment 
and plans to abate the hazards). 
224. 50 C.F.R. § 17.41(b)(2) (2019). Determination of Threatened Status for the Coastal 
California Gnatcatcher, 58 Fed. Reg. 16,742 (Mar. 30, 1993), marked the first important 
collaborative governance effort to support non-federal plans by relieving parties of incidental take 
liability. See Fischman & Hall-Rivera, supra note 83, at 97 (“[T]he 1993 rule was one of the very 
first demonstrations of Secretary Babbitt’s initiative to show that the Act provided sufficient 
flexibility to accommodate development.”). 
225. Implementing Agreement by and Between United States Fish and Wildlife Services 
California Department of Fish and Game City of San Diego To Establish a Multiple Species 
Conservation Program (“MSCP”) For The Conservation of Threatened, Endangered and Other 
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properly functioning habitat conditions.”226 Aside from the gnatcatcher 
and the West Coast salmon rules, most other 4(d) exceptions neglect to 
require Service concurrence before authorizing activities to proceed.227 
The final column in Table 5 tallies the ten practice-based triggers 
requiring some kind of reporting to the Services. Protective regulations for 
land development plans affecting the West Coast salmon require periodic 
reporting, as do the research projects exempted from green sturgeon 
takes.228 Reporting is especially important because the Services receive 
information necessary to adjust requirements so that the conservation 
criterion remains fulfilled. We explore this issue in the next Section. 
An alternative to planning as a method for specifying what criteria an 
exempt practice must meet is state and local permitting. Where a state has 
the expertise and capacity to restrict and monitor activities, the Service 
may rely on the state as a matter of efficiency, cooperative federalism, and 
collaborative governance. Reliance on state permitting is particularly 
evident in FWS exceptions for fishes, which commonly contain exceptions 
that require ordinary state hunting and fishing licenses. Some 4(d) rules 
allow a state to “permit” certain activities without clarifying whether that 
may occur only through individual permit issuance or by blanket 
permission.229 
A Utah prairie dog regulation illustrates a rare reliance on 
cooperative federalism to restrict and monitor an exception to the section 
9 take prohibition.230 The FWS allows takes of the Utah prairie dog “when 
permitted by the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources,” subject to 
geographic limitations and a requirement that the state maintain records 
on the takes.231 The state requires landowners to obtain a “certificate of 
registration” in order to take a Utah prairie dog in compliance with the 
 
226. 50 C.F.R. § 223.203(b)(12) (2019) (listing twelve considerations relevant in the 
NMFS adequacy determination); see also Wash. Envtl. Council v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 
No C00-1547R, 2002 WL 511479 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 27, 2002) (upholding the salmonid rule against 
a challenge that the incidental take liability waiver for activities under prospectively approved 
development plans violated the ESA). 
227. Some exceptions for activities not related to land development may proceed 
according to some kind of plan, such as a study design. If subject to federal permitting, concurrence 
may not be important. For instance, no green sturgeon take prohibitions apply to scientific 
research as long as the study objectives, methods, funding, and estimated takes are described and 
submitted to the NMFS regional office. No NMFS concurrence or approval is required. 50 C.F.R. 
§223.210(b)(1) (2019). 
228.  50 C.F.R. §§ 223.203(b)(12)(ii), 223.210(b)(1)(viii). 
229. See, e.g., 50 C.F.R. § 17.44 (l), (o), (r), (x) (2019) (allowing for “state-permitted 
recreational fishing activities” for the Warner sucker, Sonora chub, Pecos bluntnose shiner and 
bull trout, respectively); § 17.40(g)(3) (allowing takes of Utah prairie dogs “when permitted by 
the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources”). 
230. § 17.40(g). 
231. § 17.40(g)(3). 
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FWS 4(d) rule.232 In return for the certificate, the registrant must make 
monthly reports of the location, method of take, and method of disposal 
for each Utah prairie dog taken.233 This allows the state to monitor its 
compliance with the annual limits established by the FWS to ensure that 
the program does not diminish the populations by set percentages.234 
Whether the state actually has any incentive or capacity to engage accurate 
populations surveying is a separate issue of conservation effectiveness 
requiring Service oversight.235 Other protective regulations rely on more 
specific state permitting and reporting.236 
4. How Long: Review and Revision 
As we explain in Section IV.C.2, species recovery requires adaptive 
management to promote learning while taking steps intended to achieve 
conservation objectives. Adaptive management relies on monitoring key 
indicators of success and establishing triggers for reassessing actions when 
monitoring indicates unexpected outcomes. We analyzed the 4(d) rules to 
identify provisions that incorporate these under-implemented elements of 
adaptive management.237 Our results echo studies of judicial review of 
agency actions and federal public land planning in finding that the 
protective regulations only weakly attempt to employ adaptive 
management.238 
The need for better and more current information on species 
populations and habitats drives monitoring requirements, which are the 
only element of adaptive management apparent in 4(d) rules. Table 6 
shows that seventy-seven exceptions require monitoring and reporting by 
 
232. UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 657-19-6 (2020) (describing application requirements to 
receive authorization to take via firearm or trapping). 
233. Id. r. 657-19-8.  
234. 50 C.F.R. § 17.40(g)(3)(iii) (2019). 
235. Prairie dog “plinking” is a common hobby widely considered beneficial for ranchers. 
See Melissa Bachman, Prairie Dog Plinking – Great Summertime Rifle Practice, WINCHESTER, 
https://winchester.com/Blog/2017/07/prairie-dog-plinking-great-summer-rifle-practice 
[https://perma.cc/SC2T-ECMC]. 
236. See, e.g., § 17.84(l)(5)(v) (requiring the reporting of the “date, exact location, and 
circumstances” of the take within 24 hours for livestock owners’ permits to kill grizzly bears 
actually pursuing or killing livestock); § 17.40(i)(3)(i) (allowing harassment of Columbian white-
tailed deer if state conservation agency determines that such action is not likely to cause 
mortality); § 17.84(x)(5)(iii) (allowing takes for any person with a valid Alaska Department of 
Fish and Game permit for a wide variety of purposes). 
237. See generally Robert L. Fischman & J.B. Ruhl, Judging Adaptive Management 
Practices of U.S. Agencies, 30 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 268 (2016) (identifying as shortcomings 
of federal agency practice of adaptive management the lack of clear objectives and processes, 
monitoring thresholds, and defined actions triggered by thresholds). 
238. See id.; Robert L. Fischman, Leveraging Federal Land Plans into Landscape 
Conservation, 6 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 46 (2016); Martin A. Nie & Courtney A. 
Schultz, Decision-Making Triggers in Adaptive Management, 26 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1137 
(2012). 
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some entity (aside from what plans require, which we report in the 
previous section). We counted any reporting requirement of take as 
fulfilling the monitoring element.239 The experimental population 10(j) 
rules and the NMFS 4(d) rules are far more likely to require monitoring 
and reporting than FWS 4(d) rules. Reporting may be required even for 
routine actions by officials (designated agents) under take exceptions, such 
as removal of stranded Guadalupe fur seals.240 The NMFS also requires 
fishing vessels to host its approved observers to monitor commercial 
fisheries to overcome perverse incentives for underreporting.241 Overall, 
the NMFS salmonid rule is the best example of adaptive management, with 
monitoring, reporting, and revocation review provisions.242 
 
Table 6: Monitoring and Review in Exceptions, By Service 
 
      
Triggers for Review of Regulation 
    Monitoring Time 
Conservation 
Measure 
       
FWS Exceptions 4(d) 11 3 7 
10(j) 56 48 2 
  Total 67 51 9 
  




4(d) 9 2 2 
10(j) 1 1 0 
  Total 10 3 2 
  
   
  
Total Exceptions   77 54 11 
 
We focused on exceptions that allow modification of requirements 
outside of the time-consuming process of revision via notice-and-comment 
rulemaking. Many rules state that the Service may or will revise an 
exception via rulemaking, but the Services may do that in any event. 
Outside of reevaluation and revision of area-wide plans, a trigger for 
changing the content of exceptions is rare outside of time-limited FWS 
10(j) rules. We identified fifty-four exceptions that use a time period to 
 
239. See, e.g., 50 C.F.R. § 17.40(b)(i)(B) (2019) (requiring that any individual who takes 
advantage of the general authorization of grizzly bear takes for self-defense or defense of others 
report the take within five days). 
240. § 223.201(b)(2). For further discussion, see supra note 217. 
241. See, e.g., § 223.206(d)(2)(iii)(C), (10)(v) (requiring observers to monitor and report 
on compliance with the threatened sea turtles 4(d) incidental take regulations). 
242. § 223.203. 
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trigger review, excluding exceptions promising reevaluation of the species’ 
status in five years, which is a statutory requirement.243 We found a handful 
of innovative review provisions. For instance, the NMFS employed a 
“hammer” to ensure that tribal and state regulators submitted a timely 
fishery management plan.244 The rule provided for revocation of a take-by-
harvest exception if the NMFS did not receive the plan by a particular 
date.245 The Jarbridge River DPS of bull trout 4(d) rule contains a rare 
expiration date for its two exceptions.246 Other date-certain reevaluations 
simply promise reviews of a conservation program without any particular 
consequence for stakeholders.247 
Eleven exceptions incorporate review triggers based on the number 
or proportion of a population taken. The exception for accidental and 
problem-deer takes of Columbian white-tailed deer is unusual in providing 
several different triggers for graduated action depending on how much the 
takes exceed the annual allowable limit of 5 percent of the population.248 
If takes allowed under the special rule exceed the limit by 2 percent of the 
population, then the FWS will convene a meeting to discuss strategies to 
minimize further losses. But, if the takes exceed the limit by 5 percent, then 
no further take will be allowed for the remainder of the year.249 More 
typically, the Utah prairie dog rule allows the Service to “immediately 
prohibit or restrict” take exceptions “if the Service receives evidence” that 
they are “having an effect that is inconsistent with the conservation” of the 
species.250 Sea turtle protective regulations applicable to the fishing 
 
243. See, e.g., § 17.85(d)(4). 
244. Steel Mfrs. Ass’n v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 27 F.3d 642, 644 (D.C. Cir. 1994), explained 
the commonly used term in regulating hazardous chemicals under the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA): “The 1984 amendments to RCRA establish a strict timetable for the 
promulgation of specific treatment standards for the land disposal of hazardous wastes. . . . If 
treatment standards were not in place for any waste on the list by May 8, 1990, a statutory ‘hard 
hammer’” would fall, [with the draconian consequence of] precluding any land disposal of the 
waste in question.” (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6924(g)(6)(C) (1988)). The hammer succeeded in 
motivating regulated industries to support prompt promulgation of regulations. See Susan M. 
McMichael, RCRA’s Statutory and Regulatory Framework, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & 
ANALYSIS 10,432 (2010) (describing how RCRA’s various hammer provisions operated to ensure 
strict regulation of hazardous waste). 
245.  50 C.F.R. § 223.203(b)(2)(ii) (2019). 
246.  § 17.44(x)(2). The FWS intended the expiration date to encourage Idaho and 
Nevada to “develop a management and conservation plan” for long-term recovery. Determination 
of Threatened Status for the Jarbirdge River Population Segment of Bull Trout, 64 Fed. Reg. 
17,110, 17,122 (Apr. 8, 1999). 
247.  See, e.g., § 17.84(c)(11) (promising reevaluation of the red wolf experimental 
population program for the Alligator National Wildlife Refuge by Oct. 1, 1992); § 17.84(g)(11) 
(promising reevaluation of the black-footed ferret experimental population program within the 
first five years after release of introduced ferrets). 
248.  § 17.40(i)(4). 
249.  Id. 
250.  § 17.40(g)(6). Because these takes occur on private land, we are skeptical that the 
FWS will receive much of this evidence, which would likely need to be self-reported by 
landowners. 
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industry provide a complex set of procedures for adaptive modifications of 
practices.251 
 
Our results show incremental adjustment of the section 9 take 
prohibition, with the Services applying it in some instances and waiving it 
in others. But it is the tailoring of special exceptions that best manifests 
collaborative governance. The primary interest motivating collaboration is 
allowing habitat harms otherwise prohibited by the ESA. After 2019, these 
will be habitat harms excluded from ESA regulation absent a species-
specific 4(d) rule. The forty-three exceptions creating special roles for non-
federal agencies illustrate the vitality of cooperative federalism in wildlife 
conservation. The exceptions for landowners, livestock owners, and 
activities on non-federal land focus on decision makers who control most 
of the habitat not directly protected under ESA section 7. Further progress 
in 4(d) rulemaking will require improvements to the incentives and 
conservation outcomes bearing on these collaborators. In particular, the 
role of tailoring in converting effect-based thresholds to practice-based 
limitations for common activities is preeminently important. Whether 
through practices hammered out in the course of a 4(d) rulemaking, land-
use planning, or by third-party standard-setters, we found overwhelming 
evidence of this form of tailoring found in 135 exceptions. It is an effective 
way to nudge behaviors toward conservation outcomes and speaks to the 
evolution of the ESA toward a pollution-control model of shaping 
behavior. 
B.  Potential Conservation Shortcomings 
The past several decades of ESA administration emphasized 
incentives to negotiate collaborative conservation to improve recovery and 
to moderate opposition to the statute. Several critics worry that the rise in 
4(d) rulemaking generally, and in collaborative conservation especially, 
sacrifices the conservation standard in order to reward any 
collaboration.252 To evaluate the criticism, we reviewed the conservation 
justifications of protective regulations. We find some conservation 
shortcomings but also potential for recovery. 
We limited our review of conservation justifications to the materials 
published in the Federal Register upon promulgation of the final listing 
and 4(d) rules. Unlike the judiciary, which evaluates the administrative 
record supporting the final rulemaking, we do not dig into the actual data 
and quantitative tools referenced by the rulemaking. We intend only to 
 
251.  See, e.g., § 223.206(d)(3)(iv) (modification of tow-time restrictions on trawlers), 
(10)(vi) (expedited schedule of modifications for restrictions via rulemaking). 
252.  See, e.g., Blumm & Marienfeld, supra note 86; Sanerib, Elkins, & Greenwald, supra 
note 24. 
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highlight potential conservation shortcomings in the rules we analyzed. In 
other words, we are evaluating the rules through a coarse filter to provide 
a sense of where weaknesses may lurk in the record justifying the 
regulation as “necessary and advisable to provide for” recovery of the 
species.253 Future research may evaluate accommodative rules to quantify 
the extent of the problems we raise here. Courts leave “the scope and 
contours” of the 4(d) rules entirely to Service discretion.254 We probe more 
deeply into the connection between the specific factors driving the species’ 
decline and the special exceptions. Potential to fail does not mean harm 
without benefit—the Service may simply neglect to provide information in 
the Federal Register to justify the exception. 
In its recent rulemaking prospectively removing the blanket extension 
of section 9 prohibitions to all threatened species except as provided for in 
4(d) rules, the FWS described how it marshals its limited resources. It 
stated that its 4(d) rules fulfill the conservation criterion “by focusing 
prohibitions on the stressors contributing to the threatened status of the 
species.”255 The FWS explained that its staff “tailor regulations by limiting 
the prohibitions to those activities that are causing the threat of 
extinction.”256 This Section questions the accuracy of those representations 
for some tailored special exceptions. 
Many 4(d) exceptions shield lawful activities that clearly pose no 
threat either to persistence or to recovery of the listed taxon. For example, 
fence construction and maintenance as part of agriculture and ranching is 
not considered a factor threatening the Dakota skipper.257 However, we 
identify several exceptions where the information on threats seems to 
contradict the conservation justification in the 4(d) rule. The first 
subsection, below, describes failures to address known threats in justifying 
an exception. Then we present two case studies on responding to 
stakeholder resistance. In all these cases, we find evidence of 
accommodative conservation. The turtle protection rules discussed in 
Section III.B.2 also illustrate how early laxity created time for stakeholders 
to amortize investments, adjust to new technology, and ultimately achieve 
greater conservation results after a series of rule revisions. Finally, Section 
III.B.3 discusses an exception for the pygmy sculpin that fails to consider 
foreseeable impacts on recovery, a troubling shortcoming given the 
expected pace of environmental change. Unlike the turtle protective 
 
253.  16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (2018). Our broad-brush review is likely to miss many 
conservation shortcomings that would be revealed by a more detailed analysis of the studies 
supporting the administrative record. 
254. Ruhl, The Regulation Charade, supra note 124, at 150. 
255. Regulations for Prohibitions to Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 84 Fed. Reg. 44,753, 
44,754 (Aug. 27, 2019). 
256. Id. at 44,755. 
257. Threatened Species Status for Dakota Skipper and Endangered Species Status for 
Poweshiek Skipperling, 79 Fed. Reg. 63,672, 63,745 (Oct. 24, 2014). 
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regulations, the pygmy sculpin rule has not been strengthened through 
revisions and so may no longer reflect a long-term conservation benefit. 
1. Failure to Address Known Threats 
Two 4(d) exceptions for the streaked horned lark seem insufficiently 
aligned with the conservation needs of the species.258 The lark has 
disappeared from much of its range, and its short-grass habitat widely 
converted by development and intensive agriculture.259 Airport fields and 
grass-seed farms now provide its most productive habitat and enjoy take 
exceptions. The FWS insists that creating these acceptable habitats is 
necessary for conservation.260 However, creation of habitat for streaked 
horned lark is not the intended purpose of airport maintenance or 
agriculture. As a result, several of the activities shielded from take liability 
(e.g., mowing, discing, and burning) may create the short vegetation sought 
by the larks, but also can destroy nests and kill nestlings.261 
Much of the agricultural land in the larks’ range is private and 
unsurveyed for larks. Compared to their small footprint, airports are 
disproportionately important for conservation of known populations of the 
species. The largest recorded current population of streaked horned larks 
in the Willamette Valley occurs at the Corvallis Municipal Airport.262 The 
listing rule explains that airports “routinely implement programs to 
minimize the presence of hazardous wildlife on airfields, and these 
activities unintentionally create suitable habitat for streaked horned 
larks.”263 The FWS describes practices at some air bases and airports that 
protect nests and nestlings, in particular the adjustment of mowing regimes 
to limit harm during the nesting season.264 However, the exception for 
airport maintenance requires none of those mowing adjustments and 
places no constraints on the excepted maintenance activities. The Service 
explained that constraints on airport managers would cause them to 
 
258. 50 C.F.R. §17.41(a)(3) (2019) (excepting airport management of grass, weeds, 
shrubs, and trees through mowing, discing, herbicide application, or burning); § 17.41(a)(4)(iii)(A) 
(excepting accepted agricultural practices including—but not limited to—planting, harvesting, 
rotation, mowing, tilling, discing, burning, and herbicide application to crops). Litigation 
challenging the combined listing and 4(d) rulemaking resulted in a 2019 bench ruling that 
remanded the listing decision to the FWS without vacating the rule. See Center for Biological 
Diversity v. Zinke, No. 3:18-CV-00359-MO (D. Or. July 8, 2019). The FWS is expected to make a 
new finding on risk of endangerment/extinction in 2021.  
259. Determination of Endangered Status for the Taylor’s Checkerspot Butterfly and 
Threatened Status for the Streaked Horned Lark, 78 Fed. Reg. 61,452, 61,480-81 (Oct. 3, 2013). 
260. Id. at 61,500-02. 
261. Id. at 61,474. 
262. Id. at 61,492. 
263. Id. at 61,500. 
264. Id. at 61,474. 
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exclude streaked horned larks entirely, due to the burdensome 
requirements.265 Yet, adjusting mowing practices does not seem—on its 
face—to be a heavy burden in exchange for a shield from the take 
prohibition. 
The FWS noted that economic pressures on farms were reducing 
acreage in the most suitable cover: grass-seed production.266 The Service 
concluded that providing an exception for routine farming practices would 
benefit the lark by reducing producers’ incentives to change crops or 
convert the land through development.267 Mowing practices may be less 
flexible in agricultural settings due to the timing of the seed crop. The 
Service promised to “work closely with the farming community in the 
Willamette Valley to develop ways to monitor impacts on streaked horned 
larks from routine agricultural activities.”268 But it made no commitment 
to act upon monitoring information or to investigate agricultural practices 
that might reduce harm to, or even benefit, the lark. 
Both streaked horned-lark exceptions involve activities known to 
reduce reproductive success of the species. The exceptions provide relief 
to land managers without counter-balancing restrictions, even when the 
restrictions are demonstrably feasible (as with airport maintenance). They 
also lack commitment to act on information that improves understanding 
of take (from routine agricultural practices). As a result, they fail to 
provide the conservation benefit potentially available from the exceptions. 
Haying and grazing exceptions that seek to retain agricultural land 
cover for the Dakota skipper similarly fail to connect information on 
threats and status with a conservation benefit under the 4(d) rule.269 The 
Dakota skipper is a small butterfly inhabiting Minnesota, the Dakotas, 
Manitoba, and Saskatchewan.270 As with the airport exception for streaked 
horned lark, the FWS referenced its own unpublished studies on 
minimizing take during haying to ensure that nectar-producing plants 
remain available to breeding adults.271 Specifically, the listing rule 
concludes that “fall haying is beneficial” to the skipper “if it is conducted 
after . . . August 1 . . . no more than every other year, and there is no 
indication that native plant species diversity is declining due to timing or 
frequency of haying.”272 From this information, the Service crafted an 
 
265. Id. at 61,500. 
266. Id. at 61,480. 
267. Id. at 61,500-01. 
268. Id. at 61,501. 
269. 50 C.F.R. § 17.47(b)(3)(v), (vii) (2019). 
270. Threatened Species Status for Dakota Skipper and Endangered Species Status for 
Poweshiek Skipperling, 79 Fed. Reg. 63,672, 63,677 (Oct. 24, 2014). 
271. Id. at 63,728. 
272. Id. 
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exception for harvest of native haylands after July 15.273 In response to a 
comment that haying should not be permitted to begin that early, the 
Service offered three justifications. “First, factors other than the date in 
the 4(d) rule will likely play a greater role in determining actual haying 
dates, . . . [s]econd, the July 15 date has been used for many years in a 
variety of conservation agreements as a date to ensure that the effects of 
haying on nesting birds is minimized, . . . [and] [t]hird, even if haying is 
conducted immediately after July 15, it may be sufficient to minimize 
adverse effects to Dakota skippers at most sites and in most years.”274 If 
most haying will be after July 15 (elsewhere the Service indicates most 
haying starts after August 1), the record would better support a start date 
of  August 1.275 Further, the ground-nesting, grassland bird species 
protected by the July date will likely accrue additional protection from an 
August date. The Service provided no estimate of the increase in take that 
might occur from the less conservative mid-July date. The rulemaking also 
failed to address the frequency of haying, which often occurs annually.276 
The rule did not purport to retain the diverse, native vegetation that 
supports skippers. 
Thus, a useful, although unpublished, FWS study with nuanced 
information on the ways in which haying can benefit the Dakota skipper 
became the basis for an exception. But the exception ultimately lacked 
protections that may benefit the species, with no analysis or estimate of the 
increased risk to the skipper.277 Even if the departures from a skipper-
benefitting harvest regime are consistent with persistence of the skipper, 
the published materials contain nothing to suggest they will support 
recovery. 
Though flawed, the Dakota skipper haying exception is recognizably 
connected to research results. In contrast, the exception for grazing in the 
Dakota skipper 4(d) rule is based on observations that fail to show a 
benefit to the species. The FWS included “heavy grazing” as one of the 
factors believed to have resulted in extirpation of the species from part of 
its range.278 Nevertheless, the cattle, bison, or horse grazing exception on 
private, state, or tribal land contains no limitations on grazing intensity or 
methods.279 
 
273. Id. at 63,748. 
274. Id. at 63,700 (emphasis added). 
275. Id. at 63,746. 
276. Id. at 63,728. 
277. Id. (citing unpublished studies that “assessed the level of impact of haying to 
populations at 41 Dakota skipper sites . . . where we had sufficient information to assess the 
stressor”). 
278. Threatened Species Status for Dakota Skipper and Endangered Species Status for 
Poweshiek Skipperling, 79 Fed. Reg. at 63,680. 
279. Id. at 63,748. 
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The FWS explained that grazing may maintain habitat, but “as with 
any management practice, appropriate timing, frequency, and intensity are 
important.”280 Grazing management scenarios that benefit the skipper 
include “adaptive management to adjust grazing prescriptions according to 
their effects on essential features of the prairie ecosystem,”281 a practice 
that is not common even on federal lands with staff trained in adaptive 
management.282 Other studies found rotational grazing light enough to 
maintain plant species diversity could benefit the skipper.283 Despite all 
these limitations on the circumstances under which grazing conserves 
skipper habit, the FWS concluded that, “in light of the great importance 
that cooperative relationships with . . . private livestock producers will play 
in conserving the Dakota skipper, we find that it is necessary and advisable 
to exempt take that may be caused by grazing on non-Federal lands.”284 
The grazing exception illustrates an accommodative conservation 
approach that fails to tailor a special exception to avoid impairing recovery.  
The Service presented no information to indicate that some useful 
proportion of livestock owners used grazing regimes associated with 
benefit to the skipper (e.g., adaptive management, light grazing, 
maintenance of native plant diversity for nectar sources for breeding 
adults). Neither did it describe a funded program to support collaborative 
agreements between the Service and livestock owners to encourage such 
grazing regimes. Allowing unrestricted grazing is unlikely to prevent 
conversion to row crops, which are currently “more economically 
viable.”285 Nothing in the FWS rulemaking suggests that grazing, in the 
absence of limitations, guidance, and monitoring, contributes to recovery. 
Grazing may potentially support skipper conservation, but the exception 
does not actually support it.286 
2. Resistance to Protective Regulation 
A pair of ranching exceptions for two different amphibians with 
overlapping ranges offers contrasting approaches to generating 
 
280. Id. at 63,724. 
281. Id. 
282. See Fischman & Ruhl, supra note 237237.  
283. Threatened Species Status for Dakota Skipper and Endangered Species Status for 
Poweshiek Skipperling, 79 Fed. Reg. at 63,724. 
284. Id. at 63,745. 
285. Id. at 63,724-25; see 2020 Plowprint Report, WORLD WILDLIFE FUND (Aug. 5, 
2020), https://www.worldwildlife.org/publications/2020-plowprint-report [https://perma.cc/W5LL-
2RZZ] (documenting the steady decline in unplowed grassland). 
286. To its credit, the Service properly points out that, whereas overgrazed land can be 
returned to a condition that benefits the Dakota skipper, land that is converted to row-crop 
agriculture or to development is unlikely to benefit the species in the foreseeable future. 
Threatened Species Status for Dakota Skipper and Endangered Species Status for Poweshiek 
Skipperling, 79 Fed. Reg, 63,672, 63,698 cmt. 40, 63,724-26 (Oct. 24, 2014). 
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conservation benefits.287 In two similar circumstances, only one rule 
constrains ranching activity to ensure conservation benefit. Further 
research should explore why some collaborations include a give-and-take 
while others permit unrestricted continuation of practices that contribute 
to species imperilment. We conclude this subsection by describing the 
NMFS path to improving conservation outcomes in one of the most 
controversial 4(d) restrictions on commercial activity: turtle-excluding 
devices (TEDs). It offers hope that weak rules may improve over time. 
The California tiger salamander and red-legged frog both need moist 
conditions, which they find in burrows created by small mammals, often 
near stream-side (riparian) habitats or water impoundments (stock ponds). 
The salamanders spend most of the year in burrows; the frogs use them in 
summer.288 Both species’ 4(d) rules create an exception for “routine 
ranching activity.”289 Burrowing mammals impose costs on ranchers 
because they compete with livestock for food and create holes in the 
ground that may injure livestock.290 Soil treatments, such as discing, can be 
used to destroy burrows; discing may also be used to plant specific crops or 
ground covers for grazing. 
The salamander exception applies categorically to the “control and 
management of burrow complexes using discing and grading to destroy 
burrows and fill openings.”291 In contrast, the parallel exception for red-
legged frogs “does not apply to areas within 0.7 mi. . . . of known or 
potential California red-legged frog breeding ponds.”292 The 0.7-mile 
radius supports habitat connectivity in order to provide dispersal habitat 
for frogs moving between closely-located aquatic habitats. The rule also 
protects some burrows, ensuring they are available for summer 
occupation.293 
The routine ranching activities exception for the salamander mirrors 
the grazing exception for the skipper—both seek to protect a land use that 
may benefit the species, but without providing adequate conditions to 
 
287. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.43(c) (2019) (Cal. tiger salamander); § 17.43(d) (red-legged frog). 
288. Determination of Threatened Status for the California Tiger Salamander; and 
Special Rule Exemption for Existing Routine Ranching Activities, 69 Fed. Reg. 47,212, 47,215 
(Aug. 4, 2004); Determination of Threatened Status for the California Red-Legged Frog, 61 Fed. 
Reg. 25,813, 25,814 (May 23,1996). 
289. The FWS promulgated the salamander rule in 2004, at the time of listing, 
Determination of Threatened Status for the California Tiger Salamander, 69 Fed. Reg. 47,212, 
and the frog rule in 2006, ten years after listing. Designation of Critical Habitat for the California 
Red-Legged Frog, and Special Rule Exemption Associated With Final Listing for Existing 
Routine Ranching Activities, 71 Fed. Reg. 19,244 (Apr. 13, 2006). 
290. Id. at 19,288. 
291. Determination of Threatened Status for the California Tiger Salamander, 69 Fed. 
Reg. 47,212, 47,248 (Aug. 4, 2004). 
292. Designation of Critical Habitat for the California Red-Legged Frog, 71 Fed. Reg. 
19,244, 19,293 (Apr. 13, 2006). 
293. Id. at 19,262. 
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ensure that it does benefit the species. The contrasting red-legged frog 
exception indicates that the FWS sometimes can impose conditions on 
ranchers to ensure a conservation benefit. The FWS promulgated its frog 
4(d) rule two years after the salamander rule, so the contrast may 
demonstrate its ability to learn from past shortcomings. But it also casts 
doubt on the Service’s commitment to adaptively revise rules. 
Attempts to support economic activity while conserving species are 
not limited to terrestrial activity. Sea turtles are reptiles and have lungs, 
rather than gills. As a result, they must surface to breathe. When shrimping 
nets towed behind boats entangle turtles, they drown unless the trawlers 
raise the net often enough to remove the shrimp before the turtles 
suffocate. Entangled turtles are “bycatch,” non-target species caught 
incidentally rather than purposefully. The NMFS exception to 
accommodate shrimp harvests in the waters off the southeastern coast 
began with very limited conservation benefits to threatened sea turtles. 
Despite vehement opposition from the trawling industry, the proportion of 
the shrimping fleet using harvest techniques associated with better turtle 
survivorship has grown over several iterations of the protective regulation. 
In the 1970s, NMFS began to develop TEDs that would allow turtles 
but not shrimp to escape from nets during towing.294 In 1987, NMFS 
initially required TEDs on all shrimping vessels longer than twenty-five 
feet in offshore waters. Inshore, these larger boats could employ tow times 
less than ninety minutes or TEDs. For smaller boats, NMFS required only 
tow times less than ninety minutes.295 The NMFS’s shorter tow-time 
alternative reduced the incidence of turtle drownings in nets, 
approximating the benefit of TEDs without imposing the devices on 
trawlers, who regarded them as costly nuisances. But the regulation 
sparked intense conflict resulting in regulatory chaos and temporary 
federal actions creating a welter of requirements. Louisiana enacted 
legislation (not repealed until 2015) preventing its Department of Wildlife 
and Fisheries from enforcing TED requirements.296 As a result, TED use 
remained low.297 
 
294. History of Turtle Excluder Devices, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. 
(June 4, 2019), https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/southeast/bycatch/history-turtle-excluder-devices 
[https://perma.cc/9U4B-6S5M]. 
295. Sea Turtle Conservation; Shrimp Trawling Requirements, 52 Fed. Reg. 24,244 (June 
29, 1987). Tow times were not part of the initial proposed rule but were added due to the volume 
of comments that described them as the most effective alternative to TEDs. At the time, shrimping 
killed more than 11,000 sea turtles each year. Id. at 24,246. 
296. See Benjamin Alexander-Bloch, Bobby Jindal Signs Bill Allowing Enforcement of 
Turtle-Excluder Provisions, NOLA: TIMES-PICAYUNE (July 2, 2015, 3:54 AM), 
https://www.nola.com/news/environment/article_f0bf143b-c858-5e57-8394-7dbf8f4138e9.html 
[https://perma.cc/6TAG-DESX].  
297. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, supra note 294. 
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From the beginning, NMFS acknowledged the difficulty of enforcing 
tow times. Once a TED is installed in a net, observers can confirm their 
use simply by inspecting the nets. In contrast, tow-time enforcement 
requires some form of operations monitoring by an observer either on the 
shrimping vessel or another vessel able, covertly, to view the shrimping 
vessel for extended periods.298 In 2012, NMFS proposed to terminate the 
tow-times option. Instead, all shrimping vessels would require TEDs.299 
The proposed rule responded to an increase in sea-turtle mortality 
consistent with drowning, which suggested that tow-time restrictions were 
ineffective.300 Nevertheless, NMFS withdrew its proposal over concerns 
that the TED design at that time permitted too many turtles to enter nets 
of the vessels in question.301 
In 2016, with new TED designs available, NMFS again proposed to 
narrow the tow-time option. The proposal would have required TEDs for 
three classes of vessels previously permitted to use the tow-time 
approach.302 The 2019 final rule eliminated the tow-time exception for only 
some vessels in one of the three classes, while also postponing the 
compliance date.303 Compared to the changes proposed in 2016, the final 
rule asserted it would “achieve a significant conservation benefit for listed 
sea turtles, while affecting significantly fewer vessels and imposing far 
fewer costs upon industry.”304 However, NMFS still lacks observer data on 
turtle impacts from two classes of shrimping vessels, despite three decades 
of shrimping regulation. 
The history of 4(d) rules related to TEDs shows a tortuous but 
incremental improvement in sea-turtle protection. The progress is even 
more impressive because the NMFS 4(d) rule rejected the typical liability-
waiver framework. Typical protective regulations allow businesses to opt 
out of exceptions and instead risk the unlikely contingency that a 
prosecutor can prove a take. In contrast, the TED rules actually compel 
compliance with the 4(d) restrictions. Businesses must adopt the rule’s 
 
298. Sea Turtle Conservation; Shrimp Trawling Requirements, 77 Fed. Reg. 27,411, 
27,413 (May 10, 2012). 
299. Id. at 27,411.  
300. Benjamin Alexander-Bloch, Federal Fisheries Official Tells Shrimpers That New 
Turtle Rules are Coming, NOLA: TIMES-PICAYUNE (Mar. 1, 2013, 1:05 AM), 
http://www.nola.com/environment/index.ssf/2013/02/federal_fisheries_official_tel.html 
[https://perma.cc/YU7E-ECVS] (quoting NMFS biologist Michael Barnett, who noted that “only 
35 percent of the observed skimmers followed the 55-minute seasonal tow time limit, with many 
towing for 2 ½ hours”). 
301. Notice of Intent to Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement for Sea Turtle 
Conservation and Recovery Actions in Relation to the Southeastern United States Shrimp Fishery 
and To Conduct Public Scoping Meetings, 81 Fed. Reg. 13,772, 13,774 (Mar. 15, 2016). 
302. Id. at 13,772. 
303. Sea Turtle Conservation; Shrimp Trawling Requirements, 84 Fed. Reg. 70,048 (Dec. 
20, 2019). 
304.  Id. at 70,049. 
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practices or stop shrimping altogether. The NMFS needed to overcome 
resistance from the shrimping industry and states; Louisiana forbade state 
enforcement of TED requirements for twenty-eight years. Despite the 
controversy, NMFS leveraged increasing familiarity with TEDs over 
generational time to advance its conservation agenda. In contrast, we find 
no example of incremental bar-raising among the FWS agricultural 
exceptions. In trying to conserve species while also sustaining economically 
marginal operations, FWS must strike a difficult balance. If trawlers leave 
the industry, threats to marine resources likely decrease; if farmers and 
ranchers sell out to other land uses, threats to listed species are likely to 
increase. 
3. Consideration of Future Conditions 
Some exceptions fail to advance recovery primarily because they fail 
to consider foreseeable changes in current conditions that might 
undermine long-term conservation. These shortcomings may not 
jeopardize the status quo, but they fail to contribute to recovery. For 
instance, the pygmy sculpin is a threatened fish limited to one place, 
Coldwater Spring and its 500-foot outflow to the nearest creek. The City 
of Anniston, Alabama owns the spring, the outflow, and some surrounding 
land. At the time of the 1989 listing, Coldwater Spring discharged an 
average of 32 million gallons of water per day. The City withdrew water 
from the impounded spring at an average rate of 16.5 million gallons per 
day.305 The FWS examined threats to the sculpin from planned 
construction that might alter the hydrology of the spring, potential for toxic 
spills, and water pollution. But the Service excluded consideration of 
increased water withdrawals and climate change. 
At the time it listed the sculpin, the FWS also promulgated a take 
exception for Anniston to continue using Coldwater Spring as its water 
supply. The FWS cited the city’s ownership of the spring as an incentive 
for protection. It justified the exception with the observation that 
“withdrawal of substantial quantities of water from the spring has not 
adversely impacted this species, as evidenced by the continued stable 
population in the spring.”306  The FWS noted that a drought reducing the 
spring flow 50 percent had not affected sculpin survival. The rule permits 
the city to deplete the spring down to 2 million gallons per day, which 
would reduce the flow by 94 percent.307 
 
305. Pygmy Sculpin Determined To Be Threatened, 54 Fed. Reg. 39,846, 39,846 (Sept. 
28, 1989). 
306. Id. at 39,849. 
307. Id. 
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The observation that all had gone well in the past is at least a 
reasonable indicator that continued withdrawals will not increase jeopardy 
if nothing changes. But is that adequate for conservation? The creek below 
the spring might have held sculpin before water quality deteriorated from 
local land use.308 Should recovery require reintroduction of sculpins into 
the downstream creek, spring flow might affect sculpin use of and survival 
in the creek. Nothing in either the listing or the 4(d) rule actively 
contemplates recovery. 
The FWS promulgated the Anniston water supply exception at the 
time of listing, an approach that the FWS promised to expand in 2019. In 
that respect, the failure of the sculpin rule to fully consider recovery issues 
bodes ill for forthcoming tailored rules, which increasingly will be 
promulgated with less time for analysis. Climate-change predictions for the 
Southeast forecast rising temperatures, which will increase evaporation 
and more frequent, deeper droughts.309 Maintaining appropriate 
conditions for sculpin will likely require higher flows in the future, at the 
same time that water demand for Anniston will likely rise. 
IV. Lessons for More Effective Collaborative Governance Through 
Protective Regulations 
Protective regulations incorporate collaborative governance  in two 
ways: (1) by endorsing pre-listing conservation agreements, and (2) by 
creating post-listing incentives for conservation initiatives. First, protective 
regulations offer some reward for early action to prevent listing. Efforts to 
prevent listing after a petitioner or a Service has identified a species as a 
candidate for ESA protection are commonly praised forms of collaborative 
conservation.310 Some of these efforts to avoid the toggle to ESA 
regulation are formalized through candidate conservation agreements 
(CCAs) between a Service and stakeholders.311 Some 4(d) rules may 
 
308. See id. at 39,847. 
309. See L.M. Carter et al., Southeast and the Caribbean, in CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS 
IN THE UNITED STATES: THE THIRD NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 396-417 (J.M. Melillo et 
al. eds., 2014), 
http://s3.amazonaws.com/nca2014/low/NCA3_Full_Report_17_Southeast_LowRes.pdf?downloa
d=1 [https://perma.cc/R8PH-HVQL].  
310. See, e.g., Briefing on Improving the Endangered Species Act: Perspectives from the 
Fish and Wildlife Service and State Governors, supra note 18; Galen Schuler, Greg Corbin & 
Lawson Fite, Candidate Conservation Agreements with Assurances: The Next Great Tool for 
Win-Win Conservation, 35 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 32 (2020). 
311. Candidate conservation agreements provide enhancement-of-survival permits in 
which an early commitment to conservation action insulates parties from further habitat 
regulation upon listing. See Candidate Conservation Agreements with Assurances Policy, 81 Fed. 
Reg. 95,164 (Dec. 27, 2016) (final revised policy); Candidate Conservation Agreements with 
Assurances, 82 Fed. Reg. 55,625, 55,626 (Nov. 22, 2017) (policy review and request for comments). 
Our recommendation is to expand 4(d) exceptions to a broader range of informal conservation 
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promote pre-listing initiatives by shielding early efforts to adopt habitat 
mitigation and best practices with liability exceptions once a threatened 
listing becomes necessary.312 In other words, even if the conservation 
efforts fail to prevent listing, as long as they prevent endangered listing 
they will not trigger take liability. Of course, an individual 4(d) rule cannot 
turn back the clock on encouraging preventive initiatives. But the 
emerging custom that 4(d) rules immunize early adopters of mitigation or 
practices does increase the expected benefit to stakeholders considering 
pre-listing collaborative programs for other species. 
Second, and seldom noted, 4(d) exceptions create incentives for 
recovery actions after listing. Landowners who did not attempt to prevent 
listing may nonetheless benefit from participating in collaborative 
conservation after listing to dodge the shadow of take liability. In this 
respect, a 4(d) rule may operate like a safe harbor agreement that 
exchanges recovery efforts for assurances that landowners will not be 
required to take any further steps.313 For instance, if a landowner grows 
new habitat for a listed species under a safe harbor agreement, then she 
will not be restricted in the use of that habitat by the ESA harm 
prohibition. In fact, the landowner may eventually degrade or destroy the 
new habitat without liability as long as what remains is no worse than the 
baseline conditions at the time of the initial agreement.314 Similarly, if a 
community adopts a development ordinance that meets the conservation 
criteria of a 4(d) special exception, then subsequent private development 
would not face federal take restrictions.315 
These two incentives must be preserved for the 4(d) program to better 
support recovery. Recovery cannot be achieved by federal agencies 
 
efforts. This is particularly important now because, over the past several years, the “umbrella” 
CCAs covering broad areas of habitat have neither succeeded in recovery nor in attracting many 
participants. See Defs. of Wildlife v. Jewell, 815 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (upholding FWS decision 
to withdraw a listing proposal for the dune sagebrush lizard based upon private stakeholder 
enrollment in a CCA); Colorado v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 362 F. Supp. 3d 951 (D. Colo. 2018) 
(noting that the CCA failed to prevent Gunnison sage-grouse listing). 
312. See, e.g., 50 C.F.R. § 223.203(b)(13) (2019) (shielding from take liability activities 
that occur pursuant to a previously adopted, state-wide forest practices plan). 
313. For Landowners | Safe Harbor Agreements, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.: 
ENDANGERED SPECIES, https://www.fws.gov/endangered/landowners/safe-harbor-
agreements.html [https://perma.cc/PNQ6-STAX] (last updated Jan. 30, 2020). 
314. The FWS has employed the safe harbor program to enroll more than 400 
landowners covering nearly 2.5 million acres to raise nesting trees for endangered red cockaded 
woodpeckers in exchange for ESA immunity for eventual timber harvests. See Examining the 
Endangered Species Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy Pol., Health Care & 
Entitlements of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 113th Cong. 11 (2014) (statement 
of Michael J. Bean, Counselor to the Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife and Parks, 
Department of the Interior). 
315. See, e.g., 50 C.F.R. § 223.203(b)(12) (2019) (specifying take exception for 
prospective municipal, residential, and industrial development occurring under NMFS-approved 
local ordinances), upheld by Wash. Envtl. Council v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., No C00-1547R, 
2002 WL 511479 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 27, 2002). 
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alone—even in the unlikely scenario where their budgets substantially 
increase—because they do not control enough habitat.316 Some degree of 
accommodative conservation will continue to play a role to induce 
conservation by people who control habitat via sovereign power or 
property rights. This Part suggests systematic ways to accommodate 
stakeholder concerns with better conservation outcomes. We draw lessons 
from our study to strengthen the recovery potential of protective 
regulations in 4(d) rulemaking. The recommendations we offer in the 
following sections are not merely pie-in-the-sky hopes for reconciliation. 
They build upon actual practice-based rules that best incorporate tailoring, 
as revealed in our empirical results. We start by emphasizing the need for 
a published framework to encourage and guide collaboration in drafting 
protective regulations. We then discuss four substantive considerations 
that could be folded into the Service framework to strengthen 4(d) rules. 
A. A Framework for Preparing Regulations 
The Services should publish national guidance for drafting 4(d) rules 
to make clearer to stakeholders how to contribute to the process.317 The 
Services enjoy great deference from courts reviewing special regulations.318 
But a winning judicial record comes at the cost of a strong negotiating 
position when seeking agreement among stakeholders for a special 
exception that promotes recovery. The Services need a backstop in the 
form of clear standards in order to resist expedient concessions that fail to 
address known threats, as illustrated by the Dakota skipper.319 Without 
consistency and transparency, continued disparities, such as between the 
California salamander and red-legged frog exceptions, will undermine the 
integrity of the 4(d) program.320 Disparities discourage stakeholders (e.g., 
California ranchers dealing with red-legged frogs) who sacrifice profits in 
modifying practices, only to find fellow stakeholders facing similar species 
needs cut a more lenient deal. Whether true or not, the perception that 
 
316. See Fischman et al., supra note 18, at 91-92 (discussing the need for states to exercise 
land-use control for habitat conservation); ESA Basics: 40 Years of Conserving Endangered 
Species, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. (Feb. 2017), https://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-
library/pdf/ESA_basics.pdf [https://perma.cc/DJ4J-KUJ6] (“Two-thirds of federally listed species 
have at least some habitat on private land[.]”); Our Endangered Species Program and How It 
Works with Landowners, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. (July 2009), 
https://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/landowners.pdf [https://perma.cc/FV7M-8MYB] 
(“Approximately half of listed species have at least 80 percent of their habitat on private lands.”).  
317. Li, supra note 151, at 1, 4, 14. 
318. See supra Part II.A. 
319. See supra notes 269-286 and accompanying text. 
320. See supra notes 291-293 and accompanying text. Li et al., supra note 113, at 666 
provide another example of similar unexplained disparities between two species with similar 
needs: the Gunnison sage-grouse and the lesser prairie chicken. 
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unexplained disparities result from “ad hoc decisions influenced by 
political pressure to minimize regulatory impacts” generates contention 
and may embroil the Services in litigation.321 A framework for preparing 
4(d) rules should address each of the four topics we discuss in the following 
sections: cooperative federalism, recovery, enforcement, and delisting. Of 
the four, the most urgent need is for a framework that explains how each 
rule meets the statutory standard “to provide for the conservation” of the 
species.322 
The section 10 incidental take permit is the flagship post-listing 
program for habitat-disturbing activities. Both ITPs and protective 
regulations seek to advance recovery by engaging with stakeholders in 
conservation collaborations. However, unlike the ITP, the 4(d) program 
drifts in the absence of a published framework guiding collaborative 
conservation. That may lead to confusion, discouragement, inefficient use 
of time, and ultimately less stakeholder interest.323 These ills manifest in 
the wide variation in the structures of final rules.324 Staff who facilitate 
collaborations in far-flung field offices may not be aware of best practices 
developed in other regions to handle complex situations.325 In contrast, the 
Services have refined their handbook for ITPs, which is a model of clarity 
and incorporates the best practices of conservation biology and wildlife 
management.326 Even the CCA program now proceeds in accordance with 
a policy that provides potential collaborators with clear definitions, sets out 
the expected benefits to landowners and species, and describes the 
obligations of collaborators in exchange for the assurance of no additional 
regulation.327 The Services should offer the same clarity for 4(d) rules so 
that, even before listing, potential conservation actions can be motivated 
by a published commitment to reward early efforts with tailored special 
exceptions. 
Of all of our recommendations, the call for clarity and consistency in 
4(d) rulemaking appears to enjoy the most widespread support in the 
 
321.  Id. 
322. We agree with Li et al. that having such a standard “would limit the Services’ 
tendency to bow to political pressures. . . . It could also help assure landowners that voluntary 
efforts at conservation will not bring a heavy regulatory crackdown.” Id.  
323. Letter from Environmental Policy Innovation Center, Environmental Defense 
Fund, and Sand County Foundation to Ryan Zinke, Sec’y, Dep’t of the Interior (on file with 
author) (commenting on proposed rule withdrawing the default 4(d) rule under the ESA and 
claiming that the lack of guidance or a handbook leads to “inconsistencies in the contents of 4(d) 
rules, creating controversy, litigation, and lost conservation opportunities”). 
324. See Temple Stoellinger et al., Improving Cooperative State and Federal Species 
Conservation Efforts, 20 WYO. L. REV. 183, 205 (2020) (noting that special rules “vary 
considerably without a clear rationale”). 
325. Id. 
326. See Habitat Conservation Planning and Incidental Take Permit Processing 
Handbook, supra note 82. 
327. Final Policy for Candidate Conservation Agreements with Assurances, 64 Fed. Reg. 
32,726 (June 17, 1999). 
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conservation community.328 Institutions like the Services, which pride 
themselves on providing good science, should seek to learn from the 
experience of rulemaking. Our study shows that protective regulations 
span a wide variety of mechanisms and standards. Without a rubric for 
evaluating and comparing the performance of the regulations, the Services 
cannot hope to improve their programs and disseminate lessons learned 
through best practices. A handbook or guidance subject to frequent 
revision is a necessity.329 
This is particularly true now that FWS has revoked its default 
extension of all section 9 prohibitions to threatened species.330 The FWS’ 
former, blanket rule put the onus on landowners and commercial 
enterprises to collaborate in order to satisfy the conservation criterion 
justifying exceptions. Now that the FWS has adopted the same approach 
as NMFS, it will need to promulgate 4(d) rules at the time species are listed 
as threatened. Otherwise, no prohibitions will protect a newly threatened 
species.331 Though the FWS “intends” to promulgate special rules at the 
time a species is listed as threatened, there is no enforceable 
requirement.332 The FWS admits that promulgating “species-specific 4(d) 
rules for every threatened species may require additional resources at the 
time of listing.”333 Yet, the FWS did not indicate where it will find 
additional resources. Its proposed budgets do not request additional 
resources from Congress. Relative to the previous year’s actual budget, the 
Interior Department consistently proposed significant cuts in the FWS 
listing budget, most recently by 55 percent in appropriations for a 68 
percent decrease in staff.334 The FWS promises to make its 4(d) decisions 
 
328. See, e.g., Stoellinger et al. supra note 324, at 205 (summarizing the consensus of a 
workshop composed of academics, environmental advocates, government officials, advocates for 
the regulated community, and representatives of potential stakeholders, such as the Western 
Landowners Alliance, the Western Governors’ Association, Occidental Petroleum); see also Li, 
supra note 151, at 14; Li et al., supra note 14; Letter from Environmental Policy Innovation Center, 
Environmental Defense Fund, and Sand County Foundation to Ryan Zinke, Sec’y, Dep’t of the 
Interior (on file with author). 
329. The Services’ recovery planning guidance can serve as a model. See Listing and 
Recovery Priority Guidelines, 84 Fed. Reg. 18,243 (Apr. 30, 2019). 
330. See Regulations for Prohibitions to Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 84 Fed. Reg. 
44,753 (Aug. 27, 2019); supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
331. The consultation mandates will continue to require federal actions not jeopardize 
the species or adversely modify its critical habitat, if any habitat is designated. 16 U.S.C. § 
1536(a)(2) (2018). 
332. See Regulations for Prohibitions to Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 84 Fed. Reg. at 
44,755. 
333. Id. 
334.  U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUDGET JUSTIFICATIONS AND PERFORMANCE 
INFORMATION FISCAL YEAR 2021: FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE ES-3, 
https://www.fws.gov/budget/2021/FY2021-FWS-Budget-Justification.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A5WC-N7RS];  U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUDGET JUSTIFICATIONS AND 
PERFORMANCE INFORMATION FISCAL YEAR 2020: FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE ES-3, 
https://www.fws.gov/budget/2020/FY2020-FWS-Budget-Justification.pdf [https://perma.cc/R8KL-
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while it is also considering the status of a proposed species. The time 
pressure to do both, simultaneously, will exacerbate the austerity for 
section 4 activities.335 
The California tiger salamander and pygmy sculpin rules pose 
troubling conservation shortcomings for special exceptions promulgated 
with final listing.336 If the Service defers 4(d) rulemaking, then it risks 
further imperilment, possibly requiring up-listing to endangered status, 
which limits collaborative conservation options.337 Yet, any listing takes 
years to promulgate, so threatened species may languish without 
prohibitions as their condition declines. Therefore, any framework that 
builds on the existing tailored special exceptions will save time and avoid 
situations where parties reinvent tools already deployed elsewhere. 
With reduced time and money, we fear a weakening of the FWS 
negotiating position in collaborating with other parties on section 4(d) 
content. We expect more accommodation and less creative tailoring from 
the FWS. It may be that landowners and industry will foot-drag during 
negotiations over 4(d) rules. Delay would benefit some stakeholders by 
either obstructing listing itself or extending the period after listing and 
before special rule promulgation, when no ESA prohibitions would yet 
apply. 
One way that the Services could mitigate this problem would be to 
publish advanced notices of proposed 4(d) rulemakings at the time they 
publish warranted findings, which often lead to listing proposals. An 
advanced notice calls for general ideas rather than responses to the terms 
of a specific proposal.338 It would alert potential stakeholders and could 
kick-start collaboration. A published framework could encourage this 
practice. 
Future research should measure the impact of the 2019 FWS 
revocation of the blanket extension of section 9 prohibitions. We suspect 
threatened listings will take longer to proceed from proposal to final 
promulgation when they include protective regulations. Evidence might be 
 
E6HL] (42% budget cut); U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUDGET JUSTIFICATIONS AND 
PERFORMANCE INFORMATION FISCAL YEAR 2019: FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE ES-3, 
https://www.fws.gov/budget/2019/FY2019%20FWS%20Budget%20Justification.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/67W5-9UNW] (48% budget cut); U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUDGET 
JUSTIFICATIONS AND PERFORMANCE INFORMATION FISCAL YEAR 2018: FISH AND WILDLIFE 
SERVICE ES-3, https://www.fws.gov/budget/2018/FY2018-FWS-Greenbook.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6C96-GN8F] (19% budget cut);  James Jay Tutcheon, Getting Species on Board 
the Ark One Lawsuit at a Time, 20 ANIMAL L. 401, 414 (2014) (noting the consistent, longer term 
refusal of the Department of the Interior to propose budgets adequate to fulfill the ESA listing 
mandate). 
335.  Tutcheon, supra note 334, at 414 (2014). 
336.  See supra notes 287-290, 297-300 and accompanying text. 
337. Jamie Rappaport Clark, The Endangered Species Act at 40: Opportunities for 
Improvement, 63 BIOSCIENCE 924, 925 (2013). 
338.  JAMES T. O’REILLY, ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING § 5:6 (2020). 
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sought to gauge the shift in incentives for affected landowners and 
businesses to collaborate on a 4(d) agreement. Early lessons learned can 
then be applied adaptively through the framework we envision. For the 
reasons described earlier, we are skeptical of the claim by Stoellinger et al. 
that the change to the blanket rule “will cause the FWS to more frequently 
consider how best to tailor protections for threatened species.”339 
Collaboration manifestations that we quantified, especially the number of 
large-scale plans or defined best practices, will appear more frequently 
only if the new default succeeds in fostering more cooperation for recovery 
rather than merely more accommodation. 
A framework for 4(d) rulemaking could also spur the FWS to learn 
from the experience of the NMFS in its protective regulations for sea 
turtles that we discuss in Section III.B.2. The exceptions-based approach 
to take prohibitions is not the only way to establish a protective regulation. 
The NMFS requirement that all shrimpers employ practices to reduce 
turtle bycatch by shrimp trawlers points to the option of imposing 
affirmative duties. Affirmative duties are vastly easier to enforce because 
failure to meet the duty is itself a violation of the ESA. In contrast, the 
FWS approach does not require compliance with practice-based 
exceptions. Failure to comply simply defeats the liability shield and 
subjects a person to the take prohibition, with detection and proximate-
cause challenges posing hurdles to enforcement. The NMFS turtle 
approach is also politically explosive and often not even applicable to 
terrestrial settings where the federal government exercises far less 
commercial oversight than it does over offshore fishing. Our 
recommendations build on the existing foundation of 4(d) rules, so they 
assume that all but the rare circumstance will employ the exceptions-to-
liability approach. Still, Service guidance should recommend at least 
considering the feasibility of more easily enforceable approaches. 
B.  Cooperative Federalism 
Wildlife management traditionally falls mostly in the domain of state 
sovereignty. When statutes, such as the ESA, displace state authorities 
under the Supremacy Clause, they typically employ cooperative federalism 
to induce state cooperation.340 The ESA section 6 program of cooperative 
agreements channels funding to state programs that assist recovery of 
 
339.  Stoellinger et al., supra note 324, at 203. We concede that, without the blanket 
prohibitions, some 4(d) rules may better think through just what private actions should receive 
the greatest priority for conservation limitations. 
340. See Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources Law, supra note 10. 
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federally listed species.341 The monies are small compared to the need. 
Nonetheless, state revenue combined with federal grants sustain some 
50,000 staff on the front lines of conservation.342 These boots-on-the-
ground and field experts are critical assets for achieving ESA goals. 
A major weakness of federal biodiversity protection policy is the 
meager resources available for preventing declining species from reaching 
the point where ESA listing is necessary. States, which are primarily 
responsible for this task, loathe relinquishing control of wildlife 
management. In addition to securing biodiversity for future generations, 
states seek to conserve their imperiled species to avoid federal regulation 
under the ESA. Every state prepares and updates wildlife action plans, 
prerequisites for a modest federal grant program funding state actions to 
prevent species from slipping to the brink of extinction.343 States have 
identified some 16,000 “species of greatest conservation need” (SGCNs) 
in their plans.344 However, the conservation needs overwhelm state 
capacity, especially because most funding for state agencies comes from 
hunting and fishing licenses, with the expectation that agencies will serve 
the interests of those sports.345 Meanwhile, the Services labor under a 
growing backlog of ESA listings.346 
The ESA requires the Services to commit to cooperation with states 
on efforts to prevent listing.347 The Services’ current policy promises to 
“[u]se the expertise of State agencies in designing and implementing 
 
341. See Fischman et al., supra note 18, at 85-87 (describing section 6’s preemption 
ambiguity, its implementation focus, and appropriations to support state agreements); J.B. RUHL, 
Cooperative Federalism and the Endangered Species Act: A Comparative Assessment and Call 
for Change, in THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AND FEDERALISM: EFFECTIVE CONSERVATION 
THROUGH GREATER STATE COMMITMENT 35, 41 (Kaush Arha & Barton H. Thompson, Jr. eds., 
2011) (noting that most agreements related to listing, monitoring, and voluntary conservation 
programs). 
342. Fischman et al., supra note 18, at 87-88 (citing Oversight: Modernization of the 
Endangered Species Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Env’t & Pub. Works, 115th Cong. 50 
(2017) (statement of Gordon S. Myers, Executive Director, North Carolina Wildlife Resources 
Commission & President, Southeastern Association of Fish and Wildlife Agencies)). 
343. See Fischman et al., supra note 18, at 84-85 (describing state wildlife action plans 
and funding sources); see also Act of Dec. 21, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-553, Title IX, §§ 901-02, 114 
Stat. 2762, 2762A-118, 122-23. 
344. See New Database Available: USGS Releases “Species of Greatest Conservation 
Need” Lists, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV. (Oct. 25, 2017), https://www.usgs.gov/news/new-database-
available-usgs-releases-species-greatest-conservation-need-lists [https://perma.cc/M4HK-U4V3]. 
As with the ESA, “species” is somewhat broadly construed. In state plans, the term may 
encompass taxonomic levels from distinct population segments all the way up to entire orders. 
345. V.J. Meretsky et al., A State-based National Network for Effective Wildlife 
Conservation, 62 BIOSCIENCE 970 (2012); J.F. Organ et al., The North American Model of 
Wildlife Conservation (The Wildlife Soc’y and The Boone & Crockett Club Tech. Review No. 12-
04, 2012), https://wildlife.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/North-American-model-of-Wildlife-
Conservation.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ESF-PGLA].  
346. See, e.g., Benjamin Jesup, Endless War or End This War?, 14 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 327, 
342 (2013) (calling the long list of candidate species for which listing may be warranted an 
administrative black hole). 
347. 16 U.S.C. § 1535 (2018). 
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prelisting stabilization actions, consistent with their authorities, for species 
and habitat to remove or alleviate threats so that the listing priority is 
reduced or listing . . . is not warranted.”348 Successful SGCN initiatives need 
no help from ESA section 4(d) because they stave off listing.349 But, a 
section 4(d) rule can shield effective state SGCN conservation actions from 
liability where they show progress even though they ultimately fail to 
prevent listing. Such an exception would be particularly compelling where 
other, less effective, states in a species’ range undermine conservation.350 
A state would more likely undertake an expensive and politically difficult 
conservation program when it is confident the program will receive 
preferential treatment in any subsequent special rule. Protective 
regulations frequently exempt state conservation and research programs 
from take prohibitions. Because the state wildlife action plans themselves 
encourage conservation collaborations, the Services should extend 
conservation activity exceptions to cover private parties (e.g., land trusts) 
conducting prescribed burns and other habitat management consistent 
with the state plans.351 This would allow the Services to focus more 
attention on activities that pose greater risks to recovery. 
Special rules should support state permit programs that serve as one-
stop shops for stakeholders and reduce duplicative paperwork.352 This 
approach is now routine for incidental take from sport fishing. But habitat 
protection requires more complex programs. The Utah prairie dog permits 
rely on state regulation supplemented by a general conservation plan to 
streamline implementation.353 To protect habitat for anadromous fish, the 
 
348. Revised Interagency Cooperative Policy Regarding the Role of State Agencies in 
Endangered Species Act Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 8663, 8664 (Feb. 22, 2016) (policy section A.3). 
349. Id. at 8664 (emphasizing the role of states in preventing listings). 
350. See, e.g., Stoellinger et al., supra note 324, at 204. 
351. See Revised Interagency Cooperative Policy Regarding the Role of State Agencies 
in Endangered Species Act Activities, 81 Fed Reg., supra note 338348, at 8664; State Wildlife 
Action Plan Best Practice Working Grp., Teaming with Wildlife Comm., Best Practices for State 
Wildlife Action Plans, ASS’N OF FISH & WILDLIFE AGENCIES 30-37 (Nov. 2012), 
https://www.fishwildlife.org/application/files/3215/1856/0300/SWAP_Best_Practices_Report_Nov
_2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/U3DN-QMWF] (recommending a collaborative conservation model 
to implement FWS requirements for states to develop plans in conjunction with conservation 
partners); Expanding Opportunities for Threatened Species Conservation Through Section 4(d) 
of the ESA, supra note 151, at 13 (recommending site-specific exceptions for conservation 
management activities on land-trust and conservancy properties). Many special exceptions already 
fulfill our blanket recommendation. See, e.g., 50 C.F.R. § 17.40(o)(2)(vi) (2019) (excepting certain 
state northern long-eared bat conservation programs). 
352. See Expanding Opportunities for Threatened Species Conservation Through 
Section 4(d) of the ESA,  supra note 151 (recommending that state permits substitute for federal 
regulation). 
353. See Incidental Take Permit Application; Draft Range-Wide General Conservation 
Plan for Utah Prairie Dogs and Environmental Assessment, 82 Fed. Reg. 60,211 (Dec. 19, 2017); 
see also People for the Ethical Treatment of Prop. Owners v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 852 F.3d 
990 (10th Cir. 2017) (upholding the constitutionality of ESA-authorized Service regulation of 
private lands under the Utah prairie dog 4(d) rule). See also 50 C.F.R. § 17.40(i)(3) (allowing 
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NMFS relies on Washington’s relatively stringent review of timber 
management practices on non-federal forests—if a forest manager 
complies with the state’s FWS-approved regulatory regime, then the 
manager need not concern herself with federal permits or liability.354 This 
cooperative federalism approach, however, requires states to accept 
greater Service oversight than they have historically been comfortable 
doing.355 
In addition to wildlife staff and expertise, states have almost exclusive 
powers to control private, land-disturbing activities that affect habitat. 
Promoting state land-use controls to protect, improve, and restore habitat 
is the most important function 4(d) rules can serve for two reasons. First, 
habitat degradation is the most common cause of species imperilment.356 
Second, Congress asserts only very limited direct power to prescribe land-
use restrictions.357 Therefore, state programs that incorporate or overlay 
habitat conservation on private land use controls are essential for most 
threatened species to recover.358 
Most states delegate land-use control to local jurisdictions under 
enabling statutes and “home rule” laws. Therefore, more 4(d) rules should 
offer incentives for counties and cities to include habitat protection in their 
zoning ordinances and land-development regulations.359 Section 10(a) ITPs 
for developments that disturb habitat rely on applicants to propose the 
scope of coverage. In practice, most applications cover just an individual 
plot of land. In contrast, the Services can establish a broad geographic 
scope in special rules to encourage area-wide planning across swaths of 
habitat.360 Planning for larger areas accommodates more effective habitat 
 
private landowners certain forms of take of Columbian white-tailed deer if authorized under a 
state conservation agency permit).  
354. 50 C.F.R. § 223.203(b)(13) (2019). 
355. See supra text accompanying notes 230-37 for our misgivings on the prairie dog 
exceptions. 
356. COMM. ON SCI. ISSUES IN THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT, NAT’L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 7, 40, 94 (1995). 
357. See Fred Bosselman, The Twilight of National Land Use Policy, 45 JOHN 
MARSHALL L. REV. 237 (2012) (discussing the failed attempts at passing federal legislation to 
guide private land use). 
358. See Carson Reeling, Leah H. Palm-Forster & Richard T. Melstrom, Policy 
Instruments and Incentives for Coordinated Habitat Conservation, 73 ENVTL. & RESOURCE 
ECON. 791 (2019) (finding that land-use restrictions improve coordinated habitat conservation 
with or without voluntary conservation agreements). 
359. See, e.g., Fischman & Hall-Rivera, supra note 83, at 146-50; Stoellinger et al., supra 
note 324, at 203-04; Expanding Opportunities for Threatened Species Conservation Through 
Section 4(d) of the ESA, supra note 151, at 11; see also Christopher Serkin, Divergence in Land 
Use Regulations and Property Rights, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1055, 1071-72 (2019) (describing the rise 
of innovations in zoning to conserve habitats). 
360. For a discussion of the importance of extending plans to cover as large an area as 
possible to optimize conservation effectiveness, see Fischman & Hall-Rivera, supra note 83, at 
146-50, and Alejandro E. Camacho, Elizabeth M. Taylor & Melissa L. Kelly, Lessons from 
Areawide, Multiagency Habitat Conservation Plans in California, 46 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & 
ANALYSIS 10,222, 10,226 (2016). 
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trade-offs between neighborhoods that are more valuable for development 
and places with higher potential to serve species’ recovery. Landscape-
scale conservation that incorporates bottom-up collaborations among 
landowners—facilitated by local government—can be more effective than 
federal regulation.361 It also supports the large-scale habitat reserves 
needed for longer-term survival of species, particularly in light of climate 
change.362 
As we discussed in Section III.A, the gnatcatcher 4(d) rule relied upon 
area-wide planning under California’s NCCP program.363 While other 
states are unlikely to have in place conservation planning programs as 
comprehensive as California’s, the Services can support narrower, nascent 
planning for habitat mitigation—and not just for incidental take permits.364 
More frequently than recognizing pre-listing efforts, 4(d) rules need to 
promote prospective land-use controls to conserve habitat.365 For instance, 
West Coast salmonid 4(d) regulation for municipal, residential, 
commercial, and industrial development waives liability for incidental 
takes only if the development occurs pursuant to plans that the NMFS 
determines “adequately conserve listed salmonids by maintaining and 
restoring properly functioning habitat conditions.”366 
Both the gnatcatcher and the salmon regulations are models for area-
wide conservation planning because, in addition to monitoring the effects 
of the plan, they provide for adaptive changes to the plan and periodic 
reviews. No other 4(d) rules come even close to that level of adaptive 
management. It is discouraging to observe that these two rules are both 
over two decades old, promulgated before the more recent surge in 4(d) 
 
361. See Karen Bradshaw Schulz & Dean Lueck, Contracting for Control of Landscape 
Level Resources, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2507 (2015) (discussing collaborative management of wildlife 
and wildlife). Amanda Brook et al., found that the ESA 4(d) rule for Preble’s meadow mouse 
failed to enhance its recovery on private land. Landowner’s Responses to an Endangered Species 
Act Listing and Implications for Encouraging Conservation, 17 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1638 
(2003) (finding that most private landowners in the habitat of the Preble’s meadow mouse had not 
permitted and would not allow a biological survey on their property, and 26% of the landowners 
made efforts to harm the mouse). 
362. See N.E. Heller & E.S. Zavaleta, Biodiversity Management in the Face of Climate 
Change: A Review of 22 Years of Recommendations, 142 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 14 
(2009).  
363. 50 C.F.R. § 17.41(b)(2) (2019). Camacho, Taylor & Kelly, supra note 360 (providing 
the most comprehensive, recent analysis of the NCCP program). 
364. See J. MICHAEL SCOTT, FRANK W. DAVIS & DALE D. GOBLE, Introduction, in 1 
THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AT THIRTY: RENEWING THE CONSERVATION PROMISE 1, 12 
(Michael Scott et al. eds., 2005) (“While HCPs work well for land developers, they are of little use 
to ranchers.”). 
365. See, e.g., Stoellinger et al., supra note 324, at 203-04. 
366. 50 C.F.R. § 223.203(b)(12) (2019) (listing twelve considerations relevant in the 
NMFS adequacy determination); see also Wash. Envtl. Council v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 
No C00-1547R, 2002 WL 511479 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 27, 2002) (upholding the salmonid rule against 
a challenge that the incidental take liability waiver for activities under prospectively approved 
development plans violated the ESA). 
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collaborative governance. It suggests that rigor in conservation 
effectiveness may be sidelined in Service enthusiasm to induce greater 
stakeholder participation. Since the 2000 salmon rule, the Services have 
promulgated only four extant exceptions that rely on any plans to define 
take limitations, which suggests waning enthusiasm for that kind of 
collaborative governance in 4(d) rules. Planning guided by 4(d) exceptions 
hatched but never fledged. The Services must try to revive planning. 
Finally, for a species whose range covers multiple states, protective 
regulations should reward states with successful recovery programs. The 
emerging caselaw makes it difficult to designate distinct population 
segments for delisting if they were not identified in original listing rules, 
unless the remnant population outside of the DPS remains viable.367 
Threatened species, such as the grizzly bear, may benefit from revised 4(d) 
rules that lift take restrictions in states that have succeeded in reaching 
population goals established through recovery plans. Instead of allowing 
lagging states to delay relief from hunting and depredation-control 
prohibitions,368 successive 4(d) rulemakings can shield from liability certain 
takes in a state as it achieves recovery goals.369 Even within a state, special 
rules can facilitate conservation efforts where state managers designate 
certain regions for strict protection and others for takes. For instance, the 
Gila trout special rule authorizes Arizona to allow takes by recreational 
anglers except in four creeks where relict populations important to 
recovery remain.370 
 
367.  See Crow Indian Tribe v. United States, 965 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2020); Humane Soc’y 
v. Zinke, 865 F.3d 585 (D.C. Cir. 2017).  
368.  For example, Wyoming’s inadequate gray wolf management plan held up delisting 
of the distinct population segment that also occurred in Montana and Idaho for many years. See 
ERIN H. WARD, CONG. RES. SERV., R46184, THE GRAY WOLF UNDER THE ENDANGERED 
SPECIES ACT (ESA): A CASE STUDY IN LISTING AND DELISTING CHALLENGES 15 (2020). 
369.  The FWS adopted this approach for experimental wolf populations in the northern 
Rocky Mountains, where states and tribes with FWS-approved wolf management plans could 
address “unacceptable impacts” of depredation on ungulates. See Revision of Special Regulation 
for the Central Idaho and Yellowstone Area Nonessential Experimental Populations of Gray 
Wolves in the Northern Rocky Mountains, 73 Fed. Reg. 4720 (Jan. 28, 2008). Tailoring 
prohibitions to account for variations in existing state regulatory regimes have been the subject of 
statutory reform proposals. See Hearing on the Modernization of the Endangered Species Act 
Before the S. Comm. on Env’t. and Pub. Works, 115th Cong. 224-26 (2017) (statement of Dave 
Freudenthal, Former Governor, State of Wyoming); Expanding Opportunities for Threatened 
Species Conservation Through Section 4(d) of the ESA, supra note 151, at 11 (advocating for 
greater distinctions between states based on disparate conservation successes and contrasting the 
recovery experiences of Karner blue butterflies in Wisconsin and Ohio).  
370. 50 C.F.R. § 17.44(z) (2019); see also Li, supra note 151, at 14 (citing a Gila trout rule 
as a good illustration of effective delegation to states that can fine-tune wildlife management on a 
finer geographic scale). 
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C.  Promoting Recovery 
In order to fulfill both the ESA’s purpose and the conservation 
mandate of section 4(d),371 the Services must enhance the performance of 
special rules in promoting species recovery. Budgets, staff, and private 
investment are tightly limited in species conservation. Therefore, in 
implementing lessons for recovery, the Services will need to focus on 
reducing the most important threats driving extinction. Activities that take 
individual organisms but benefit recovery, cause trivial population 
impacts, or are conservation neutral should qualify for 4(d) exceptions 
without much concern.372 In addition to freeing the Services to focus on 
more important harms, quick approval of these exceptions builds 
relationships and social acceptance critical for further recovery projects. 
Recovery priorities generally protect and restore habitat. The section 
9 take prohibition is difficult to tie directly to habitat alteration. Hence, our 
finding that 4(d) exceptions focus on practice-based standards is an 
important strength that the Services should build upon in advancing 
recovery. We recommend that the Services revive the use of collaborative 
governance to encourage habitat-wide plans, such as the one for the 
California gnatcatcher, that contain site-specific, tailored standards for 
land-disturbing activities.373 Where that is not feasible, we recommend 
defining as precisely as possible the practices shielded from liability in 4(d) 
rulemakings. 
Even within a species’ existing range, 4(d) exceptions should 
distinguish between different places in which the same species faces 
different threats.374 The Services can build on the existing thirty-six 
exceptions that distinguish among activities based on location. That can 
allow for fine-tuning of restrictions based upon counties or other 
jurisdictions.375 To increase social acceptability of conservation reserves, 
rules may contemplate loosening limitations on take to reduce economic 
impacts on neighboring landowners.376 In other situations, rules may tailor 
exceptions based on habitat features critical for recovery, such as bat 
hibernacula and roost trees.377 
This Section recommends two priority reforms to promote recovery. 
First, we urge the Services to promulgate a rule defining the 4(d) recovery 
 
371. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531(b), 1533(d) (2018). 
372. See Li, supra note 151, at 11-12. 
373. See supra notes 224-227 and accompanying text. 
374. See, e.g., Stoellinger et al., supra note 324, at 203-05. 
375. See, e.g., 50 C.F.R. § 17.40(b)(1)(i)(F) (2019) (deferring to national park regulations 
to control grizzly bear takes within national parks). 
376.  See, e.g., § 17.40(g)(3)(ii) (describing Utah prairie-dog exception for private 
property within 0.5 mile of a conservation reserve).  
377. See, e.g., § 17.40(o)(1) (prohibiting incidental takes of northern long-eared bats 
within 0.4 km of a known hibernaculum or within 45 meters of a roost tree). 
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standard. It would establish a backstop to avoid accommodative 
conservation that fails to lower a species’ extinction risk. Such a rule should 
incorporate sequential mitigation to ensure that 4(d) rules practice 
avoidance and minimization of impacts before imposing a compensation 
requirement. Compensation both advances recovery and limits adverse 
impacts by forcing parties taking advantage of special exceptions to 
internalize the costs to conservation objectives. Second, we urge that the 
4(d) program catch up with other collaborative initiatives by structuring its 
special exceptions for adaptive management. Adaptive management will 
assist recovery through iterative adjustments as the Services monitor and 
learn from experiments with special exceptions.    
1. A Conservation Standard 
Courts typically review only whether a 4(d) rule provides some 
conservation benefit relative to no prohibitions at all.378 For incidental 
takes, the Services enjoy unrestrained discretion to accommodate 
stakeholder activities. But that comes at the cost of momentum advancing 
recovery. The Services could promote more effective implementation of 
the ESA by publishing a rule defining the 4(d) standard of “necessary and 
advisable to provide for” recovery of the species.379 By tying their own 
hands, the Services would strengthen their position to engage with 
stakeholders rather than merely accommodate landowners and businesses 
in collaborations. Such a rule would avoid the shortcomings we document 
in Section III.B380 and ensure that stakeholders contribute their fair share 
of recovery needs.381 This might translate into more precisely defined best 
practices, such as the habitat protection zones for red-legged frogs that are 
absent from the California tiger salamander rule.382 In other words, a 
definition for the conservation standard should insist that all rules 
counteract the known threats to habitat that special exceptions permit to 
occur. The Service can accomplish this by implementing sequential 
mitigation. 
National and international environmental management programs 
commonly practice sequential mitigation.383 The strategy involves first 
 
378. See, e.g., In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing and Section 4(d) Rule 
Litigation, 818 F. Supp. 2d 214, 230 (D.D.C. 2011); see supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
379. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (2018).  
380. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 269-278 (discussing the hay harvesting 
exception for the Dakota skipper, which lacks limits and data to ensure that the species actually 
benefits). 
381. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act Compensatory Migration Policy, 81 Fed. Reg. 
95,316 (Dec. 27, 2016), withdrawn Endangered Species Act Compensatory Migration Policy, 83 
Fed. Reg. 36,469 (July 30, 2018). 
382. See supra text accompanying notes 219-293. 
383. See Shelley Welton, Michela Biasutti & Michael B. Gerrard, Legal & Scientific 
Integrity in Advancing a “Land Degradation Neutral World”, 40 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 39 (2015); 
 
Collaborative Governance Under the Endangered Species Act 
1047 
 
avoiding harms, then minimizing the harms that cannot be avoided, and 
finally mitigating whatever harms do occur from habitat-modifying 
activities. A critical shortcoming of 4(d) rules is that they fail to cultivate 
avoidance, minimization, and compensatory mitigation strategies to 
reverse habitat loss. 
The Services can build on their experience with the ITPs. Recall that 
habitat modification, in and of itself, does not constitute a take unless it 
rises to the level of harm by actually killing or injuring wildlife.384 But 
habitat modification resulting from a major investment, such as a shopping 
mall or residential development, often hinges on financing. Banks and 
other lenders generally proceed cautiously around liability risk. Congress 
provided an escape valve for this potential harm liability: an ITP for 
otherwise lawful activities. A 4(d) framework can borrow from the 2016 
ITP Handbook emphasizing that an HCP must be based on a conservation 
strategy.385 The manual lists the conservation measures as: 
● avoiding the impact through project design 
● minimizing the impact through best management practices 
● minimizing the impacts of the taking by reducing or eliminating other 
threats 
●  mitigating (offsetting) impacts by: restoration of degraded habitat, 
enhancement of functional habitat, preservation of habitat, creation of new 
habitat, and translocating or repatriating species.386 
The HCP Handbook does not go so far as to require sequencing, but 
it should. Sequencing is more effective because avoiding habitat 
degradation is more likely to succeed than attempts to compensate for the 
impact from such degradation.387 Though the ESA does not compel such 
an interpretation, the best way to advance species recovery would be to 
 
United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification Secretariat, Zero Net Land Degradation: 
A Sustainable Development Goal for Rio +20, UNCCD 13 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION TO 
COMBAT DESERTIFICATION (May 2012), 
https://catalogue.unccd.int/58_Zero_Net_Land_Degradation.pdf [https://perma.cc/5PUH-
GSQL]. Domestically, sequential mitigation is employed in ESA ITPs and Clean Water Act 
(CWA) fill permits. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (2018); 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2018). 
384. The FWS harm regulation prohibits as a take “an act which actually kills or injures 
wildlife. Such act may include significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually 
kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, 
feeding or sheltering.” 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1999). The NMFS definition adds the terms “spawning,” 
“rearing,” and “migrating” to the list of essential behavioral patterns. Definition of “Harm,” 64 
Fed. Reg. 60,727, 60,731 (Nov. 8, 1999). 
385. Habitat Conservation Planning and Incidental Take Permit Processing Handbook, 
supra note 82, at § 9.0. 
386. Id. § 9.3.  
387. Scholars often cite the sequencing requirement for avoiding, minimizing, and 
mitigating impacts on wetlands as the most effective aspect of the CWA fill permitting program. 
33 C.F.R. § 332.1(c) (2019) (sequencing requirements). See Royal C. Gardner et al., Compensating 
for Wetland Losses Under the Clean Water Act (Redux), 38 STETSON L. REV. 213, 231-33, 249 
(2009); Welton, Biasutti & Gerrard, supra note 383, at n.116. 
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require all three mitigation steps, sequentially, to the maximum extent 
practicable. Such a strategy proved successful in arresting the net loss of 
wetlands under the CWA.388 
Currently, FWS 4(d) rules typically do not implement the avoidance, 
minimization, and mitigation strategy, which makes them more permissive 
and less likely to contribute to recovery than the ITPs.389 This may drive 
savvy landowners and businesses toward negotiating 4(d) exceptions 
rather than applying for ITPs. A threatened species should be able to 
endure greater habitat modification than an endangered species without 
going extinct, but a threatened species still needs recovery efforts. The 
current disparity between rules and permits is too great, undermines 
conservation, and flies in the face of conservation biology.390 
Moreover, the Services have shown they are able to employ such a 
strategy in a 4(d) rule. The NMFS salmon exception for purposeful fish 
harvests requires a plan that avoids depleting even populations already 
above viable thresholds, in order to improve the likelihood of recovery.391 
Some of the twelve FWS exceptions documented in Table 3 are limited by 
distance from habitat elements, resembling an avoidance and minimization 
strategy for habitat. For instance, the California red-legged frog’s 
exception for rodent control outside of 0.7 miles of “known or potential 
breeding ponds,” avoids loss of those key habitat features.392 Similar 
avoidance strategies may be evident in exceptions that limit activities 
seasonally.393 
Many take exceptions do not impair species recovery at all. Section 
4(d) does not require affirmative conservation offsets. But Congress did 
not forbid it, and the capacious text of section 4(d) provides the Services 
with authority to go beyond the prohibitions of section 9 where additional 
 
388. See Gardner et al., supra note 387, at 231-33 (showing how the three-step process 
requires an emphasis on avoidance, first and foremost); Welton, Biasutti & Gerrard, supra note 
383, at 62-69 (emphasizing the design challenges in mitigation efforts, especially in banking and 
exchanging wetland reserves). 
389. Li, supra note 151, at 14. 
390.  Several environmental groups have also identified the need for reform. See, e.g., Li, 
supra note 151, at 14-15; Letter from Environmental Policy Innovation Center, Environmental 
Defense Fund, and Sand County Foundation to Ryan Zinke, Sec’y, Dep’t of the Interior (on file 
with author) (commenting on proposed rule withdrawing the default 4(d) rule under the ESA). 
391. 50 C.F.R. § 223.203(b)(4)(B) (2019) (“Harvest actions impacting populations that 
are functioning at or above the viable threshold must be designed to maintain the population or 
management unit at or above that level.”); see also Li, supra note 151, at 15 (discussing this 
exception). 
392. § 17.43(d)(3)(iii); see also § 17.40(l)(2)(iii) (describing the Preble’s meadow jumping 
mouse exception for ongoing agricultural activities limited to existing cultivated footprint). 
393. See, e.g., § 17.47(b)(3)(v) (providing Dakota skipper exception for haying to 
mowing after breeding season, when the butterfly lays eggs upon leaves); see supra text 
accompanying notes 272-276 (discussing implementation shortcomings of seasonal restrictions in 
the skipper rule). 
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restrictions on activities could promote recovery.394 The Services have used 
that power sparingly.395 Requiring avoidance, minimization, and mitigation 
is a fair and effective limitation on incidental take activities that enjoy 
liability shields. 
2. Adaptive Management 
Just as a listing decision must evaluate foreseeable future conditions, 
the protective regulations should also consider whether a special exception 
might burden long-term recovery. Integrating elements of adaptive 
management into 4(d) rules would advance recovery. Adaptive 
management is especially important in the typical situation where great 
uncertainty surrounds both the ecological conditions necessary for species 
conservation and the efficacy of actions and programs to attain those 
conditions. Climate change multiplies those uncertainties,396 and the FWS 
relies heavily on 4(d) rules to craft prohibitions for species listed because 
of climate change threats.397 
A strong consensus supports adaptive management in conservation 
programs generally, as well as in ESA implementation.398 Without adaptive 
management, promulgation of the 4(d) rule may spell the end of 
collaboration activities, allowing parties to neglect implementation. 
Service directors and their cabinet secretaries get a political bang out of 
announcing a new collaboration and showing how well they play with 
 
394. See Li, supra note 151, at 7-8. President Obama attempted to promote net 
conservation benefits in mitigation, Presidential Memorandum: Mitigating Impacts on Natural 
Resources from Development and Encouraging Related Private Investment, WHITE HOUSE 
(Nov. 3, 2015) https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/03/mitigating-
impacts-natural-resources-development-and-encouraging-related [https://perma.cc/AW4R-
LHZQ], but the Trump Administration rolled the benefits back and withdrew the ESA mitigation 
policy, Endangered Species Act Compensatory Migration Policy, 83 Fed. Reg. 36,469 (July 30, 
2018).  
395.  See, e.g., § 17.40(e) (describing the African elephant rule limiting trophy 
importation more stringently than the section 9 prohibitions demand). 
396. See Tim Newbold, Future Effects of Climate and Land-use Change on Terrestrial 
Vertebrate Community Diversity Under Different Scenarios, 285 PROC. OF THE ROYAL SOC’Y B, 
no. 20180792 (2018) (predicting that climate-change impacts will exceed land-use driven habitat 
disturbance as the chief threats facing biodiversity by 2070); E. Barrett Ristroph, Can Adaptive 
Management Help Alaska’s Natural Resource Managers Respond to Climate Change?, 60 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 47 (2020) (concluding that the answer to the question posed in the article title is 
“yes”). 
397. See Ruhl, The Regulation Charade, supra note 124, at 150; see also Blumm & 
Marienfeld, supra note 86 (reviewing climate-change driven listings and their failure to constrain 
GHG emissions). 
398. See Fischman & Ruhl, supra note 237 (documenting the consensus in natural 
resource management generally); Daniel M. Evans et al., Species Recovery in the United States: 
Increasing the Effectiveness of the Endangered Species Act, 20 ISSUES IN ECOLOGY 1, 18-19 
(2016) (describing a panel of experts convened by the Ecological Society of America reporting on 
improving the ESA track record of recovery). 
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others in promulgating the 4(d) rule. Following through with 
implementation, interactive problem solving, enforcement, and program 
modification are challenging and yield little in the way of kudos for jobs 
well done.399 Yet, our evaluation of the NMFS TED rules, which improved 
substantially over several iterations, shows that evaluation and revision are 
possible to move 4(d) programs toward greater conservation contributions. 
In order to fulfill its promise, adaptive management requires clear 
objectives against which to assess the results of conservation actions.400 
Then, the Services can respond to results through iterative monitoring and 
adjustment. Ideally, adaptive management needs a framework for 
facilitating learning so that actions may serve as experiments to enhance 
understanding of species recovery. The more effective adaptive 
approaches specify clear triggers to indicate when experiments need to be 
extended, modified, or terminated. But, even where budget constraints 
preclude true experimentation and frequent fine-tuning, some adaptive 
planning is better than none. The Services commit to adaptive 
management in their 2016 ITP and HCP Handbook.401 The protective 
regulations should similarly incorporate adaptive management. 
The best practices for recovery plans already incorporate metrics to 
evaluate success.402 The ESA itself requires “objective, measurable 
criteria” for determining when recovery occurs.403 Because section 4(d) 
requires conservation, protective regulations should adapt those recovery 
metrics. But 4(d) rules promulgated at the time of listing will not have the 
benefit of an existing recovery plan.404 Therefore, we recommend that the 
protective regulations contain triggers for reevaluation when the Service 
completes a recovery plan to ensure that indicia of success match recovery 
plan criteria.405 Such triggers for the stream flows upon which the pygmy 
 
399. For instance, the streaked horned lark 4(d) promulgation promised that FWS would 
“work closely with the farming community in the Willamette Valley to develop ways to monitor 
impacts on streaked horned larks from routine agricultural activities.” Determination of 
Endangered Status for the Taylor’s Checkerspot Butterfly and Threatened Status for the Streaked 
Horned Lark, 78 Fed. Reg. 61,452, 61,501 (Oct. 3, 2013). Further research should be done to 
determine whether the Service followed through on such unenforceable promises upon which 
adaptive management depends.  
400. See generally Byron K. Williams, Robert C. Szaro, & Carl D. Shapiro, Adaptive 
Management: The U.S. Department of the Interior Technical Guide, U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
INTERIOR (2009), https://www.fwspubs.org/doi/suppl/10.3996/072017-JFWM-
059/suppl_file/10.3996072017-jfwm-059.s4.pdf [https://perma.cc/WW8G-HELZ] (providing the 
authoritative guide for design and implementation of adaptive management in natural resources 
administration). 
401. Habitat Conservation Planning and Incidental Take Permit Processing Handbook, 
supra note 82,  ch. 9.0. 
402. Evans et al., supra note 398, at 18-21.  
403. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(1)(B)(ii) (2018). 
404. See Regulations for Prohibitions to Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 84 Fed. Reg. 
44,753, , 44,755 (Aug. 27, 2019). 
405. Again, here, the Services could borrow from the HCP handbook. Habitat 
Conservation Planning and Incidental Take Permit Processing Handbook, supra note 82, at ch. 
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sculpin depend, discussed in Section III.B.3, would relieve our concern that 
nearby development and climate change will undermine the conservation 
promise of the special exception. 
Even the best metrics are useless unless someone collects data to 
indicate whether a protective regulation is making conservation progress. 
We found seventy-seven exceptions directly requiring monitoring and ten 
based on plans that require reporting. Sustaining monitoring programs is a 
big challenge for agencies with small budgets that suffer unpredictable 
variations in annual appropriations. Protective regulations already enlist 
private or state help in monitoring.406 Still, 4(d) rules will never entirely 
relieve the Services of oversight and sponsoring research to better 
understand the causes of species decline.407 
Unexamined monitoring data cannot shed light on the effectiveness 
of conservation. Adaptive management scholarship criticizes the dearth of 
clear triggers for modifying plans, programs, and actions.408 Only eleven 
protective regulations (Table 6) contain a standard for triggering review of 
conservation effectiveness. Without such triggers, regulatory regimes 
linger to the detriment of species and the public that bears the cost of the 
resulting increased imperilment.409 
Sometimes identifying a trigger acceptable to all collaborators is not 
possible because of information gaps or disagreements about recovery 
standards. In that case, the Services should establish hard deadlines to 
force reevaluation of a rule’s effectiveness and—if necessary—restarting 
the collaborative process.410 Sunset provisions establish an expiration date 
for some authority, such as a statute or a regulation.411 They are common 
in 10(j) rules. They are rare in the 4(d) rules but should be more common 
incentives to assess progress. The ESA requires the Services to reevaluate 
the status of all listed species every five years.412 That establishes a schedule 
 
10.5.1 (illustrating triggers with Montana’s Native Fish HCP, which requires mitigation actions if 
stream temperature increases by 1.0° C.). 
406. See, e.g., 50 C.F.R. § 17.40(g)(iii)(D) (2019) (limiting Utah prairie dog exceptions to 
a percentage of a baseline population determined by the state wildlife agency’s surveys).  
407. The most rigorous models for monitoring and oversight remain the FWS coastal 
California gnatcatcher rule and the NMFS anadromous fish rule. §§ 17.41(b), 223.203. 
408. Nie & Schultz, supra note 238; Fischman & Ruhl, supra note 237 (identifying as 
shortcomings of federal agency practice of adaptive management the lack of clear objectives and 
processes, monitoring thresholds, and defined actions triggered by thresholds). 
409. Li, supra note 151, at 15. 
410. See, e.g., 50 C.F.R. § 223.203(b)(2)(ii) (2019) (providing revocation of a take-by-
harvest exception if the NMFS does not receive the plan by a particular date). 
411. See Justin Pidot, Governance and Uncertainty, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 113 (2016). 
412. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(c)(2) (2018). As with so many deadlines in federal environmental 
law, appropriations have not kept up with statutory mandates. As a result of higher priorities, 
especially writing recovery plans, the FWS has not kept pace with the statutory command to 
review listings every five years, and current data suggest more species are overdue for review than 
have experienced timely reviews. To track the status of reviews, see ESA 5-year Status Review 
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for review that can be used in sunset timing. A sunset provision might also 
spur collaborators to act expeditiously to implement their promised 
conservation measures in order to show progress by the time the rule 
expires and needs renewal. Because both Services now apply no take 
prohibitions to threatened listings without protective regulations, simple 
expiration dates no longer suffice. Instead, protective regulations need to 
specify default protections if collaborative efforts fail to achieve 
conservation metrics.413 
D. Enforcement 
The section 9 prohibitions are notoriously difficult to enforce. 
Harmed animals may be hard to locate. Once found, proximately 
connecting the harms to some responsible party may be impossible.414 
Section 4(d) rules that establish liability shields for economic activities 
offer a clear refuge for parties wishing to avoid violating prohibitions. But 
others willing to take the risk of exposing themselves to broader ESA 
section 9 prohibitions may face only small likelihoods of detection and 
prosecution. Scarce investigative resources compound the difficulty of 
demonstrating proximate cause. Collaboration, while necessary to bring 
diverse interests together to implement recovery programs, also builds 
relationships where enforcement may seem like a double cross, or at least 
a betrayal of the collaborative spirit. On the other hand, collaboration 
creates a community of insiders motivated to monitor and enforce 
prohibitions on actors who do not contribute to the program or renege on 
commitments.415 
An important counterweight to timid federal enforcement is the 
powerful citizen suit provision that allows any person to commence a civil 
suit to enjoin any other person from violating a section 9 prohibition or a 
4(d) rule.416 The expense of litigation precludes most people from 
considering citizen enforcement, but some environmental groups have 
 
Dashboard, DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE: CTR. FOR CONSERVATION INNOVATION, 
https://defenders-cci.org/app/five_year_review [https://perma.cc/7AK7-JU8W].  
413.  See, e. g., 50 C.F.R. § 223.203(b)(2)(ii) (2019) (revoking a take exception if the 
Service failed to receive an adequate resource management plan by a certain time). 
414. See, e.g., Aransas Project v. Shaw, 756 F.3d 801 (5th Cir. 2014) (reversing a district 
court finding that state permits allowing water diversions proximately caused the deaths of 23 
endangered whooping cranes downstream during a drought).  
415. Insiders police collaborations against encroachment from outsiders. See, e.g., 
OSTROM, supra note 126, 62; Maria Damon et al. Grandfathering: Environmental Uses and 
Impacts, 13 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 23, 29-30 (2019). Collaborators police themselves to 
ensure that insiders do not cheat. See, e.g., OSTROM, supra note 126, at 67-69.  
416. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2018). Citizens acting as private attorneys general must provide 
notice to the federal government of the alleged violation. The federal government then has sixty 
days to preclude citizen enforcement by filing its own enforcement action. If it does not, the private 
suit may move ahead. Id. § 1540(g)(2). 
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experienced success.417 The citizen suit provision allows parties outside of 
the collaborative community to ensure that participants are held to the 
promises reflected in 4(d) rules. This is especially true if rules precisely 
delineate the boundaries between exceptions and prohibited actions. 
The Services should build on existing exceptions that convert the 
foreseeable causation needed to enforce take prohibitions on habitat 
degradation into clear planning maps and behavioral mandates. Outcome-
based section 9 prohibitions present difficult burdens of proximate proof. 
The stochastic and indirect relationship between any particular habitat 
modification and actual species harm confounds proof of a take.418 It is 
much easier to monitor compliance with adherence to land use 
development zones and required practices. 
There is a trade-off between the certainty that landowners and 
businesses seek through special exceptions and the adaptation needed to 
continually adjust activities to new information from monitoring. Too 
much certainty for stakeholders can lead to conservation failure. Too much 
adaptation by agencies may lead collaborating stakeholders to abandon 
their support because the “time and emotional energy” required exceeds 
the risk of enforcement.419 One approach to balance those competing 
interests is to promote planning that generates the specifics of how 
activities may qualify for a liability shield. With oversight and periodic 
concurrence from the Service, the collaborators on the plan may 
themselves define and modify practices. In the absence of plans, the 
Services should define practices in detail in the 4(d) rules themselves. The 
examples we discuss in our results, such as for the Mazama pocket gopher 
exception for farming practices, point toward the greater clarity we 
suggest.420 
E.  Delisting Trials 
A 4(d) rule may serve as a trial for downlisting, where an endangered 
species is moved to the threatened list, or delisting, where a species is 
removed entirely from the ambit of ESA protection.421 Just as CCAs 
negotiated before listing may test conservation approaches that may then 
be incorporated into 4(d) rules after listing, delisting approaches may be 
incorporated into 4(d) rules to create incentives for conservation 
experiments. Both delisting and downlisting require rulemakings that 
 
417. See, e.g., Marbled Murrelet v Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 1996). 
418. See Fischman, The Divides of Environmental Law and the Problem of Harm in the 
Endangered Species Act, supra note 66. 
419. Bradshaw, Agency Engagement, supra note 7, at 447. 
420. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.40(a)(4)(ii)(D) (2019); supra text accompanying note 220.  
421. Stoellinger et al., supra note 324, at 204; Li, supra note 151, at 13. 
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consider the same risk factors that previously justified listing.422 In addition 
to factors relating to habitat, over-exploitation, and disease, the ESA 
requires the Service to evaluate the “inadequacy of existing regulatory 
mechanisms” and other threats undermining species viability.423 A 4(d) 
rule may harness collaborative governance to test the effectiveness of new 
regulatory mechanisms and habitat management practices. 
When a species reaches its ESA recovery goal, the Service “delists” 
it. However, delisting is a dramatic toggle that poses risks for species reliant 
on the legal protections of the ESA in order to sustain populations.424 The 
Services often predicate delisting rules on the attainment of population 
targets established in recovery plans.425 If those targets are reached only 
because of ongoing ESA programs, then delisting could undermine the 
progress already achieved. One approach to prevent backsliding after 
delisting is for states to fill the regulatory gap left when the ESA no longer 
protects a species.426 Still, applicable state law may vary, implementation 
may be unenthusiastic, and states often allow takes prohibited by the 
ESA.427 
A 4(d) rule can assist in transitioning species like the gray wolf off the 
ESA list. One approach would be to downlist the wolf before delisting it. 
The downlisting would allow the Service to promulgate a rule that mimics 
the regulatory approach to takings that would ultimately apply when the 
species is delisted. The Services should take advantage of the flexibility of 
the threatened status to downlist before delisting when private takes 
(including incidental habitat degradation) present an ongoing risk to 
species viability.428 Even threatened species, though, would benefit from a 
transitional 4(d) rule that mimics the state regulatory regime.429 
Delisting and downlisting are vitally important to sustaining political 
support for the ESA, as they demonstrate tangible success in conservation 
and recovery. But durable success, where a delisted species continues to 
recede from imperiled status, is best achieved through adaptive 
 
422. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1) (2018). 
423. Id. 
424. J. Michael Scott et al. demonstrate the falsehood of the ESA’s underlying 
assumption that “once recovery goals for a species are met it will no longer require continuing 
management” for 84% of listed species. Conservation-reliant Species and the Future of 
Conservation, 3 CONSERVATION LETTERS 91 (2010). 
425. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(1); see, e.g., Removal of the Louisiana Black Bear from the 
Federal List of Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, 81 Fed. Reg. 13,124 (Mar. 11, 2016). 
426. See § 1533(a)(1)(D) (providing that adequate state “regulatory mechanisms” may 
be a basis for revising the status of a species).  
427. See Fischman et al., supra note 18. 
428. Listed species whose habitat occurs mostly on federal land or whose habitat is 
affected mostly through activities subject to federal permits are not as well-suited for delisting 
experimentation, because section 7 applies strictly to both endangered and threatened species. See 
Stoellinger et al., supra note 324, at 204; Li, supra note 151, at 13. 
429. See, e.g., Proposed Reclassification of the Red-Cockaded Woodpecker From 
Endangered to Threatened with a Section 4(d) Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. 63,474 (Oct. 8, 2020).. 
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management. An effective first step would be to use 4(d) rules to pilot post-
listing prohibitions and programs. If monitored, the 4(d) trial may be fine-
tuned at the time of delisting.430 We agree with Stoellinger et al. that 
delisting trials should involve cooperation with states to implement 
management plans that could endure after final delisting.431 Innovative 
4(d) experimentation might subject different populations to different 
potential post-listing regimes to test the relative effectiveness of 
approaches that states might adopt. 
Conclusion 
Habitat loss and degradation imperil most species currently on the 
brink of extinction in the United States. Collaborative governance can 
tailor recovery solutions to fit the shared problem of improving habitat. 
Our study reveals specific methods that can be expanded through shared 
management of habitat resources. But our recommendations call for much 
broader adoption of tools to generate more motivation and commitment 
for stakeholders to act. 
The greatest weakness of the ESA is not its content but rather its 
context. It stands isolated, with few other federal programs to prevent 
species from declining into its domain. When invoked, it dramatically, even 
rudely, shifts the regulatory environment into a new phase, triggering 
resentment and—sometimes—hardship. States remain largely responsible 
for preventing species from slipping to the brink of extinction. Yet, states 
allocate little money to reverse population declines and habitat 
degradation. Without significant infusions of money for states, the forecast 
indicates a flood of ESA listings for increasingly imperiled species. States 
do not welcome the listings, but they cannot afford to prevent the listings. 
Service directors do not want to promulgate all the listings, but the science 
compels them to do so. 
Avoiding species extinctions requires undoing, in many cases, 
centuries of habitat degradation. The cost of achieving the ESA’s “no 
extinctions” policy must be borne by somebody and over a long period of 
time. Private landowners object to paying for recovery without 
concomitant private benefit. Sharing the recovery burden seems the best 
path forward. Short of giving up on the congressional commitment to avoid 
extinctions, collaboration is essential to balance trade-offs between 
increased regulatory pressure on the private sector and greater 
government subsidies, grants, and budgets. 
Our research demonstrates that collaborative governance guides 
many elements of the protective regulations covering threatened species. 
 
430. See Li, supra note 151, at 13. 
431. Stoellinger et al., supra note 324, at 204. 
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Our recommendations point the way to negotiating more deals that 
employ incremental, tailored approaches in place of the dramatic disparity 
between unlisted status and endangered species prohibitions. Our most 
important result is that almost three-quarters of protective regulations 
substitute practice-based limitations for difficult-to-detect proximate 
consequences of an activity. In that respect, collaborative governance 
transforms the ESA from a statute that prohibits biological entities from 
crossing invisible ecological thresholds (i.e., harm, jeopardy, recovery 
impairment) into a regulatory program insisting on best practices. Greater 
compliance with collaboratively crafted, practice-based conservation 
requirements may improve the prospect for recovery, even if they are less 
stringent than the standard statutory prohibitions. That is a paragon of the 
“win-win” scenario often promised by supporters of collaborative 
governance. 
The ESA’s protective regulations offer lessons for collaborative 
governance. Most U.S. legislation and administrative programs dealing 
with collaborative governance focus on procedures and feel-good 
encouragement. But our study insists that prohibitive backstops provide 
traction for collaborative governance requiring stakeholder sacrifice. 
Understanding how collaborative governance can promote conservation 
effectiveness while still accommodating the interests of stakeholders 
requires detailed case studies that trace the arc of a process over several 
iterations.432 This Article comprehensively documents ongoing recovery 
experiments through protective regulations that should be compared 
through longitudinal research employing congruent rubrics. 
The collaborative governance literature teaches that behind the 
tentative successes, promising approaches, and skepticism that surround 
protective regulations is the need to craft incentives. Any statutory reforms 
that relieve the private sector of responsibilities for recovering imperiled 
species would reduce the motivation for participating in collaborations 
either to avoid listing or to recover already listed species. Flexibility to 
tailor rules must be constrained to avoid creating a carte blanche for 
continuing activities that thwart conservation. But collaborative rules must 
also offer some certainty to the regulated community that it can shoulder 
its share of the costs associated with recovery. 
Appendix 
The Appendix supplements the information above by providing 
details on the method of our empirical analysis of protective regulations 
and also introducing interested readers to the data spreadsheet. 
 
432. Emerson, Nabatchi & Balogh, supra note 7, at 10. 
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I. Supplemental Information About Domain and Method 
We reviewed all species-specific FWS and NMFS 4(d) and 10(j) rules 
in force as of September 26, 2019, the date that the FWS reversed its 
default approach of applying all section 9 prohibitions unless excepted by 
a protective regulation. We do not evaluate rules that are no longer in force 
because of delisting or judicial vacatur. Our domain includes all animal 
species that occur in the United States and its territories outside of 
captivity. Because our focus is on incidental takes and habitat 
conservation, we exclude protective regulations with only extraterritorial 
application, generally dealing with solely commerce in wildlife.433  Though 
ESA section 4(d) does apply to plants, the Services promulgated no extant 
rules tailoring section 9 prohibitions to particular listed plants during the 
time frame of our study. During the timeframe of our study, the FWS 
extended to all threatened plants a blanket limit to the statutory 
application of endangered prohibitions for seeds of “cultivated origin” and 
for state agency employees or agents acting under the terms of a section 6 
cooperative agreement who remove and reduce to possession plants from 
federal lands.434   
All the coding decisions we make with respect to 4(d) rules also apply 
to 10(j) rules. When we refer to 4(d) rules or regulations, we mean also to 
include 10(j) rules and regulations. Both tailor prohibitions to a listed 
species (or experimental subset). Though we coded the two types of 
tailoring rules the same way, our tables and discussion frequently separate 
4(d) rules from 10(j) rules to show how they sometimes differ. With a few 
notable exceptions, such as the Mexican and red wolf reintroduction 
programs, experimental population regulations tend to be less 
controversial and more accommodating of landowners. Where the Services 
promulgate both a 4(d) and a 10(j) rule for the same species, such as the 
grizzly bear, we count them as two separate rules because they appear in 
two different sections of the Code of Federal Regulations (Code).435   
In examining rules, we drew from the Code to ensure that we captured 
any revisions accumulated since initial promulgation. Other than the 
information referenced in our analysis of the conservation shortcomings in 
Section III.B, we limited our analysis of the rules to the material in the 
Code itself. We did not examine documents, such as plans or best practices, 
referenced in a rule. Similarly, we did not examine state laws and 
 
433. See, e.g., 50 C.F.R. § 17.40(m)(2) (2019) (setting out tailored prohibitions that allow 
some trade in vicuna products, such as raw wool, wool cloth, and handicraft products). 
434. § 17.71 
435.  § 17.40(b) (grizzly bear 4(d) rule); § 17.84(l) (grizzly bear 10(j) rule). This is also the 
practice of the Services in the official ESA list § 17.11(h), which count 10(j) populations in a 
separate species line from threatened species. 
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regulations, such as fishing restrictions, which serve as standards in many 
rules.  
We refer to a particular attribute we analyzed in coding as a variable. 
We interpreted each exception to code it with a value that sorted each 
variable into two or more categories.  
We read, coded, and cross-checked all of the extant content of the 
rule, as published in the Code as of September 26, 2019. For our qualitative 
analysis of conservation shortcomings in Section III.B, we supplemented 
this content with the supporting materials included in Federal Register 
notices and secondary sources. 
II. Data and Values Spreadsheet 
We provide as a separate, Excel document, the data we collected. 
While limitations of publishing preclude its inclusion in this document, it is 
available on request from Robert Fischman at rfischma@indiana.edu. The 
spreadsheet tabs contain a row for each of the exceptions in protective 
regulations. The columns display the variables we coded.  
 
 
 
